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Abstract 
 
 
 In this dissertation I argue that a new cinematic apparatus [dispositif] has 
appeared in the last three decades that ties the ontology of the medium to the 
precarious physical life of celluloid. I refer to this apparatus as the “new materialism” 
of cinema. The dissertation traces the development of this apparatus around film 
heritage and film restoration, and in the context of post-Fordism, that is, the post-
industrialization of the global economy. I argue that this materialism, which centers on 
the conservation of celluloid as the material artifact of a fading era, points to 
significant new forms and functions of cinema. In the first half of the dissertation this 
argument is developed vis-à-vis several recent experimental films and in terms of what 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
calls “intangible heritage.” As intangible heritage, the history of cinema takes the form 
of a living archive of values, norms, and communicative procedures. This archive, I 
argue, is becoming directly integrated into the production of capital, and of social life 
more generally, and thus forms a new nexus of economic exploitation and political 
struggle. The second half of the dissertation examines how the dynamics of heritage 
are crystallized in, and shaped by, film restoration. For example, in the “before and 
after” demonstrations featured on many DVDs of restored films the image is posited 
as a material remnant of the past that is absorbed into the present and made viable for 
new markets. This process occurs through the application of technical expertise, rather 
than the traditional processes of mechanical duplication. Alongside such promotional 
materials, the dissertation also examines restoration through its effects on film form, 
focusing on restored versions of Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1996) and Fritz Lang’s 
Metropolis (2010). I contend that restoration creates an image with a peculiar 
ontology, which simultaneously invokes the authenticity of a photographic original 
and the interactive surfaces of new media. This image dramatically alters the 
construction of time in restored films and reflects structural shifts in the temporality of 
work. Overall, the dissertation provides both an original historical account of how 
cinema was re-imagined amidst pronouncements of the death of the medium, as well 
as a new type of historical materialism that links the details of cinematic form to 
emerging modes of labor. 
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Introduction 
On the (New) Materialism of Cinema 
 
 
 
 
 
Cinema is the art of moving image destruction.  
 —Paolo Cherchi Usai, The Death of Cinema 
 
 
The production of capital is, ever more clearly 
and directly today, the production of social life. 
 —Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude 
 
 
 
 
 In this dissertation the phrase “materialism of cinema” has two meanings. 
These two meanings are interrelated, mutually determining, and everywhere 
coextensive. Nonetheless, I will here hold these two meanings apart temporarily for 
the sake of clarity, and by way of introduction. On the one hand, the materialism of 
cinema constitutes the subject, or topic, of the project. In this first sense, it refers to a 
variety of filmic practices and discourses on film at the end of the twentieth century 
and the beginning of the twenty-first that foreground the physical characteristics of 
cinematic technology. On the other hand, the materialism of cinema is the idiom, or 
analytic, I use to engage this subject. This is a historical materialism: an 
understanding of all matter and materiality as produced by labor, which is to say, 
social relations. The main goal of this dissertation is to show how the first materialism, 
 
 
2 
which tends in many cases to lean towards positivism and thus a certain brand of 
idealism, can nonetheless open onto new historical materialist approach to cinema. 
I will refer to the first materialism as the new materialism of cinema.1 As with 
all such formulations, the “new” here is overdetermined and somewhat precarious; it 
refers less to some kind of absolute break than to a recent permutation of the 
problematic of the materialism of cinema. In the broadest sense, what is new is the 
social and historical context in which this materialism is situated, but there also more 
specific dimensions to the newness of this materialism. In this dissertation, the two 
foci for investigating the new materialism of cinema are film heritage and film 
restoration, particularly in the context of North America and Europe. I will return to 
heritage and restoration below. 
First, it will be useful to outline the new materialism of cinema in a more 
general way, beginning in the realm of film theory. Indeed, it is in film theory, where 
one finds what is arguably the most brash and provocative expression of this new 
                                                
1 In addition to indicating a periodization, I also use this term to connote a broad resonance (as 
in a low frequency wave) with “new materialism” in media studies. This latter new 
materialism is most often associated with the work of Friedrich Kittler. For an overview of 
this type of scholarship, see Bill Brown, “Materiality,” in Critical Terms For Media Studies, 
W.J.T. Mitchell and Mark B.N. Hansen, eds. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2010), 49-
63; and Jussi Parikka, What is Media Archaeology? (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2012), especially 
63-89. However, the Marxian meaning I give to materialism below diverges from the work of 
Kittler, and most of new materialism in media studies. Moreover, I use “new materialism” to 
indicate a loose affinity with the recent use of the term in philosophy, which draws heavily, as 
I do throughout this dissertation, on the work of Gilles Deleuze. See, for example, Diana 
Coole and Samantha Frost, eds. New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, Politics (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2010) ; and Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, eds. New 
Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press-
MPublishing, 2012). Again, though, my adherence to a Marxian analytic diverges from the 
majority of this scholarship. 
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materialism: Paolo Cherhi Usai’s The Death of Cinema: History, Cultural Memory 
and the Digital Dark Age, published in 2001. On the first page of this book, Cherchi 
Usai pitches the new materialism of cinema directly on the level of ontology: “Cinema 
is the art of moving image destruction.”2 This destruction is inherent to the chemical 
composition of images on celluloid such that “the moving image has a genetically 
preordained history and a limited lifespan.”3  Cherchi Usai’s description of the 
physical demise of film in his earlier book, Silent Cinema: An Introduction, serves as a 
less pithy version of this ontology:  
From the moment it is produced, film stock begins its 
decomposition process, even in the best storage 
conditions (that is, at very low temperatures and in ideal 
humidity). In the course of this process the film emits 
various gases, especially nitrogen dioxide, which 
combined with the water in the gelatin and with air 
forms nitrous acid and nitric acid. These acids corrode 
the silver salts in the emulsion, destroying the image and 
the support that bears its traces, until the film is 
completely ruined.  
    The stages of the gradual death of a film are sadly 
familiar, even if the speed of the process is, to a large 
                                                
2 Cherchi Usai, Death of Cinema, 6. 
3 Ibid., 107. 
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extent, quite unpredictable. The film shrinks, and the 
distance between perforations decreases, making 
projection impossible and copying problematic. The 
emulsion becomes sticky and it is increasingly difficult 
to unroll the film. Then eruptions of soft dark matter 
form on the surface of the reels. This continues until the 
film becomes an indistinct mass covered by a brown 
crust. In the final phase of decay, the film is reduced to a 
whitish mass, or even to a powder.4 
Here Cherchi Usai is writing specifically of cellulose nitrate, which was the dominant 
film stock until the mid-twentieth century. In addition to chemical decomposition, the 
destruction of nitrate was often hastened by its notorious flammability—it is able to 
self-ignite at three-hundred degrees, burns twenty times faster than wood, and emits 
enough oxygen to continue burning underwater, making it nearly impossible to 
extinguish.5 Tales of horrific fires in early cinemas are numerous, the most famous 
occurring in the spring of 1897, when some 121 people were killed at a charity bazaar 
in Paris. Such incidences led to the eventual banning of nitrate and its replacement 
with acetate. While acetate, or “safety film,” is far less flammable, it is still prone to 
decay. In fact, the “vinegar syndrome” (a term coined by film archivists in the 1980s 
in reference the odor of the destructive acids produced naturally over time by acetate) 
                                                
4 Cherchi Usai, Silent Cinema, 12-13. 
5 Slide, Nitrate Won’t Wait, 1-3. 
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is thought to corrode safety film at an even faster rate than nitrate. Color fading is also 
a major part of the decomposition of acetate, and can appear in as little as five years. 
In the case of both acetate and nitrate, decay can be slowed but never actually stopped. 
Cherchi Usai’s work exemplifies how the new materialism of cinema breaks 
with the two most influential and well-known materialist philosophies of the medium, 
those of André Bazin and Walter Benjamin. In “The Ontology of the Photographic 
Image,” Bazin defines cinema in terms of the indexical quality of photographic 
images, that is, the physical inscription of light onto the emulsion; the photographic 
image and the thing photographed, Bazin argues, “share a common being, after the 
fashion of a fingerprint.”6 For Bazin, the photographic image “embalms time, rescuing 
it simply from its power of corruption;” in the case of photography the image shares in 
and preserves the being of the thing photographed at a specific moment, while in 
cinema, “the image of things is likewise the image of their duration, change 
mummified as it were.”7 Bazin thereby links cinema to the practice of mummification 
in ancient Egypt; of this practice, Bazin asserts: “by providing a defense against the 
passage of time it satisfied a basic psychological need in man, for death is but the 
victory of time.”8 In contrast, in Cherchi Usai mortality and the irreversible flux of 
change is shifted onto the substance of the image itself. The paradigm of a defense 
against death and time thus moves from the creation of an image, that is, the 
inscription of duration on celluloid, to the care of the image, or, from preservation on 
                                                
6 Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 15. 
7 Ibid., 14-5. 
8 Ibid., 9.  
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the image to conservation of the image. For his part, Cherchi Usai, at the end of The 
Death of Cinema, understands this paradigm not as embalming, but rather in terms of 
“a physician who has accepted the inevitability of death even while he continues to 
fight for the patient’s life.”9 
Furthermore, the focus on the instability of the material substrate of the image 
throws any axiomatic identity of copies into question, as the destruction of images on 
celluloid varies wildly. Differences in temperature and humidity, for instance, shape 
the rates and patterns of chemical decomposition. There is also the variable wear 
caused by running a print through a projector; as Vincent Pinel suggests, in a phrase 
that resonates with Cherchi Usai’s materialism, the projector is a “veritable scratching, 
ripping and grinding machine.”10 Cherchi Usai thus concludes: “Every print of a film 
is a unique object, with its own physical and aesthetic characteristics, and should not 
be treated as identical to other prints with the same title.”11 This statement runs in the 
opposite direction of the argument in Benjamin’s essay, “Art in the Age of Its 
Technological Reproducibility.” Benjamin grounds his observations on the social, 
historical, and political impact of cinema in the mechanical reproduction of the 
photographic image. Benjamin writes of this technology: “By replicating the work 
                                                
9 Cherchi Usai, Death of Cinema, 105. Murray Pomerance offers another metaphor for this 
new paradigm: “It is therefore a horticulture of sorts, invoking a millennial pastoralism or new 
ecological piety that privileges care for what has already been ‘planted’ over the yearning to 
plant anew.” “The Man Who Wanted to Go Back,” 48.  
10 Vincent Pinel, “Restoration,” 81.  
11 Cherchi Usai, Silent Cinema, 147.  
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many times over it substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence.”12 Benjamin 
contends that such reproducibility ushers in a new epoch of art wherein the unique 
physical existence of an artwork and notion of an authentic “original,” which he 
famously describes in terms of the work’s “aura”—“all that is transmissible in it from 
its origin on, ranging from its physical duration to the historical testimony relating to 
it”—becomes insignificant.13 Cherchi Usai employs a similar idea, but to the opposite 
effect, when he calls for a film history based on the “‘internal history’ of the copy: the 
history of the places where it was shown and kept…the history of the changes that 
have taken place within the object in the course of time; the history of its progressive 
self-destruction, and perhaps, of its final disappearance before it could be restored.”14        
 To be sure, this materialist view of film as physical stuff with a substantive 
duration of its own is not entirely new. For instance, in separate works of film history, 
Penelope Houston, Anthony Slide, and most recently, Caroline Frick, have shown how 
this approach to cinema has been prevalent throughout the twentieth century within 
the world of film archives.15 What is new is the way in which, over the last few 
decades, this materialism has proliferated across and created resonances between a 
panoply of idioms, institutions, and forms. The new materialism of cinema thus 
designates a loose, but narrowly focused, social machine, or apparatus, that has been 
                                                
12 Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” 104. 
13 Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” 103.  
14 Cherchi Usai, Silent Cinema, 12. 
15 See Keepers of the Frame: The Film Archives; Nitrate Won’t Wait: A History of Film 
Preservation in the United States; and Saving Cinema: The Politics of Preservation, 
respectively.  
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articulated to the broader apparatus of cinema. Elaborating on his use of the term 
‘apparatus’ [dispositif ] Michel Foucault states: 
 What I’m trying to pick out with this term is…a 
thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of 
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic 
propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. 
Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus 
itself is the system [le réseau] of relations that can be 
established between these elements…a particular 
discourse can figure at one time as the programme of an 
institution, and at another it can function as a means of 
justifying or masking a practice which itself remains 
silent, or as a secondary re-interpretation of this practice, 
opening out for it a new field of rationality. In short, 
between these elements, whether discursive or non-
discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of 
position and modifications of function which can also 
vary very wildly.16  
                                                
16 Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh,” 194-5. For a compact genealogy of this concept 
and an argument for of its relevance to contemporary society, see Giorgio Agamben, “What is 
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I use ‘apparatus’ here in the same way as Foucault and in contrast to ‘apparatus 
theory’ in film studies, which tends to gravitate towards a single concrete element, 
namely technology itself.17 Thus, as an apparatus, the new materialism of cinema is a 
network of relations between an array of elements including film theory, film history, 
and archival theory, as well as federal legislation, major film studios, national 
archives, non-governmental organizations, cable television, DVDs, behind-the-scenes 
documentaries, restorations of “classic” movies, and experimental films. What gives 
consistency to this apparatus and makes it congeal is a recognition or theorization, 
highly variable in its terms and intent, of the physical lives of moving images on 
celluloid.  
 In an essay on Foucault, Gilles Deleuze describes the apparatus as a 
“multilinear ensemble” consisting of a variety of different dimensions, or lines. In 
every apparatus, the visible and the sayable, or what Deleuze describes as “curves of 
visibility and curves of enunciation…machines which make one see and speak,” 
compose two such dimensions.18 In the most immediate sense, what the new 
materialism I am describing makes visible and speakable is cinema. For instance, the 
ontological declaration of what cinema is, such as “Cinema is the art of moving image 
destruction,” constitutes a particularly dense point on the line of enunciation of this 
apparatus, with which other statements intersect at more or less oblique angles—e.g. 
                                                                                                                                       
an Apparatus?” in What Is An Apparatus? And Other Essays, translated by David Kishik and 
Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 1-24. 
17 See, for example, Teresa De Lauretis and Stephen Heath, eds. The Cinematic Apparatus.  
18 Deleuze, “What is a dispositif?” 159, 160. 
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Martin Scorsese’s statement in the preface to The Death of Cinema: “Film 
preservation has become a relevant item in the cultural agenda of our times.” For the 
most part, I will focus throughout this dissertation on the dimension of visibility that 
cuts across this apparatus. Visibility, Deleuze writes, “is made of lines of light which 
form variable shapes inseparable from the apparatus in question. Each apparatus has 
its way of structuring light, the way in which it falls, blurs and disperses, distributing 
the visible and the invisible, giving birth the objects which are dependent on it for 
their existence, and causing them to disappear.”19 Drawing on Foucault, Deleuze cites 
painting and architecture as two elements making up the line of visibility. In the 
chapters that follow, I approach visibility through film form. Through analysis of a 
relatively small number of films, I take an intensive rather than extensive approach to 
the new materialism of cinema; rather than provide an aerial survey, as it were, of this 
apparatus, I instead try to burrow into the line of visibility. As Deleuze writes, “in 
every apparatus [dispositif] the lines break through thresholds,” such that there is 
“drifting, transformations, and mutations” between them.20 Thus, in closely following 
the line of visibility I will also crisscross the heterogeneous set of elements listed 
above.  
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
                                                
19 Deleuze, “What is a dispositif?” 160. 
20 Ibid. 
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 I stated above that a large part of what is “new” about this materialism is its 
historical context. Foucault suggests one way of contextualizing an apparatus when he 
writes, “I understand by the term ‘apparatus’ a sort of—shall we say—formation 
which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an 
urgent need.”21 In terms of the new materialism of cinema, such a need is captured by 
the phrase, “Nitrate Won’t Wait!” Writing in the 1990s, Anthony Slide argues: 
“‘Nitrate Won’t Wait!’ has become the rallying cry for film archivists in their efforts 
to raise funds as well as public consciousness of the need for such funds in the 
preservation of the world’s film heritage.”22 According to Slide, this phrase was 
coined in the late 1960s by Sam Kula, archivist for the American Film Institute (AFI) 
from 1968-1973, at a conference organized by the International Federation of Film 
Archives (FIAF). Another important FIAF conference in this regard was that held in 
Brighton in 1978, which, Thomas Elsaesser writes, “brought together for the first time 
archivists and film scholars around a common purpose.”23 Featuring several hundred 
films from the period 1900-6, lent by archives from around the world, the conference 
has now become famous for sparking a re-appraisal of early cinema in film studies. In 
the introduction to a collection of some of the most noteworthy scholarship to emerge 
after Brighton, Elsaesser frames the conference in a way that resonates with Kula’s 
slogan:    
                                                
21 Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh,” 195. 
22 Slide, Nitrate Won’t Wait, 1. 
23 Elsaesser, “General Introduction,” 2. 
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The Brighton meeting was itself symptomatic of a new 
urgency felt by film archives about the preservation and 
accessibility of materials from the early period. The 
urgency was partly a response to specific crises (the 
Langlois affair in 1968 [when the Cinémathèque 
française was seized by the French government], various 
disastrous fires, the lifespan of nitrate film coming to an 
end), and also reflected the increased call made on all 
kinds of audio-visual records by television, with its 
appetite for authentic archive footage in political, 
documentary, biographical, [and] education 
programming…Hence the need for an 
internationalization of research, and collaboration 
between archivists and scholars.24  
From this perspective, Brighton was also significant for exposing academics to the 
exigency of archival discourse. 
 Throughout the 1980s and 90s this sense of urgency became particularly 
prevalent in the United States. As Caroline Frick observes, “[w]ith coverage in 
technical journals, Hollywood trade press, and even national gossip and entertainment 
magazines, the message that American film heritage was on the verge of extinction 
                                                
24 Elsaesser, “General Introduction,” 2, my emphasis.  
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resonated amid all levels of U.S. press discourse.”25 Much of this discourse clustered 
around Ted Turner’s plans in the late 80s to colorize much of the MGM film 
catalogue, which I will discuss in chapter one. The AFI—established in 1967 in large 
part to facilitate film preservation—was also a crucial node in this discourse, as were 
the public efforts of Scorsese.26 In 1980 Scorsese presented a program on color fading 
titled, “The Moving Image: Cultural Suicide,” at the Venice Film Festival and the 
New York Film Festival, prompting an article in the New York Times with the 
headline, “Martin Scorsese’s Campaign to Save Film Heritage.” By the end of the 
decade, he was making similar presentations in Washington D.C. as part of a lobby for 
federal legislation on film preservation; in 1990 he established The Film Foundation, a 
non-profit organization whose mission is, as Scorsese describes it in the preface to The 
Death of Cinema, “to raise funds and awareness of the urgent need to preserve motion 
picture history.”27 The Film Foundation’s partners now include, among others, Sony 
Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Turner Classic Movies, IBM, Gucci, Vanity Fair, 
and the Louis B. Mayer Foundation. Other indicators of the pressing nature of film 
decay during this time are numerous. For example: in 1988, the U.S. Congress 
established the National Film Preservation Board; the same year, Paramount began 
construction of a high-tech vault for storage of its film catalogue; in 1989, Universal 
                                                
25 Frick, Saving Cinema, 80.  
26 On the AFI’s role in this discourse, see Slide, 74-88. The press release for the creation of the 
AFI clearly reflects the new materialist paradigm: “It is as important to conserve as to create, 
and the founders wish emphatically to bring attention, as others have before, to the necessity 
of preserving this Nation’s film heritage.” Qtd. in Slide, 75. 
27 Scorsese, “Preface.” 
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commissioned a study on the state of its archival holdings, which led to the 
construction of an official studio archive in 1998; in 1994 the Library of Congress, in 
consultation with the National Film Preservation Board, published a “national plan” 
for film preservation; and in 1994 and 1996, Warner Brothers and Fox, respectively, 
created new positions for film archivists.28 
 Another component of the need that has fueled the new materialism of cinema 
is the discourse of the “death of cinema.” In February of 1996, Susan Sontag 
published an article in the New York Times Magazine titled, “The Decay of Cinema.” 
In the first line of this article, Sontag writes: “Cinema’s 100 years seem to have the 
shape of a life cycle: an inevitable birth, the steady accumulation of glories and the 
onset in the last decade of an ignominious, irreversible decline.”29 For Sontag, the 
dwindling standards of quality and hugely expanding expectations for profit had, by 
cinema’s centenary, made the creation of ambitious and artistically innovative films 
nearly impossible. Moreover, Sontag argues, cinephilia “has come under attack, as 
something quaint, outmoded, snobbish;” and if “cinephilia is dead, the movies are 
dead too, no matter how many movies, even very good ones, go on being made.”30 
Sontag certainly was not alone in expressing these views. Looking back to the “pre-
millennial cultural moment,” Stefan Jovanovic notes the “proliferation of academic 
                                                
28 For a detailed account of Universal’s preservation efforts, see Jan-Christopher Horak, “The 
Hollywood History Business,” in The End of Cinema as We Know It: American Film in the 
Nineties, edited by Jon Lewis (New York: NYU Press, 2001), 33-42. The full text of the 
Library of Congress’ “national plan” can be found at http://www.loc.gov/film/plan.html 
(accessed July 2, 2013). 
29 Sontag, “The Decay of Cinema.” 
30 Ibid. 
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and journalistic discussions…urgently declaring the cinema’s end to be both imminent 
and inevitable.”31 Much of this discourse centered on the rise of digital technology in 
filmmaking—in this regard, 1995 was an important year, not for the centenary of 
cinema, but for the release of the first feature film consisting entirely of computer-
generated images, Pixar’s Toy Story. In 1999, George Lucas’ Star Wars: Episode I—
The Phantom Menace and Pixar’s Toy Story 2 became the first movies to be projected 
digitally, without film. In response, famed film editor and sound designer Walter 
Murch wrote in the New York Times: “film itself, the physical medium that carried all 
these inventions uncomplainingly on its shoulders, is, at the end of the century, about 
to put down its burdens and slip away. In a few years it will become a historical 
curiosity.”32 Later that year, Godfrey Cheshire contemplated the implications of digital 
projection in a two-part article in the New York Press titled, “The Death of 
Cinema/The Decay of Cinema.” Here, Cheshire asserts: “Whatever else happens, one 
thing now is certain. Film is about to disappear over the historical horizon. It will 
always be a 20th century phenomenon.”33 In 2000, Cheshire’s piece provided the 
theme for a special colloquium at the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA), featuring, 
among others, Cheshire, cinematographer John Bailey, producer Jason Kliot, director 
Peter Bogdanovich, and the executive director of the American Museum of the 
Moving Image, Rochelle Slovin. In 2001, a collection of scholarly essays was 
published with the apocalyptic title, The End of Cinema as We Know It: American 
                                                
31 Jovanovic, “The Ending(s) of Cinema,” Part 1. 
32 Murch, “A Digital Cinema of the Mind?” 
33 Cheshire, “The Death of Cinema/The Decay of Cinema.” 
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Film in the Nineties; in the last essay of the collection, “Twenty-five Reasons Why It’s 
All Over,” Wheeler Winston Dixon writes: “Now, in the first years of the second 
century of cinema, we are faced with the inescapable fact that, at the very least, ‘film’ 
has become an altogether different medium from that imagined and practiced by its 
pioneers and classicists.”34 Of course, 2001 is also the year Cherchi Usai declared his 
own Death of Cinema. The next year, Lucas’ Star Wars: Episode II—Attack of the 
Clones became one of the first live-action films to be shot, edited, and in many cases, 
distributed and projected, almost entirely without the use of celluloid. 
 While the obsolescence of celluloid has proceeded slower than Cheshire and 
others thought, it has nonetheless proceeded, as has the often hyperbolic discourse 
around it. Thus, in The Virtual Life of Film, from 2007, D.N. Rodowick states: “The 
next ten years may witness the almost complete disappearance of celluloid film stock 
as a recording, distribution, and exhibition medium. For the avid cinephile, it is 
tempting to think about the history of this substitution as a terrifying remake of 
Invasion of the Body Snatchers.”35 In 2009, ten years after Cheshire’s article, Leo 
Enticknap takes a similar approach to digital projection in an essay in the Quarterly 
Review of Film and Video: “Film is not going to be part of mainstream popular culture 
much longer…after almost a decade of speculation as to when the mass rollout of 
digital theatre projection will begin to take a significant proportion of the market 
                                                
34 Dixon, “Twenty-five Reasons,” 356. See also Dixon’s “Vanishing Point: The Last Days of 
Film,” Senses of Cinema 43 (May 2007). http://sensesofcinema.com/2007/feature-articles/last-
days-film/ (accessed July 20, 2013). 
35 Rodowick, Virtual Life of Film, 8. 
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shared from film, that moment is now upon us.”36 In 2011, Panavision, along with 
Aaton and ARRI, announced plans to cease all production of film cameras.  
 In the same essay, Enticknap comes to the following conclusion:  
If I am correct in that within a decade, the theatrical 
projection of film prints will have ceased in all but a 
handful of cinematheques, museums and archive 
screening rooms, it will become ever more difficult for 
historians and scholars to attempt to assess the ways in 
which digital surrogates of productions originated on 
film inform the authenticity of the viewing 
experience…The disconnect between “film” as a 
specific technology and “film” as a cultural form is 
nothing new: it dates back at least to the emergence of 
consumer videotape…What makes it a pressing issue 
now is my belief that the former does finally stand on 
the verge of obsolescence as a distribution and 
exhibition medium…If this is the case, we need to 
consider what the implications are for the historical and 
cultural status of a century-long legacy of moving 
images produced using this medium...Unless archivists 
and scholars can find ways of accepting and integrating 
                                                
36 Enticknap, “Electronic Enlightenment,” 415.   
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that into their criticism and methodologies...we are 
unlikely to see any light at the end of this tunnel.37  
Enticknap provides here a fairly clear formulation of how the notion of the death of 
cinema can be levered towards a materialist view of the medium. This view is at once 
a technologically-specific ontology, as well as a kind of archaeology. This 
archaeological dimension is also invoked at the end of “Twenty-five Reasons Why It’s 
All Over,” where Dixon writes: “the classics of the past will continue to haunt us, 
informing our collective consciousness…they reveal much about ourselves as member 
of a global imagistic tribe; they tell us of our ancestors, they serve as totemic emblems 
of an earlier age.”38 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
 Another way of contextualizing the new materialism of cinema is indicated in 
“The Decay of Cinema” when Sontag writes, “[i]t’s not that you can’t look forward 
anymore to new films that you can admire. But such films not only have to be 
exceptions…They have to be actual violations of the norms and practices that now 
govern movie making everywhere in the capitalist and would-be capitalist world—
which is to say, everywhere.”39 Put differently, every contemporary apparatus is 
embedded within the array of interlocking apparatuses of global capital. It is this 
                                                
37 Enticknap, “Electronic Enlightenment,” 422-3, my emphasis. 
38 Dixon, “Twenty-five Reasons,” 365-6, my emphasis. 
39 Sontag, “The Decay of Cinema,” my emphasis. 
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context of the new materialism of cinema that will interest me the most in the chapters 
that follow; hence the second meaning of the “materialism of cinema” in this 
dissertation: historical materialism. A coupling of this second meaning of materialism 
with the first meaning, broadly construed, can be found in Benjamin’s “Work of Art” 
essay, as well as in much apparatus theory, such as the work of Jean-Louis Comolli 
and Jean-Louis Buadry; and Peter Gidal’s writing on the structural films of the 60s 
and 70s, which he further specifies as “materialist film.”40 However, my approach 
diverges from these examples insofar as it is largely informed by the so-called neo-
Marxism, or autonomist Marxism, that took shape in Italy in the 1960s and 70s, and 
which is perhaps best known in North America by way of Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri’s widely read and oft-debated Empire, published in 2001.41 In particular, my use 
of historical materialism revolves around a cluster of three related concepts: post-
Fordism, immaterial labor, and to a lesser extent, the multitude. This conceptual 
assemblage will be elaborated from a variety of angles through this dissertation. Here, 
I will provide a more or less general overview of each of these concepts, using Hardt 
                                                
40 See, for example, Teresa De Lauretis and Stephen Heath, eds. The Cinematic Apparatus; 
Philip Rosen, ed. Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), especially Part 3 and Part 4; and Peter Gidal, Materialist Film (New York: Routledge, 
1989). 
41 For an overview of this strand of Marxism, see Sylvère Lotringer and Christian Marazzi, 
eds. Autonomia: Post-Political Politics (Los Angeles: Semiotext[e], 2007); and Paolo Virno 
and Michael Hardt, eds. Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2006); for a historical account of the development of 
autonomism in Italy, see Steve Wright, Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in 
Italian Autonomist Marxism (London: Pluto, 2002). For the debates around Empire, see Paul 
A. Passavant and Jodi Dean, eds. Empire’s New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri (New 
York: Routledge, 2003).  
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and Negri’s work, not only in Empire, but also in its ‘sequel,’ Multitude: War and 
Democracy in the Age of Empire, from 2004, as a guide. 
 I use post-Fordism in a very broad way to designate a tendency in the 
development of the structure and composition of labor that took off in the mid to late 
1970s and that is still ongoing. This tendency, which is also often referred to as 
postmodernization or informatization, is a corollary to Sontag’s observation that 
capital has now infiltrated every corner of the globe. With post-Fordism, the extensive 
expansion of the capitalist system is met with an intensive transformation of the 
system itself. This transformation is constituted above all by the dispersal of 
production into every pore of society—capitalism is everywhere, geographically, and 
production is everywhere, socially. The full depth and breadth of social life is 
absorbed into an abstract, systemic, and planetary social machine for the production of 
wealth. Labor moves beyond the walls of the factory and the limits of the eight-hour 
workday; economic production and the re-production of society as a whole move 
towards conflation. The paradigm of labor thus tends in post-Fordism to become fully 
and explicitly ontological: labor and its products are increasingly indistinguishable 
from being as such.  
 In somewhat less abstract terms, post-Fordism entails the displacement of mass 
industrial labor as the hegemonic form of work. This displacement is effectuated by a 
general re-structuring of all areas of production. Hardt and Negri summarize this re-
organization of work as follows: “Whereas economic modernization, which developed 
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Fordist labor relations, centered on the economies of scale and large systems of 
production and exchange, economic postmodernization, with its post-Fordist labor 
relations, develops smaller scale, flexible systems.” 42 In this situation, long-term 
employment contracts are increasingly scarce, there is more frequent movement 
between jobs, both during the day and throughout an individual’s lifetime, and jobs 
require facility with a broader variety of tasks. Rigid vertical, or hierarchical, 
structures of work-flow are supplemented by, and often give way to, more supple and 
complex horizontal arrangements. There is a transformation of “the organization of 
production from the linear relationships of the assembly line to the innumerable and 
indeterminate relationships of distributed networks. Information, communication, and 
cooperation become the norms of production, and the network becomes its dominant 
form of organization.”43 Keeping apace with this process of transformation, as both 
cause and effect, is the integration of new information and communication 
technologies into all types and facets of work: “The technical systems of production 
therefore correspond closely to its social composition: on one side the technological 
networks and on the other the cooperation of social subjects put to work.”44 
 More specifically, post-Fordism is marked by the hegemony of immaterial 
labor. Immaterial labor is defined in a first sense as labor whose products are 
immaterial, including ideas, knowledges, linguistic figures, codes, and symbols, as 
well as habits, tastes, desires, opinions, needs, and modes of collaboration and 
                                                
42 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 112. 
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44 Ibid. 
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communication. The term “immaterial” is thus somewhat misleading; rather than non-
material, it connotes instead a materiality that is indistinct—spatially and/or 
temporally—and that modulates across the inorganic and the organic. At base 
immaterial labor produces forms of thinking, acting, and communicating, that is, it 
produces subjectivities or, really, producers. As Hardt and Negri write, “[m]aterial 
production—the production, for example, of cars, televisions, clothing, and food—
creates the means of social life…Immaterial production, by contrast…tends to create 
not the means of social life, but social life itself.”45 Immaterial labor is also defined in 
terms of the composition of the processes of production. On one side, immaterial labor 
exploits the full spectrum of cognitive and communicative aptitudes of living subjects, 
often in interaction with computer technologies. One may think here, for example, of 
data entry and word processing, as well as the expanding sphere of the service industry 
wherein the service provided is a human interface with vast sets of coded information. 
On another side, immaterial labor exploits capacities of subjects to generate and 
manage affective states and forge social bonds, however ephemeral. In this regard, 
immaterial labor encompasses the activities, for example, of flight attendants, nurses, 
sex workers, food servers, and teachers. (As this list at least partially implies, the 
exploitation of such labor overlaps considerably with gender inequality.) For the most 
part, immaterial labor combines these two aspects in variable and modulating forms—
e.g. in telemarketing, and in customer service for credit card and telecommunications 
companies. In a more general sense, then, immaterial labor directly exploits 
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subjectivity and sociality tout court. As Hardt and Negri put it, immaterial labor is 
“animated by social intelligence, by the general intellect and at the same time by the 
affective expressions that define social relations and rule over the articulations of 
social beings…value is determined today in the affects, in the bodies crisscrossed by 
knowledge, in the intelligence of the mind, and in the sheer power to act.”46 
  To say that immaterial labor is hegemonic, or becoming hegemonic, is not to 
say that these jobs outnumber those in industrial or agricultural sectors. Rather, the 
hegemony of immaterial labor is a qualitative phenomenon. On this point, Hardt and 
Negri write:  
The hegemonic figure [of labor] is not dominant in 
quantitative terms but rather in the way it exerts a power 
of transformation over others. Hegemony here 
designates a tendency.  
   In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, industrial 
labor was hegemonic in the global economy even 
though it remained a minority in quantitative terms with 
respect to other forms of production such as agriculture. 
Industry was hegemonic insofar as it pulled other forms 
into its vortex: agriculture, mining, and even society 
itself were forced to industrialize. Not only the 
mechanical practices but also the rhythms of life of 
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industrial labor and its working day gradually 
transformed all other social institutions…The 
transformed laboring practices, in fields such as 
industrialized agriculture, of course, always remained 
different from industry, but they also increasingly shared 
elements in common…Just as in that phase all forms of 
labor and society itself had to industrialize, today labor 
and society have to informationalize, become intelligent, 
become communicative, become affective.47  
Perhaps the most blatant sign of the hegemony of immaterial labor is the ubiquity of 
computer technology, from the robotic systems used in automotive assembly to the 
internet as a site of consumption, production, and circulation. An immaterial, 
informational paradigm can also be seen in agriculture in terms of the escalation of 
resources and struggles around genetic engineering. On an equally vast scale, and as I 
indicated above, the post-Fordist model is re-structuring production in all sectors in 
terms of ever tighter and finely calibrated circuits of information and communication, 
both within and between globally networked productive sites, as well as between the 
factory and the market. Furthermore, the value of material goods is increasingly tied to 
immaterial factors—e.g., the lifestyle, ethos, and corporate image associated with 
Apple products. Finally, the development of this new hegemony is reflected in the 
expansion of the service sector, especially in the economies of globally dominant 
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countries, and in legal wrangling, often in these same countries, over immaterial 
property like programming code and academic ideas.  
 The multitude is both a socioeconomic and a political concept, which is to say, 
it is a class concept. Hardt and Negri describe the multitude as “all those who work 
under the rule of capital and thus potentially as the class of those who refuse the rule 
of capital.”48 The multitude thus occupies the same conceptual position as the working 
class in much Marxist thought, but with several important differences. While the 
working class is traditionally aligned with large-scale industrial labor, as in the 
writings of Marx and Lenin, the multitude is an open and expansive concept that 
includes all types of labor. This expansiveness is an index of the displacement of the 
hegemony of industrial labor, and the increasing communicability between various 
sectors of production. In A Grammar of the Multitude, Paolo Virno explains the 
conceptual makeup of the multitude by contrasting it with the concept of the “people.” 
In the tradition of political thought dominated by Thomas Hobbes, the people is a 
“synthetic unity” that coheres via the sovereign State; it is the body politic. For 
Hobbes, Virno argues, the people is contrasted with an anarchic plurality existing in a 
“state of nature:” “Before State, there were many; after the establishment of the State, 
there is the One-people, endowed with a single will.” This “many” is designated as the 
multitude in Hobbes, and dismissed because it “shuns political unity, resists authority, 
does not enter into lasting agreements, never attains the status of juridical person 
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because it never transfers its own natural rights to the sovereign.” 49 But, according to 
Virno, what Hobbes shuns, Baruch Spinoza affirms. Rather than the negative 
underside of the “people,” the multitude is conceived in Spinoza as an operative 
alternative: “For Spinoza, the multitudo indicates a plurality which persists as such in 
the public scene, in collective action, in the handling of communal affairs, without 
converging in a One, without evaporating within a centripetal form of motion.” 
Multitude is thus “the form of social and political existence for the many, seen as 
being many: a permanent form, not an episodic or interstitial form.”50 As with Hardt 
and Negri, Virno draws on this Spinozist conception of the multitude to move beyond 
the notion of the working class as a subject with a unified identity, such as white male 
factory workers. The concept of the multitude refuses the ostensible binary of class 
identity and liberal plurality, and instead affirms a more complex logic of multiplicity. 
This logic recognizes the ability for social subjects with irreducible and irrepressible 
differences to nonetheless think and act in concert, and, moreover, to do so without 
centralized, hierarchical, and representative forms of leadership.51 Furthermore, there 
is no privileged point of struggle in the multitude, as in Lenin’s critique of 
imperialism, because all labor is woven into the same social and communicative 
fabric. The sites of potential resistance are multiple and fluid; they can metabolize at 
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virtually any point in the global system, and can spread and mutate across the social 
terrain like a virus. Glimpses of this phenomenon can be detected, for example, in the 
recent cycle of struggles from the Arab Spring, to Wisconsin, Greece, the indiñados in 
Spain, and Occupy.52 It is experimentation with the social, ethical, and political forms 
of multiplicity—the many that can act as many—that constitutes the bridge between 
the multitude as all those that labor under capital, and the multitude as the open project 
of those that potentially refuse this labor. 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
 In emphasizing this context, I am not claiming that contemporary capital 
constitutes something like an ultimate and unitary cause of the new materialism of 
cinema. Nor do I intend to merely submit the latter to an ideological critique whereby 
the truth content of the apparatus is measured against the realities of post-Fordism. 
Rather, my goal is to show how this new materialism, in articulating a field of what 
can be seen and said of cinema, also and at the same time, articulates a field of what 
can be seen and said of post-Fordism, immaterial labor, and the multitude. Again, this 
field and its objects is inseparable from the apparatus; it is an active construction and 
distribution of phenomena, rather than a passive recording. The historical materialist 
                                                
52 For analyses of these events, see Alain Badiou, The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and 
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dimension of this construction is not only due to the embeddedness of the new 
materialism of cinema within the broader machinery of capital. It is also due to the 
way cinema in particular has, from its origins, been directly linked to capital. As 
Benjamin suggests, as does much of the scholarship on early film that emerged after 
Brighton (what Elsaesser calls the “new film history”), the development of cinema at 
the end of the nineteenth century and throughout the first half of the twentieth century 
was one of the dominant emblems of the hegemony of industrial labor.53 Cinema 
employed modern technical machinery, engaged urban masses as masses in the 
collective viewing experience, and swiftly became a massive commercial enterprise at 
the center of what, in 1944, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer famously termed 
“the culture industry.”54 It is unsurprising, then, that at the end of a century dominated 
by cinema and in the midst of the seismic displacement of industrialism, a rethinking 
of cinema should touch on the capitalist mode of production. Indeed, from this 
perspective the shift from the analog to the digital can be read as yet another sign of 
the shift towards the hegemony of immaterial labor.  
 This dissertation is therefore as much about the new materialism of cinema as 
it is about contemporary labor. It is about the way the latter is (literally) envisioned by 
                                                
53 See Thomas Elsaesser, ed. Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative (London: BFI, 2008). In 
addition, see Miriam Bratu Hansen, “The Mass Production of the Senses: Classical Cinema as 
Vernacular Modernism,” Modernism/Modernity 6.2 (1999): 59-77; Peter Wollen, 
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Vanessa R. Schwartz, eds. Cinema and the Invention of Modern Life (Berkeley: University of 
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54 See Max Horkeimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by 
Edmund Jephcott, edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
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the former, and the politics inherent therein. In approaching the new materialism of 
cinema in this way, and in working mainly on the line of visibility, my goal is not to 
simply amass a list of formal traits and aesthetic proclivities. My goal, rather, is to 
transform this visualization into a conceptualization; in other words, my goal is to 
construct a theoretical practice out of a cinematic practice. I am taking a cue in this 
regard from Deleuze’s two-volume study of cinema—Cinema 1: The Movement-
Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image. In the final section of Cinema 2, Deleuze 
offers a compact reflection on methodology. In this section Deleuze writes, “theory 
too is something which is made, no less than its object…philosophical theory is itself 
a practice, just as much as its object.” Deleuze continues: “A theory of cinema is not 
‘about’ cinema, but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are 
themselves related to other concepts corresponding to other practices, the practice of 
concepts in general having no privilege over others, any more than one object as over 
others.”55 In this way, my aim is to give a conceptual consistency, or legibility, to the 
ideas that emanate from the visible dimension of the new materialism of cinema. Such 
consistency is generated by placing this materialism in relation to concepts drawn 
from film theory, political theory, cultural theory, and philosophy. 
 This practice of transfusion between the cinematic and the theoretical is 
articulated across and through two central axes in the new materialism of cinema: film 
heritage and film restoration. Heritage and restoration form dual lenses through which 
the new materialism of cinema focuses its line of visibility. My first two chapters 
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theorize the new materialism of cinema as it appears through the lens of heritage. In 
Saving Cinema: The Politics of Preservation, published in 2011, Frick provides the 
first genealogy of film heritage. According to Frick, while the discourse of film 
heritage circulated amongst film archivists and preservationists throughout much of 
the twentieth century, it was not until the redoubling of efforts in the 1970s to raise 
awareness around film preservation—“Nitrate Won’t Wait!”—that this discourse 
began to be used widely and consistently. Thus, for example, in 1972 the newly 
created AFI published The American Film Heritage: Impressions from the American 
Film Institute Archives, a collection of essays by archivists and films scholars on the 
Institute’s collection. “This book,” writes Gregory Peck (the first chair of the AFI’s 
board of trustees) in a Foreword to the volume, “reflects a new national effort, 
initiated by The American Film Institute, working in collaboration with the Library of 
Congress, the Museum of Modern Art, George Eastman House, and other 
organizations to locate and preserve the films that have survived.”56 As Frick details, 
prior to the 1970s, film preservation was framed largely in terms of an “interest in 
retaining and celebrating film history and a corresponding desire to view the motion 
picture as art (or, at least, as more than mass produced trash).”57 As a way of 
legitimating film preservation and later film restoration, the discourse of heritage goes 
further. In the introduction to The American Film Heritage, Kula sheds light on the 
rather nebulous notion of heritage. Here, Kula begins by describing the unstable nature 
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of film as follows: “It is as if every book in the Library of Congress were printed on 
paper that would self-destruct and disappear forever unless copied every five to ten 
years.”58 He then writes,“[i]t is a platitude to say that ‘all films teach,’ but it is a fact 
that every film makes a conscious or unconscious statement about the values, mores, 
and societal relations of the characters who appeared in them, the people who made 
them, and the audiences who watched them.”59 As heritage, films are recognized not 
just as art, but also explicitly as sociological artifacts, that is, as the stuff of 
archaeology. Film heritage is thus proffered as a key to the inner workings of a 
society, and to its vitality. In a 1965 speech commemorating the creation of the 
National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities, which would provide the 
institutional framework for the AFI, Lyndon Johnson described cultural heritage as the 
way “we reveal [to] ourselves and to others, the inner vision which guides us as a 
nation.” “And where there is no vision,” Johnson intoned, “the people perish.”60    
 The discourse of film heritage in the United States in the 1970s reflected and 
appropriated the contemporaneous discourse propagated by FIAF. At this time, Frick 
argues, FIAF’s “rhetorical and pragmatic shift—from sharing preserved prints of the 
world’s cinematic art and iconic film texts to saving and protecting global motion 
picture heritage—influenced film archiving practice in every part of the world…[and] 
ensured the centrality of heritage preservation to the field’s identity and practice.”61 
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FIAF had, in turn, co-opted the discourse of heritage from the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Throughout the 1970s, 
FIAF worked in close collaboration with UNESCO towards developing the latter’s 
film-based initiatives. In 1980, UNESCO granted FIAF official nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) status, formally providing for collaboration and exchange 
between the two institutions.62 The same year, UNESCO ratified and published its 
Recommendation for the Safeguarding and Preservation of Moving Images. In this 
document, which is the only internationally recognized document on film 
preservation, UNESCO officially designated film as heritage. “Thus,” Frick writes, 
“by the early 1980s, the position of film as international heritage was ingrained, 
formally sanctioned, and accepted in all nations around the world—or, at least, in all 
of UNESCO’s 153 member states who unanimously supported the 
Recommendation.”63    
 It is at this point in time, and with this document by UNESCO, that I begin 
chapter one, “Film Heritage and the Cinematic Common.” The chapter follows the 
history of heritage through its popularization in the United States in the 1980s and 90s, 
particularly in relation to Turner’s project of colorization and to the cable television 
channel American Movie Classics, which, like Turner’s own Turner Classic Movies, 
became known for programming based almost exclusively on old films. I use this 
account of film heritage as a springboard for generating a concept of the cinematic 
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common. The “common,” which, in a basic sense, denotes that which is shared, has 
become a topic of much recent political theory. For example, Hardt and Negri, among 
others, argue that immaterial labor directly incorporates and produces shared aspects 
of existence, not in a legal sense, but in an ontological sense—e.g. language. There 
has, however, been little attention paid to how cinema, as one of the dominant social 
institutions of the twentieth century, has shaped the formation of the common within 
post-Fordism. I argue that the discourse of film heritage serves as an indication of 
precisely this role of cinema. Through close attention to this discourse, and working in 
dialogue with Hardt and Negri’s conceptualization of the common in Multitude and 
the subsequent Commonwealth—the latter completing a loose trilogy begun with 
Empire—as well with Marx’s concept of the “general intellect,” I develop the 
cinematic common to show how the “values, mores, and societal relations” that Kula 
identifies as film heritage function within the present as a shared set of tools for the 
construction of social life within the networks of immaterial labor. In this sense, the 
cinematic common describes what has been an unexplored dimension of immaterial 
labor. Moreover, I contend that the cinematic common can also function as a way to 
conceptualize the political project of the multitude. I argue that this function of the 
cinematic common requires a re-theorization of the idea of film heritage that diverges 
from the popular discourse. Indeed, along with illuminating the outlines of the 
cinematic common, the discourse of film heritage also works as means of controlling 
the common by chaining it to notions of the nation, identity, and property. Drawing on 
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UNESCO’s more recent articulation of “intangible heritage,” I point to the possibility 
of a film heritage that breaks with the exclusive logics of the nation, identity, and 
property, and works as what Hardt and Negri describe as an institution of the common: 
an institution for facilitating the democratic self-governance of the multitude, or 
production of the common for the common good.  
 The construction of this dual concept of the common is threaded through 
analyses of recent experimental films, including Gustav Deutsch’s Film ist. series 
(1998-2009), Bill Morrison’s The Film of Her (1996), and Harun Farocki’s Arbeiter 
verlassen die Fabrik [Workers Leaving the Factory] (1995). All of these films are 
composed of found images, and, as suggested by Deutsch’s title, can be seen as 
reflections on the ontology of cinema, provoked in part by the ostensible death of the 
medium. Erika Balsom thus describes Deutsch and Morrison, alongside Martin Arnold 
and Peter Tscherkassky, as part of a new “cinephilic avant-garde” that takes up the 
ontological investigations of the structural filmmakers, but with an added dose of 
history, reflecting “a love for cinema at the moment of its loss, or at the very least of 
its profound transformation.”64 Based on an experimental montage of images from the 
past rather than the creation of new ones, or what André Habib calls a “poetic 
archaeology” of cinema, the films present a vision of cinema colored by the 
persistence of film history in the form of physical artifacts.65 In the case of The Film of 
Her, which is about the re-discovery and restoration of the Library of Congress’ Paper 
                                                
64 Balsom, “A Cinephilic Avant-garde,” 264. 
65 Habib, “Ruin, Archive, and the Time of Cinema,” 128. 
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Print Collection, the material archive is made into an explicit theme. In my reading of 
these three films, with an emphasis on Farocki’s Arbeiter in particular, this 
materialism expands to also encompass the brains and bodies of workers and the 
dynamic weave of their social relations. In my view, these films provoke a 
theorization of heritage as the sedimentation of film history within the very capacities 
of humans for sociality today. This living, or immaterial, archive—a collective 
reservoir of ideas, habits, beliefs, and desires informed by over a century of cinema 
and embedded in collective corporeality—constitutes the social and conceptual terrain 
of the cinematic common.  
 I further explore this theorization of heritage in chapter two, “The Eye of 
Matter: Decasia and the Politics of Cinematic Perception.” In this chapter I argue that 
film heritage, understood as a mode of being shaped by film history, also functions as 
what Fredric Jameson calls “cognitive mapping.” Cognitive mapping is a sort of 
nascent class-consciousness that is operative in cultural texts, and in thought more 
generally. It is an attempt to translate the unrepresentable totality of global capital into 
“a mode of experience that is more visceral and existential than the abstract certainties 
of economics and Marxian social science.”66 Cognitive mapping is a way of grappling 
with what Jameson describes as “a new and historically original dilemma, one that 
involves our insertion as individual subjects into a multidimensional set of radically 
discontinuous realities, whose frames range from the still surviving spaces of 
bourgeois private life all the way to the unimaginable decentering of global capital 
                                                
66 Jameson, “Class and Allegory,” 51. 
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itself.”67 Film heritage is a form of cognitive mapping that uses images from film 
history as building blocks to construct such a vision of global capital. This chapter 
provides a case study of this aspect of heritage through an extended analysis of 
another of Morrison’s films, Decasia (2002). Decasia is composed of found-footage, 
mostly from the first decades of cinema, which is marked by varying states of 
decomposition.   
 In the case of Decasia, cinema works as both the ‘content’ for cognitive 
mapping, as well as the medium in which it is carried out. I therefore preface my 
analysis of the film with an elaboration of cognitive mapping that is specific to the 
medium of cinema. While many of Jameson’s discussions of cognitive mapping come 
from film, a link between the concept and an ontology of cinema remains untheorized 
in his work. To forge this link, I turn to Deleuze’s cinema books, specifically to 
Cinema 1 and the concept of the movement-image. Indeed, Deleuze’s study of cinema 
provides a major touchstone for the dissertation from this point forward. The central 
concepts in these books are the movement-image and the time-image.68 The 
movement-image is an image or assemblage of images that presents time indirectly 
                                                
67 Jameson, Postmodernism, 413.  
68 In the “Preface to the English edition” of Cinema 1, Deleuze writes: “These concepts are not 
technical (such as the various kinds of shot or the different camera movements) or critical (for 
example the great genres, the Western, the detective film, the historical film, etc.). Neither are 
they linguistic, in the sense in which it has been said that the cinema was the universal 
language, or in the sense in which it has been said that the cinema is a language. The cinema 
seems to us to be a composition of images and of signs, that is, a pre-verbal intelligible 
content (pure semiotics), whilst semiology of a linguistic aspiration abolishes the image and 
tends to dispense with the sign. What we call cinematographic concepts are therefore types of 
images and the signs which correspond to each type,” ix.  
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through movement in space. In contrast, the time-image is an image or assemblage of 
images in which space is subordinated to time, and time is thus presented directly. 
Beginning with my second chapter, these two ways of constructing time and space 
constitute the framework for my analysis of film form. My use of the movement-
image and the time-image historicizes these concepts differently than Deleuze. For 
Deleuze, the most formally innovative cinema—in his books, the work of cinema’s 
most celebrated auteurs—tends in the pre-war period toward the movement-image, 
and toward the time-image in the post-war period.69 This break, whose explanations 
are many, is, however, far from absolute. For instance, Deleuze refers to the oeuvre of 
Robert Bresson for examples of both the movement-image and the time-image; and 
the pre-war films of Yasujiro Ozu are cited as exemplary of the time-image. 
Moreover, the movement-image lingers after the war in what Deleuze considers stale, 
politically reactionary films. In locating both types of image within the new 
materialism of cinema, my aim is not to critique Deleuze’s insistence on a historical 
break; nor do I, strictly speaking, champion this account. I simply take the existence of 
both types of images in contemporary cinema (and not just in bad films) as axiomatic; 
Deleuze certainly allows for this position, but he nonetheless does not stress it. In so 
doing, my aim is to demonstrate how the movement-image and the time-image supply 
the ontological ordinates for cinematic visions of contemporary capital.  
                                                
69 For a detailed and somewhat critical account of Deleuze’s periodization in the cinema 
books, see Jacques Rancière, “From One Image to Another? Deleuze and the Ages of 
Cinema,” in Film Fables, translated by Emiliano Battista (Oxford: Berg, 2006), 107-24. 
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  In chapter two, I argue that the relation of the movement-image to what, 
following Henri Bergson, Deleuze calls the “whole,” overlaps with the totalizing 
mechanisms of cognitive mapping. The whole is a cosmic totality that transforms in 
time, creating, as Bergson puts it, a “thread that is transmitted down to the smallest 
particle of the world in which we live the duration immanent to the whole of the 
universe.”70 In the movement-image this totality is created through montage in a 
double movement that continually divides the whole into distinct parts, such as shots 
or groups of shots, at the same time it sweeps these parts together into an indivisible 
flux. In the films of D.W. Griffith and Sergei Eisenstein, for instance, montage maps 
the whole as a social organism whose parts interact according to distinct visions of the 
development of history. Breaking with the tendency in analyses of Decasia, as well as 
in film studies more generally of late, to equate the ontology of the cinema with the 
index—a trend that can be seen as a kind of cousin of the new materialism of 
cinema—I develop an original reading of the film based on the dual nature of its 
construction of the whole. This duality arises from the way the visible marks of decay 
on the image and the image’s original content create different regimes of movement in 
the film. These two regimes of movement, and their respective visions of the whole, 
correspond to two modes of perception, or two modes of subjectivity. These two 
modes of perception present film heritage from, on the one hand, the perspective of 
identity, and, on the other hand, from the perspective of the common. I elaborate on 
the latter in relation to earlier such visions in Dziga Vertov and structural film, and 
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argue that Decasia reflects how a collective political subject for reappropriating the 
common still remains to be seen.   
Chapters three and four then theorize the new materialism of cinema as seen 
through the lens of film restoration. Film restoration is a somewhat fluid term whose 
definition is the subject of ongoing debate.71 However, most definitions of this 
practice fall within the same basic set of terms. This hegemonic formulation is most 
clearly and succinctly laid out by Raymond Borde, founder of the Cinémathèque de 
Toulouse: “Restoration is the application of specific technologies to materials 
degraded by time and man in order to return a film as closely as possible to its original 
state.”72 The meaning of the “original state” is also subject to some variation, as I will 
detail in chapter three, but it is usually aligned with the imagined intentions of the 
director. In contrast to film restoration, preservation connotes the maintenance of a 
film in its present state. A film is considered preserved when it is stored in optimal 
conditions of temperature and humidity. In many cases, preservation also entails the 
transfer of film to a more stable film stock—e.g. from nitrate to acetate or polyester-
based stock. This distinction between restoration and preservation has its roots in 
architectural debates of the nineteenth century. The French architect and theorist 
Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc, who oversaw the restoration of many buildings, 
                                                
71 See Busche, “Just Another Form of Ideology?” See also Eileen Bowser, “Some Principles of 
Film Restoration,” Griffithiana 11.38-9 (1990): 170-3; Paul Read and Mark-Paul Meyer, 
Restoration of Motion Picture Film (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2000); and Dino 
Everett, “Introduction to Bio-Classification Theory: Remix Methodologies and the Archivist,” 
The Moving Image 8.1 (2008): 15-37. 
72 Borde, “Film Restoration: Ethical Problems,” 90. 
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including Notre Dame, in the middle of the century, is widely considered the founder 
of the modern approach to restoration in the West. Viollet-le-Duc proposed a 
restorative practice based on the principle of l’unité de style, and a researched, but 
often hypothetical, assessment of the style of a building’s original construction. To 
this end, he often advocated for the razing of additions from later periods (some 
centuries old), as well as the construction of new components mimicking the unifying 
stylistic themes. This approach was critiqued by a preservationist movement led by 
John Ruskin, and later by William Morris, who argue that restoration warped history 
and advocated instead for prolonging the life of every aspect of a building for as long 
as possible. 73  
 Film restoration effectively began with Kevin Brownlow’s work on Abel 
Gance’s Napoleon (1927), which had been re-edited dozens of times after its initial 
premiere. Brownlow started the restoration in 1969, and screened an initial version at 
the AFI’s theater in 1973. While a few other films were restored during this time—in 
1972, for example, Arthur Lenning restored Erich von Stroheim’s Foolish Wives 
(1922) in collaboration with Robert Gitt at the AFI—it was the attention garnered by 
Brownlow’s project that, as Slide observes, sparked a “restoration movement” in 
film.74 In the New York Times Manohla Dargis recalls Napoleon’s widely publicized 
New York premiere in 1981 as “the cinema event of the year.”75 The film, distributed 
                                                
73 On these debates, see Rosen, Change Mummified, 43-88. 
74 Slide, Nitrate Won’t Wait, 110.  
75 Dargis, “Napoleon Is Lost, Long Live Napoleon!” See also, Kevin Brownlow, Napoleon: 
Abel Gance’s Classic Film, 2nd Edition (London: Photoplay, 2004); William K. Everson, “The 
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by Francis Ford Coppola and with a score by Carmine Coppola, played for three sold-
out nights at Radio City Music Hall before going on to tour the country. Over the next 
two decades, film restoration became a widespread phenomenon. In 1983 a restored 
version of A Star is Born (1954), financed by Warner Bros. and the Academy of 
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, also premiered at Radio City Music Hall, and was 
then released on home video. In 1989 MOMA’s restoration of Griffith’s Intolerance 
(1916) premiered at the New York Film Festival, and a restored Lawrence of Arabia 
(1962) screened at the Cannes Film Festival. The same year, Brownlow restored a 
different version of Intolerance for Thames Television, and Turner celebrated the 
fiftieth anniversary of Gone With the Wind (1939) with the theatrical and home video 
release of a restoration that grossed seven million dollars. In 1992, Robert Epstein 
wrote in the Los Angeles Times: “Never before have so many old films…emerged 
from vaults, closets and hiding places to be dusted off, restored, enhanced, and then 
turned into magic moments again.”76 By the publication of Cherchi Usai’s The Death 
of Cinema in 2001 restorations had flooded the DVD market, prompting the 
beginnings of a critical backlash similar to that mounted against Viollet-le-Duc in the 
nineteenth century. In fact, The Death of Cinema itself is presented largely as a 
critique of the popularization of restoration, with Cherchi Usai calling the notion of an 
“‘authentic’ restoration” a “cultural oxymoron.”77 Furthermore, Cherchi Usai argues, 
                                                                                                                                       
Many Lives of Napoleon,” Film Comment 17.1 (1981): 21-3; and Jack Kroll, “A Lost Epic 
Regained,” Newsweek, February 2, 1981.   
76 Epstein, “Mining Hollywood’s Old Movie Gold,” F1.  
77 Cherchi Usai, Death of Cinema, 101. 
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“any attempt to restore the moving image is derived from motivations which are at 
best alien, if not contrary, to the unstable nature of the carrier…[and] tantamount to a 
denial that the moving image has a history.”78  
 In chapter three, “The Perfect Crystal: Vertigo and the Restoration-Image,” I 
zero in on one of the high-profile restorations from this period, Universal’s restoration 
of Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958) in 1996. My goal with this chapter is to create a 
concept of what I term the “restoration-image.” Despite the prevalence of film 
restorations in the last three decades, there has as yet been no serious attention paid to 
the specificity of these films beyond a narrow and vague technological determinism. 
The restoration-image explains this specificity at the level of form. This type of image 
has two sides, or aspects: the demonstration-image and the diegetic-image. The 
diegetic-image names the image as component of the formal and narrative mechanics 
of a given film. The demonstration-image names the image as an example of 
restoration, both in general and specific to a given film. The latter image is “cued,” 
and supplied with content, by marketing materials, particularly the restoration 
demonstrations that accompany most restored films on DVD. In the case of the DVD 
release of the restored Vertigo, the restoration demonstration is part of a short 
documentary, Obsessed with “Vertigo:” New Life for Hitchcock’s Masterpiece. The 
demonstration-image foregrounds the plasticity of the image as a material object, and 
serves as testimony of, as Klinger puts it, “the ability that capital and technology have 
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to triumph over the various limitations and liabilities of time.”79 In other words, 
restoration is celebrated as domination of the unruliness of materiality and history. Yet 
this conquest can itself be historicized in terms of the labor of restoration. Through a 
close reading of Obsessed with “Vertigo,” I show how restoration is, in this case, 
presented as a form of immaterial labor. More specifically, the conquest of the 
materiality of the image is presented as a mobilization of knowledge and affect—what 
the documentary repeatedly emphasizes as an obsessive quest and a “labor of love.”  
 I argue that the restoration-image has profound effects on Vertigo, shifting the 
film from the regime of the movement-image to that of the time-image. Indeed, the 
nature of the relation between the two sides of the restoration-image composes a 
variant of the time-image that Deleuze refers to in Cinema 2 as the “crystal-image.” 
The crystal-image is an image with two aspects that travel on a circuit linking what 
Deleuze deems the actual and the virtual. The actual is the dimension of the image that 
is given to perception and thus “visible and limpid,” while the virtual is given to 
recollection, “referred elsewhere, invisible, opaque and shadowy.”80 The two aspects 
of the image are drawn into a ceaseless and reciprocal exchange between these two 
dimensions, such that it is impossible to fix either aspect as virtual or actual, the one 
pulsing through the other as in a figure-ground illusion. This dynamic makes visible 
the way time is constantly splitting between the present as present and the present as 
already past: “The present is the actual image, and its contemporaneous past is the 
                                                
79 Klinger, Beyond the Multiplex, 121. 
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virtual image…there is a recollection of the present, contemporaneous with the present 
itself, as closely coupled as a role to an actor.”81 In light of the specific nature of both 
the demonstration-image and the diegetic-image in the restored Vertigo, I argue that 
the film reflects the capitalist command of time within post-Fordism.  
 “The Virtual Metropolis: Restoration as Simulacrum,” the fourth and final 
chapter, erects the conceptual scaffolding for a radically different practice of film 
restoration. This alternative approach to restoration is initially defined within the terms 
of Deleuze’s “reversal” of Platonism in the first Appendix to The Logic of Sense, “The 
Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy.” There is a considerable overlap between 
Deleuze’s critique of the Platonic Idea and the critiques of the notion of the “original” 
in film restoration. In the work of Cherchi Usai, for example, the “original,” which he 
calls the “Model Image,” is a fiction of transcendence, that is, an image that is 
assumed to exist outside of time and history. But where Cherchi Usai begins and ends 
with this negative view of restoration, I contend that restoration can be positively re-
thought through Deleuze’s concept of the “simulacrum,” which, it will suffice to say at 
this point, is nearly the complete opposite of the more familiar version of this concept 
in the work of Jean Baudrillard and Jameson.  
 I then turn to the 2010 restoration of Fritz Lang’s Metropolis (1927), 
christened The Complete Metropolis. The Complete Metropolis counts as the fourth 
restoration of Lang’s film in less than forty years. While this restoration was, by all 
accounts, guided by a traditional approach to restoration, it nonetheless contains some 
                                                
81 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 78-9.  
 
 
45 
peculiar formal effects that illustrate the workings of the simulacrum in properly 
filmic terms, by way of the time-image. Here the time-image is generated out of the 
relations between images. In particular, time flows out of the moments of disjuncture 
created by the film’s juxtaposition of images with divergent physical histories. What is 
made visible in this way is a form of time as immanent and inexhaustible reserve of 
difference. In contrast to the asphyxiated time of exploitation that appears in the 
restored Vertigo, this is a time full of potential, whose political nature is thrown into 
relief against the backdrop of Metropolis’ dystopian narrative of a city run by worker-
slaves. In a brief conclusion to the dissertation, I reflect on how such a time may 
intersect with the multitude as a political project, and on the possible relations between 
this project and the cinema, materialist or otherwise. 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
  
The line of visibility that I follow throughout this dissertation is thus marked 
by tension and competing tendencies. Within this line there are what, in the essay on 
Foucault cited earlier, Deleuze calls “lines of stratification or sedimentation,” as well 
as what he calls “lines of fracture,” “lines of escape,” or “paths of creation.” Whereas 
the former work to enforce and rigidify the order of the present, the latter, born of 
resistance, illuminate futures of possibility. Therefore, Deleuze writes:  
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In each apparatus we have to untangle the lines of the 
recent past and those of the near future…that which 
belongs to history and that which belongs to the process 
of becoming; that which belongs to the analytic and that 
which belongs to the diagnostic…If Foucault is a great 
philosopher, this is because he used history for the sake 
of something beyond it: as Nietzsche said, acting against 
time, and thus on time, for the sake of a time one hopes 
will come. For what appears to be the present-day or the 
new according to Foucault is what Nietzsche called the 
unreasonable, the uncontemporary, the becoming which 
bifurcates with history, the diagnostic which relays 
analysis with other roads.82  
 In writing about the new materialism of cinema, I have sought to follow the approach 
Deleuze describes here, untangling the lines of the apparatus, and, wherever possible, 
developing a diagnostic sensitivity to the “unreasonable” and the “uncontemporary,” 
with an eye towards the “time one hopes will come.” This is not to indulge in 
prediction, but rather, in Deleuze’s words, “to be attentive to the unknown which 
knocks at the door.”83 This unknown is a fundamental part of any present and of any 
apparatus, and as such is a necessary part of the type of analysis I pursue in this 
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dissertation. As Jameson puts it in the final sentence of A Singular Modernity: Essay 
on the Ontology of the Present: “Ontologies of the present demand archaeologies of 
the future, not forecasts of the past.”84 A method and a politics, this is as sober and as 
solid a description of utopia as any, both a point of departure and an always-receding 
horizon.    
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Chapter One 
The Cinematic Common: Film as Heritage 
  
 
 
 
 
As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in  
the midst of the richest possible concrete development, 
where one thing appears as common to many, to all. 
—Karl Marx, Grundrisse 
 
 
One must first give the films one refers to in one’s 
thoughts their own space. 
—Harun Farocki, “Towards an Archive for Visual Concepts” 
 
 
 
 
Fredric Jameson concludes “Totality as Conspiracy,” the first essay in The 
Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System, with an analysis of 
Alan J. Pakula’s classic film, All the President’s Men (1976). Jameson caps this 
analysis by zeroing in on one of the film’s most famous shots. Bob Woodward (Robert 
Redford) and Carl Bernstein (Dustin Hoffman) sit in the domed reading room of the 
Library of Congress, seeking leads in their investigation into Watergate in huge stacks 
of call slips. The camera, just above their heads, looks straight down on the call slips. 
Slowly, and through several dissolves, the camera pulls backwards towards the high 
ceiling of the dome. Ultimately, Woodward and Bernstein are reduced to tiny specks 
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within the reading room. This bravura camera movement suggests the way in which 
the two reporters are caught in a massive conspiracy that dwarfs their individual 
efforts. Jameson interprets this shot as a movement from microcosm to macrocosm: 
“The mounting camera shot…confirms the momentary coincidence between 
knowledge as such and the architectural order of the astronomical totality itself, and 
yields a brief glimpse of the providential, as what organizes history but is 
unrepresentable within it.”1 This totality, Jameson continues, “what Hegel…called 
Absolute Spirit, is now from our perspective rather to be identified as Capital itself, 
whose study is now our true ontology. It is indeed the new world system, the third 
stage of capitalism, which is for us the absent totality, Spinoza’s God or Nature, the 
ultimate (indeed, perhaps the only) referent, the true ground of Being of our time.”2 
(Jameson famously reads conspiracy in American cinema of the 1970s and 80s as an 
instance of what he calls “cognitive mapping,” a concept that I will take up in chapter 
two). Jameson identifies an analogue to this image in the long, overhead shots that 
conclude Alain Resnais’ meditative documentary on the Bibliothèque nationale, Toute 
la mémoire du monde (1956) (Figure 1.1). Here, Jameson quotes Jacques Rivette, who 
understands these shots, wherein “you can see each reader, each researcher in his 
 
 
                                                
1 Jameson, Geopolitical Aesthetic, 79. 
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Fig. 1.1                                                                      Toute la mémoire du monde (1956) 
place, bent over his manuscript,” as indicative of the loss of a “unity of culture” and 
the “common treasure of mankind” within the division of labor.3  
 The American experimental filmmaker Bill Morrison’s The Film of Her (1996) 
also includes a section within the Library of Congress.4 This twelve-minute film is 
composed almost entirely of found-footage, much of it drawn from the archives of the 
library itself. Among shots of stacks of books, researchers hunched over desks, and 
                                                
3 Qtd. in Jameson, Geopolitical Aesthetic, 80. See Jean Domarchi, et. al., “Hiroshima, notre 
amour,” trans. Liz Heron, in Cahiers du Cinéma, Vol. 1 (The 1950s), ed. Jim Hillier 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 59-70.  
4 Morrison has cited Toute la mémoire du monde as an inspiration for The Film of Her. See 
André Habib, “Matter and Memory: A Conversation with Bill Morrison,” Offscreen 8.11 
(November 2004). http://www.horschamp.qc.ca/new_offscreen/interview_morrison.html 
(accessed April 19, 2013).  
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clerks busy filing, a brief image of the central reading room appears, looking straight 
up into the dome from below. Winding through  
the labyrinthine bureaucracy and architecture of the library, we eventually come to a 
vault. The doors of the vault swing open, and inside are thousands of films. This, the 
narrator intones, is the Paper Print Collection, consisting of some of the earliest films, 
submitted to the Library of Congress for copyright between 1894 and 1912. Images 
from Fred Ott’s The Sneeze (1894), and Thomas Edison’s Electrocuting an Elephant 
(1903) flash on the screen. Keeping with the terms of Jameson and Rivette’s analyses, 
The Film of Her raises several questions: If the library stands in for the “world 
system” of capital, what role within the mode of production can be assigned to this 
cache of old films? How does film history intersect with labor, knowledge, and the 
“common” patrimony of history? This chapter will pursue these questions as a way of 
intervening in a crucial problematic of recent political theory.    
 In The Coming Community, first published in 1990, Giorgio Agamben 
anticipates and condenses this problematic:    
Today, in the era of the complete triumph of the 
spectacle, what can be reaped from the heritage of [Guy] 
Debord? It is clear that the spectacle is language, the 
very communicativity or linguistic being of humans. 
This means that a fuller Marxian analysis should deal 
with the fact that capitalism…was directed not only 
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toward the expropriation of productive activity, but also 
and principally toward the alienation of language itself, 
of the very linguistic and communicative nature of 
humans, of that logos which one of Heraclitus’s 
fragments identified as the Common. The extreme form 
of this expropriation of the Common is the spectacle, 
that is, the politics we live in. But this also means that in 
the spectacle our linguistic nature comes back to us 
inverted. This is why…the violence of the spectacle is 
so destructive; but for the same reason the spectacle 
remains something like a positive possibility that can be 
used against it.5  
At least since the publication of Hardt and Negri’s Multitude in 2004, the concept of 
the “common” has been widely discussed.6 Furthermore, language has provided a 
refrain for much of this work. What has not been taken up, however, is precisely the 
frame in which Agamben poses the question of the common, that is, images. The aim 
of this chapter is to begin to bring the image back into focus for the common.  
                                                
5 Agamben, Coming Community, 80.  
6 In addition to the works cited in this chapter, see for example Cesare Casarino and Antonio 
Negri, In Praise of the Common: A Conversation on Philosophy and Politics (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Cesare Casarino, “Universalism of the Common,” 
diacritics 39, no. 4 (2009): 162-76; Anna Curcio and Ceren Özselçuk, eds. The Common and 
the Forms of the Commune, special issue of Rethinking Marxism 23, no. 3 (2011); Nick Dyer-
Witheford, “Commonism,” Turbulence 1 (2007): 81–87; Naomi Klein, “Reclaiming the 
Commons,” New Left Review 9 (2001): 81-9; and Jason Read, “The Production of 
Subjectivity: From Transindividuality to the Commons,” New Formations 70 (2010): 113-31. 
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 In his recent book, The Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy 
and the Society of the Spectacle, Jonathan Beller provides one of the most thorough 
and intriguing attempts to expand upon the work of Debord. Beller summarizes his 
thesis as follows: “It is in and through the cinematic image and its legacy, the 
gossamer imaginary arising out of a matrix of socio-psychomaterial relations, that we 
make our lives…The image, which pervades all appearing, is the mise-en-scène of the 
new work.”7 (1). While the “new work” Beller is primarily concerned with is that of 
attention, or looking at all manner of screens and images, his thesis is also relevant for 
immaterial labor more broadly construed. Yet Beller’s work does not have much to 
offer for conceptualizing the common with, and through, the image. Agamben 
anticipates this difficulty with his reference to “inversion.” The image in Beller, as in 
Debord, is fundamentally a negation; the pervasiveness of the image amounts to 
nothing less than a liquidation of being—one might think, Beller suggests, of the 
images of unconscious human batteries in The Matrix (1999). What this approach 
blocks is the ontological density, positivity, and autonomy of living labor that is the 
heritage of Italian autonomist Marxism, and which animates the recent theorizations of 
the common. In this regard, the difference between the two shots of the reading room 
in the Library of Congress, from All the President’s Men and The Film of Her, 
respectively, may be seen as a metaphor for the difference in these two approaches. 
Rather than examine the issue of the image and the common “from above,” from the 
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perspective of power, this chapter will seek to articulate the perspective “from below,” 
from within the dense social fabric of immaterial labor.    
 I thus turn here to a very different discourse from that of Beller and Debord, 
namely the discourse of film heritage. In Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri state: 
“Specters of the common appear throughout capitalist society, even if in veiled and 
mystified forms.”8 The discourse of film heritage is one such form. I begin, then, with 
a brief account of the official, popular, and mystified discourse of film heritage, 
particularly the discourse of American film heritage. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is in 
the United States—in the proverbial belly of the beast of the culture industry—where 
film heritage has been most widely mediatized and commercialized, and where the 
tensions inherent in the concept, primarily between the private and the public, are most 
visible. This account of film heritage will set the stage for a direct confrontation 
between film heritage and labor—by way of Harun Farocki’s film, Arbeiter verlassen 
die Fabrik [Workers Leaving the Factory] (1995)—with the aim of outlining a concept 
of the cinematic common. As the term implies, I am specifically concerned in this 
essay with cinematic images. The cinematic common therefore constitutes one 
particular, and somewhat preliminary, take on the much larger issue of the common 
vis-à-vis images. I will then return to film heritage as a way to push the cinematic 
common from a diagnostic concept to a prognostic concept, before concluding with a 
brief coda on The Film of Her. 
 
                                                
8 Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 152.  
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*  *  *  *  * 
 
The discourse of film heritage reached an unprecedented level of 
institutionalization in 1980 when UNESCO ratified its Recommendation for the 
Safeguarding and Preservation of Moving Images. This document begins with a series 
of axioms meant to legitimize the titular protective actions:  
Considering that moving images are an expression of the 
cultural identity of peoples, and because of their 
educational, cultural, artistic, scientific and historical 
value, form an integral part of a nation’s cultural 
heritage, 
Considering that moving images constitute new forms of 
expression, particularly characteristic of present-day 
society, whereby an important and ever-increasing part 
of contemporary culture is manifested,  
Considering that moving images also provide a 
fundamental means of recording the unfolding of events 
and, as such, constitute important and often unique 
testimonies, of a new dimension, to the history, way of 
life and culture of peoples and to the evolution of the 
universe,  
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Noting that moving images have an increasingly 
important role to play as a means of communication and 
mutual understanding among all peoples of the world,  
Noting furthermore that, by disseminating knowledge 
and culture through the world, moving images 
contribute extensively to the education and to the 
enrichment of each human being.9 
This document expands UNESCO’s understanding of heritage, as laid out in its first 
document on the subject, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage, from 1972. In this earlier document, “cultural 
heritage” is divided into three broad domains: monuments (including “architectural 
works,” and “monumental sculpture and painting”); groups of buildings; and sites 
(including “archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the 
historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological points of view.”)10 “Natural 
heritage” is defined as “physical or biological formations or groups of such 
formations,” including the habitats of threatened species of plants and animals and 
“natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science, 
conservation or natural beauty.”11     
 Against the older definitions of heritage, UNESCO’s delineation of a moving 
image heritage has at least three broad distinctions that will prove important in the 
                                                
9 UNESCO, Recommendation, Preamble. 
10 UNESCO, Convention Concerning World Heritage, Article 1.  
11 Ibid., Article 2.  
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remainder of this chapter. First, as outlined in the second axiom, moving images are 
understood as a significant aspect of the contemporary moment, and not simply as a 
cherished element of the past. The status of “heritage” is thereby given to a widely 
experienced aspect of daily life. Second, moving images are a much more mobile form 
of heritage. As opposed to a heritage site like Angkor Wat in Cambodia, moving 
images are not rooted to a specific place, but are able to travel, circulating around the 
globe and through all areas of the social environment. This form of heritage can thus 
be confronted almost anywhere, and at anytime.12 Yet UNESCO still maintains the 
concrete materiality of moving images, which are defined in the Recommendation as 
“any series of images recorded on a support (irrespective of the method of recording 
or the nature of the support, such as film, tape or disc, used in their initial or 
subsequent fixation).”13 Indeed it is this very materiality that, in light of the 
document’s opening axioms, makes the safeguarding and preservation of moving 
images a pressing issue: “due to the nature of their material embodiment and the 
various methods of their fixation, moving images are extremely vulnerable…many 
elements of the moving image heritage have disappeared due to deterioration, accident 
or unwarranted disposal, which constitutes an irreversible impoverishment of that 
heritage.”14  
                                                
12 This is, of course, one of Walter Benjamin’s main points about film versus earlier arts in his 
canonical essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility.”  
13 UNESCO, Recommendation, Definitions.  
14 UNESCO, Recommendation, Preamble.  
 
 
58 
 The third important distinction in the definition of a moving image heritage is 
the emphasis placed on the nation. While the Recommendation specifies national 
heritage in its opening lines, in the Convention the nation plays a more secondary role 
as an agent in protecting world heritage. In Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri identify 
the nation as one of the most powerful contemporary social institutions in which “the 
common is both deployed and corrupted.”15 While the nation deploys the common by 
invoking a set of shared traditions, values, and norms, it corrupts the common by 
constructing the image of a unified people, which excludes all those who are different. 
This exclusive and “corrupt” idea of the common is evident in the development of the 
notion of American film heritage. Film heritage entered the popular media in the U.S. 
in 1986 when Ted Turner announced plans to colorize much of the recently purchased 
MGM film catalogue. The backlash against Turner was widespread and went as far as 
hearings before Congress and an inquiry and report by the U.S. Copyright Office. The 
legal challenge to Turner was a matter of intellectual property, specifically the “moral 
right” law giving control of artistic creations to the artist.16 However, this recourse to 
the rights of the artist quickly spilled into rhetoric about the desecration of national 
heritage and the rights of the American public. The President’s Committee of the 
Directors Guild of America wrote that colorization “represents the mutilation of 
history, the vandalism of our common past, not merely as it relates to film, but as it 
                                                
15 Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 163. 
16 For an extensive legal analysis of the case, see Wagner, “Motion Picture Colorization.” 
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affects society’s perception of itself.”17 As Paul Grainge observes, this sentiment was 
echoed throughout the media to the extent that it seemed Turner was “creating private 
property out of an ostensibly public resource.”18  
 Grainge argues that the discourse of heritage surrounding the Turner case was 
largely reactionary. Against Turner, Grainge writes, “many liberal voices rushed to the 
defense of the classic work; they justified the policing of taste against commercial 
opportunism and the vulgarities of consumer preference; they sought to counter the 
debilitating effects of post-modern technology and its digital manipulation of the 
visual image.”19 Grainge finds parallels between the mobilization against Turner and 
the then nascent cultural wars led by conservative, right-wing figures like Allan 
Bloom, William Bennet, and Richard Kimball. For Bloom and others, the rise of 
cultural studies and discourses of multiculturalism in universities threatened to 
denigrate the great achievements of Western Civilization and bury the canon of ‘great 
books.’ The case against Turner and the case against the so-called ‘tenured radicals’ 
both deployed nostalgia in the service of protecting authenticity, tradition, and a 
narrow, whitewashed image of American cultural identity.  
 While the culture wars raged on for some time, the Turner affair was a short-
lived media circus and the legal challenge met a dead end, with the dictates of private 
property reigning supreme. The cause of film heritage, however, kept its momentum. 
In September 1988, the National Film Preservation Act was signed into law. The 
                                                
17 Qtd. in Wagner, “Motion Picture Colorization,” 645. 
18 Grainge, “Reclaiming Heritage,” 624 
19 Ibid.  
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centerpiece of the Act, which describes film as “an indigenous American art 
form...[and] an enduring part of our Nation’s historical and cultural heritage,” was the 
creation of a national film board—composed of members of the Academy of Motion 
Picture Arts and Sciences, the Director’s Guild of America, the Writers Guild of 
America, the National Society of Film Critics, the Society for Cinema and Media 
Studies, and the American Film Institute— whose main duty is to select twenty-five 
“culturally, historically or aesthetically significant” American films per year to be 
listed in the National Film Registry.20 Listing a film in National Film Registry requires 
the copyright owner to submit a print or negative to be housed at the Library of 
Congress. Film heritage continued to carry with it the notion of the public, but without 
the legal associations of the Turner case. As Frick details in Saving Cinema, “general 
press and pubic discourse fully supported and even advocated that the nation’s 
citizenry possessed an inherent right in ensuring the protection and survival of 
American motion picture history—even if the same films remained the corporate 
assets of privately held companies.”21 At this time, the exclusivity of heritage as a 
public resource shifted away from the borders of taste and canonicity and towards the 
                                                
20 National Film Preservation Act, Sec. 1. The first twenty-five films placed on the registry 
are: The Best Years of Our Lives (1946), Casablanca (1943), Citizen Kane (1941), The Crowd 
(1928), Dr. Strangelove; or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964), The 
General (1927), Gone With the Wind (1939), The Grapes of Wrath (1940), High Noon (1952), 
Intolerance (1916), The Learning Tree (1969), The Maltese Falcon (1941), Mr. Smith Goes to 
Washington (1939), Modern Times (1936), Nanook of the North (1921), On the Waterfront 
(1954), The Searchers (1956), Singin’ in the Rain (1952), Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs 
(1937), Some Like It Hot (1959), Star Wars (1977), Sunrise (1927), Sunset Boulevard (1950), 
Vertigo (1958), The Wizard of Oz (1939). A complete list of films on the registry can be found 
at www.loc.gov/film.    
21 Frick, Saving Cinema, 80. 
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borders of the nation. In 1989, Congress held a hearing on the effects of the 
globalization of capital on American media. One well-publicized topic of discussion 
was Sony’s recent purchase of Columbia Studios, which was framed in terms of 
national treasures falling into foreign hands.22 The xenophobic anxiety around this 
deal was captured by a Los Angeles Times article, which opined: “The library that 
Japanese electronics giant Sony will get with its pending takeover of Columbia 
Pictures includes the greatest film ever made about its country’s bombing of Pearl 
Harbor—Fred Zinneman’s 1953 Oscar-winner From Here to Eternity.”23     
By the late 1980s, film heritage was also becoming a business. Turner had all 
but dropped his colorization plans, which were quickly overshadowed and outsold by 
marketing strategies based on a reverence for film heritage. Thus, in 1989 Turner 
released a restored version of Gone With the Wind (1939)—named as one of the first 
twenty-five films on the National Film Registry. The following year Disney and 
Paramount released highly publicized restorations of Fantasia (1940) and The Ten 
Commandments (1956), respectively.24 In 1997, Fox’s theatrical release of “special 
editions” of the Star Wars films—the original film was also among the first films on 
the National Film Registry—earned over two hundred million dollars at the box office. 
Futhermore, film heritage found a prominent commercial venue on cable channels 
                                                
22 Frick, Saving Cinema, 81-3. 
23 Easton, “Sony to Cash In on Columbia’s Cache.”  
24 Citron, “Value in the Vault.” See also Gracy, “Coming Again to a Theater Near You: The 
Lucrative Business of Recycling American Film Heritage,” Stanford Humanities Review 7.2 
(1999): 180-91.  
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devoted to film history, including Turner’s own Turner Classic Movies (TCM), started 
in 1994.  
In Beyond the Multiplex: Cinema, New Technologies, and the Home, Barbara 
Klinger offers one of the few scholarly accounts of American film heritage through 
her analysis of a similar channel, American Movie Classics (AMC). Launched on a 
limited basis to 250,000 subscribers in 1984, AMC had thirty-nine million subscribers 
by 1991, and over sixty million by the mid-1990s.25 One of AMC’s recurring 
strategies for presenting film as heritage is the celebration of national holidays with 
blocks of films by a particular Hollywood star. For instance, for Memorial Day in 
1992 AMC featured a marathon of films starring John Wayne, including Fort Apache 
(1948) and Flying Leathernecks (1951). Similarly, for Independence Day in 1995 
AMC played a marathon of Henry Fonda’s films, including Young Mr. Lincoln (1939) 
and The Grapes of Wrath (1940). “By staging a festival of an actor’s films in 
association with a holiday,” Klinger argues, “a double action occurs: the star comes to 
represent a ceremonial moment in American history, and that moment is observed in 
relation to the actor and the films in which he or she appears.”26 Hollywood film 
history and American history more broadly are therefore conflated, and figures like 
Wayne are made to personify a national identity. Klinger also cites AMC’s 1993 
original series, “Shots Seen ’round the World.” This series consisted of six short 
documentaries on famous images from Hollywood film history. These images include, 
                                                
25 Klinger, Beyond the Multiplex, 96.  
26 Ibid., 106. 
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among others, the final encounter between Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman on 
the runway in Casablanca (1943); Deborah Kerr and Burt Lancaster rolling in the surf 
in From Here to Eternity (1953); and Cary Grant fleeing the deadly crop-dusting plane 
in North By Northwest (1959). According to Klinger, the series “accomplishes several 
rhetorical feats: it equates cinema and U.S. history, distinguishes the importance of 
cinematic imagery to the nation, and uses the language of heritage (‘they’ve had an 
effect on our shared culture’) to further stress cinema’s historical significance.”27 
Klinger links the rise of the discourse of American film heritage to capital in 
two ways. First, she emphasizes the prodigious globalization of capitalism. Like Frick, 
Klinger references Sony’s purchase of Columbia in 1989, as well as Matsuhita’s 
purchase of Universal in 1990. Here she quotes congressman Richard A. Gephardt, 
who during the 1989 congressional hearings on globalization and the media, stated: 
“The current international media industry is very much a child of America. Film, for 
example, is a uniquely American art form: we brought it to life, we made it talk, we 
used it to address our deepest social concerns. Now, we see our media industry on the 
global auction block.”28 Klinger also points to the rise of media piracy from outside 
the U.S.’s borders as a factor in this flare of xenophobia and nominal protectionism. 
Furthermore, Klinger places the nationalist rhetoric of film heritage in the context of 
the rise of massive multinational media corporations. Viacom’s purchase of CBS in 
1999, and AOL’s purchase of Time Warner in early 2000, are two of many examples 
                                                
27 Klinger, Beyond the Multiplex, 104. 
28 Qtd. in Klinger, Beyond the Multiplex, 129. 
 
 
64 
of the consolidation of media enterprises by such corporations. Globalization, Klinger 
summates, “makes defining America a problem:” “The more American business 
becomes dispersed, dissolved, or unrecognizable through economic ventures, the more 
discourses turn urgently to the tasks of emphasizing self-determination, of clarifying 
principles that have traditionally defined the nation, of preserving aspects of the 
heritage that are threatened.”29       
Second, Klinger sees the rise of American film heritage as one strategy for 
conquering the burgeoning ancillary film markets of home video and cable television. 
In this light, film heritage is a marketing scheme based on the principle of “adaptive 
reuse” or, “a recycling of the past that integrates it with the present, preferably for 
profit.”30 As heritage, an old film is transformed into a viable commodity for a new 
market. A significant aspect of this new viability is the notion of education. More than 
mere commercial enterprises, channels like AMC are branded as social institutions not 
unlike museums, possessing vast repositories of knowledge and charged with 
educating the public. In a 1997 article in the New York Times, Stephen Henderson 
praised TCM and AMC, as well as the Fox Movie Channel (FXM), claiming that 
without these venues for film history, “millions might grow up film-illiterate.”31 AMC 
in particular has cultivated its image as a public service through an annual film 
festival, co-organized with Martin Scorsese’s Film Foundation, meant to raise money 
and awareness for film preservation and restoration. 
                                                
29 Klinger, Beyond the Multiplex, 120. 
30 Ibid., 118.  
31 Henderson, “Teaching New Generations,” 29. 
 
 
65 
This view of film heritage echoes UNESCO’s assertions of the importance of 
moving images for “communication and mutual understanding,” the “dissemination of 
knowledge,” and the “education and enrichment of each human being.”32 Though 
shrouded in the somewhat credulous and well-meaning language of NGOs, the 
articulation of film in terms of communication and cognition allows us to move from 
the market to labor, specifically the regime of post-Fordism and immaterial labor that 
has developed in tandem with the processes of globalization noted by Klinger and 
Frick. This relationship between heritage and immaterial labor can be elaborated 
through Paolo Virno’s characterization of “the communication industry (or rather, the 
spectacle, or even yet, the culture industry)” as the “industry of the means of 
production.”33 Virno explains: 
Traditionally, the industry of the means of production is 
the industry that produces machinery and other 
instruments to be used in the most varied sectors of 
production. However, in a situation in which the means 
of production are not reducible to machines but consist 
of linguistic-cognitive competencies inseparable from 
living labor, it is legitimate to assume that a conspicuous 
part of the so-called “means of production” consists of 
techniques and communicative procedures. Now, where 
                                                
32 UNESCO, Recommendation, Preamble. 
33 Virno, Grammar of the Multitude, 61.  
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are these techniques and procedures created, if not in the 
culture industry? The culture industry produces 
(regenerates, experiments with) communicative 
procedures, which are then destined to function also as 
means of production in the more traditional sectors of 
the economy.34  
As dense bundles of shared cultural values, norms, and references—“linguistic-
cognitive competencies”—images function within the networks of immaterial labor as 
machines for the construction of social relations. There is some truth, then, in the quip 
Turner made amid the colorization scandal:  “We've got Spencer Tracy and Jimmy 
Cagney working for us from the grave!”35 If images are part of the means of 
production, a studio or cable channel’s catalogue of old films is a reservoir of fixed 
capital, that is, dead labor. There is also some truth in the marketing of channels like 
AMC that, as Klinger contends, sell film literacy as valuable, rarefied knowledge, or 
cultural capital. However, this phenomenon is less of a mass cultural extension of a 
liberal arts education than a sort of social transformation and diffusion of polytechnics. 
In short, film literacy is general ‘know-how.’ 
 This point is illustrated in a series of films titled, Film ist. (1998-2009), by the 
Austrian experimental filmmaker Gustav Deutsch. Erika Balsom situates Deutsch, 
alongside his Austrian contemporaries Peter Tscherkassy and Martin Arnold, under 
                                                
34 Virno, Grammar of the Multitude, 61. 
35 Qtd. in Sherman, “Ted Turner.”  
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the rubric of what she terms a “cinephilic avant-garde.” Balsom also includes Bill 
Morrison in this category. All of these filmmakers work primarily with found-footage, 
producing films that interrogate the nature of the medium and are largely “about film 
itself: what it has been, what it has meant, and what it can do.”36 The films of these 
directors are often compared to the structural films of the 1960s and 70s, which, in 
Balsom’s summation, “interrogated the basic principles of cinematic specificity 
through reductionist measures that might be considered the filmic analogue of 
Clement Greenberg’s prescriptions for the distillation of painting down to its essential 
principle of flatness.”37 Two of the most well-known structural films are Michael 
Snow’s Wavelength (1967), composed of a single 45-minute zoom, and Tony 
Conrad’s The Flicker (1966), which consists entirely of alternating intervals of black 
and white leader. For Balsom what broadly distinguishes Deutsch, et al., from 
structural film is the question of history. Whereas structural film attempted to distill 
the ontology of film to basic material elements, this contemporary set of filmmakers 
“infuses considerations of ontology with a studied sense of film history, insisting on 
the perpetual becoming of the medium over time rather than attempting to isolate its 
stable or essential being.”38 Both Arnold and Tscherkassy, for instance, draw heavily 
from the history of Hollywood to pair formalist deconstructions of movement, the 
materiality of celluloid, and the individual photogram, with historical investigations of 
                                                
36 Balsom, “A Cinephilic Avant-garde,” 263. 
37 Ibid., 265. On the comparison with structural film, which I will return to in chapter two, see 
Doane, “The Index and the Concept of Medium Specificity;” and Akira Lippit, “Martin 
Arnold’s Memory Machine,” Afterimage 24.6 (1997): 8-10.  
38 Balsom, “A Cinephilic Avant-garde,” 264. 
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the conventions of narrative, genre, sexuality, and the iconicity of stars.39 As Balsom 
argues, this concern with history is inextricable from the innumerable proclamations 
of the death of cinema over the last two decades. The “cinephilia” of this avant-garde 
is thus “a love for cinema at the moment of its loss, or at the very least of its profound 
transformation.”40  
 Film ist. has thirteen parts. The first twelve parts are short films, five to ten 
minutes in length, while the thirteenth part is feature-length. For the most part, the 
footage in Film ist. is drawn from obscure and hard to identify films. Accompanying 
the images is a soundtrack consisting of an abstract collage of music and sound 
effects. Each film begins with a plain, black and white title card with the film’s 
number and title in German and English. The title of each part corresponds to a 
substantial element of the medium. The first six parts, released in 1998, are titled: 
“Movement and Time;” “Light and Darkness;” “An Instrument;” “Material;” “A Blink 
of an Eye;” and “A Mirror.” Parts seven though twelve, released between 1999 and 
2002, are titled: “Comic;” “Magic;” “Conquest;” “Writing and Language;” “Emotions 
and Passion;” and “Memory and Document.” The thirteenth part is titled, “Girl and A 
Gun,” after Godard’s famous maxim. As the titles suggest, Deutsch treats the ontology 
of cinema as multiple and proliferating. This mutable ontology owes as much to the 
technology of cinema, as to the discourses around the medium, deployed in different 
                                                
39 For example see Mulvey, “The Possessive Spectator,” in Death 24x a Second: Stillness and 
the Moving Image (London: Reaktion Books, 2006); and Alice Lovejoy, “Space Invaders,” 
Film Comment 38.3 (2002): 31-2.  
40 Balsom, “A Cinephilic Avant-garde,” 264. 
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contexts and to different purposes. Thus, “film is both a musical instrument as well as 
a surgical instrument that can penetrate the human body (“An Instrument”), the dream 
of a universal language (“Writing and Language”) as well as a conveyor of cultural 
difference (“Conquest”), a guarantor of documentary truth (“Memory and Document”) 
as well as a charlatan trickster (“Magic”).”41 “Heritage” could conceivably provide the 
title to yet another part or, better, an alternative title to the whole project. As the 
opening statements of UNESCO’s Recommendation demonstrate, heritage gathers 
together many of the attributes of cinema suggested by Deutsch’s titles. Heritage is a 
kind of catchall, encompassing the “educational, cultural, artistic, scientific and 
historical” valences of cinema.  
 Yet, Deutsch seems to be after more than an examination of the various ways 
cinema has been defined. In each film the images function as examples, or “visual 
synonyms” of the title; they are arranged “vertically,” as it were, constructing 
paradigms rather than syntagms.42 Deutsch often plays with this format, allowing 
mini-narratives to briefly arise and disappear, and affecting often humorous shot 
reverse-shots, but the vertical structure remains the film’s backbone. Deutsch’s nod to 
structural linguistics is, however, largely a playful feint. As Tom Gunning points out, 
the richness and density of the images easily exceeds and frustrates the lexical 
constraints of the titles. More than a list of discrete synonyms, the groups of images 
are perhaps best seen as “blocks of perception,” as Deutsch himself states. As these 
                                                
41 Balsom, “A Cinephilic Avant-garde,” 293.  
42 Gunning, “Film ist.”  
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blocks pile up, the titles appear as less of an enumeration of cinema’s diverse 
definitions, and more as partial entries in a sort of visual encyclopedia—in fact, 
Deutsch draws images from the Encyclopaedia Cinematographica, a forty year project 
begun in the 1950s by the Institut für den Wissenschaftlichen Film in Göttingen to 
capture every living creature on film. The idea that unites the various parts of Film ist. 
is the idea that the ontology of cinema is intertwined with epistemology. In other 
words, it is via cinema that we know the world. Deutsch emphasizes this point by 
using footage from scientific and educational films for the first six parts of Film ist.—
e.g. car crash tests; Muybridgean motion studies of birds in flight, mammals walking, 
and bullets hitting targets; x-ray images of humans in motion. Cinema measures, 
calibrates, and processes the world. When Deutsch turns in the last seven parts to 
narrative films from the first three decades or so of cinema, the images appear as 
social data, offering operative principles for living. “Emotions and Passion,” for 
example, a series of mostly close-ups of actors from the silent era, seems like a lesson 
in physiognomy. In Gunning’s words, Film ist. is akin to a “child’s spelling book, 
amply illustrated:” “a primer for a visual world.”43    
 Film ist.’s blocks of perception are pared down, abstract versions of the 
programming blocks that Klinger describes on AMC. The 1995 Fourth of July 
marathon of Henry Fonda films might, for instance, be arrayed under the somewhat 
ungainly title of “Individualism, Patriotism, and Democracy.” Klinger writes:  
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Fonda’s portrayals of Lincoln and Joad…represent 
moments in U.S. history when individuals had to fight 
against overwhelming odds to further the cause of 
democracy. In these cases, the inequities that exist 
within the democratic system itself in the forms of 
slavery and poverty. Although critical of the system, 
Fonda’s characterizations suggest that democracy can 
rectify these wrongs though the actions of heroic 
individuals who oppose injustice…Fonda embodies a 
kind of patriotism that exhibits faith in America’s ability 
to resolve crises through the spirit of social 
conscience—democracy’s mechanism for righting social 
wrongs.44  
With Fonda, AMC thus offers a model of how to be a proper American citizen. The 
individual is valorized and mythologized as the agent of historical change, which can 
only come about within the confines of the existing system. Similarly, celebrating 
Black History Month in 1994 with films starring African Americans—e.g. St. Louis 
Blues (1958), starring Nat King Cole, and The Slender Thread (1965), starring Sidney 
Poitier—AMC, Klinger argues, “depicts the integrity of the African American stars as 
able to transcend social prejudice;” and Katherine Hepburn, in the words of AMC, 
                                                
44 Klinger, Beyond the Multiplex, 108.  
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represents “the Statue of Liberty, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Lady Luck. The American 
ideal personified: the image of discipline, drive, the Puritan ethic fulfilled.” 45 
 The discourse of film heritage not only points to the function of film history as 
knowledge, or know-how, but also shapes and organizes this knowledge. The 
discourse of film heritage thus functions as a kind of instruction manual for the 
‘proper’ use of images that have existed for decades and been shorn from their original 
context. The very existence of this type of instruction implies that these image-tools 
can be used in more than one way, pointing to the potential for a different formation of 
heritage. In order to formulate an alternative film heritage it is necessary to expand the 
concept. We need to further understand images from film history as “means of 
production” via their sedimentation in, and inseparability from, living labor. Here the 
tensions apparent in the squabbles over film heritage as private property versus public 
resource—manifest in a different register in UNESCO’s valuation of moving images 
as part of a “nation’s cultural heritage,” as well as “the heritage of mankind as a 
whole”—open onto the common.      
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
 Farocki’s Arbeiter verlassen die Fabrik is a powerful example of the manifold 
uses of images. Made in 1995, Farocki used Arbeiter as a way to mark the ostensible 
centenary of cinema. The thirty-six minute film is a montage of scenes from 
                                                
45 Klinger, Beyond the Multiplex, 112, qtd. 109.   
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throughout the history of cinema showing workers at factory gates, beginning with the 
Lumière brothers’ Workers Leaving the Factory (1895) (Figure 1.2).46 Farocki mines 
the history of cinema in order to re-write that history. In an essay that expounds on the  
 
Fig. 1.2                                                                 Workers Leaving the Factory (1895) 
theoretical connotations of the film (and shares its title), Farocki writes, “[w]ith the 
montage before me, I found myself gaining the impression that for over a century 
cinematography had been dealing with just one single theme.”47 By rendering the 
history of cinema as a long meditation on labor, Farocki turns film against itself. On 
this point, Farocki states: “Films about work or workers have not emerged as one of 
the main film genres, and the space in front of the factory has remained on the 
                                                
46 In 2006, Farocki turned the film into an art installation titled, Arbeiter verlassen die Fabrik 
in elf Jahrzehnten [Workers Leaving the Factory in Eleven Decades]. For an excellent analysis 
of the installation and the politics of cinema in the context of the museum, see Steyerl.   
47 Farocki, “Workers,” 242. 
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sidelines…Immediately after the workers hurry past the gate, they disperse to become 
individual people, and it is this aspect of their existence which is addressed by most 
narrative films.”48 Excising everything but scenes of workers from film history 
constitutes a return of the repressed, betraying the class myopia of the bourgeois, 
individualistic narratives that define popular cinema.   
 This aspect of the film corresponds to what Jacques Rancière, in The Future of 
the Image, terms dialectical montage. Rancière, who is careful to point out that this 
term “goes beyond the boundaries of some particular school or doctrine,” develops the 
notion of dialectical montage largely via a film not unlike Farocki’s Arbeiter, Jean-
Luc Godard’s Histoire(s) du cinéma (1988-98).49 Godard too uses images from the 
history of cinema to offer a different version of this history, suggesting that cinema 
betrayed its enormous creative powers by retreating into fantasy and clichéd narrative. 
Godard thus uses cinema to reveal what cinema itself has hidden from view. It is 
precisely this type of revelation of a secret that is the key function of dialectical 
montage. This form of montage, Rancière states, “invests chaotic power in the creation 
of little machineries of the heterogeneous” in order to blast open cliché and 
convention, and reveal “the other world whose writ runs behind its anodyne or 
glorious appearances”—“the far-off conflict behind home comforts; the homeless 
expelled by urban renovation behind the new buildings and old emblems of the 
                                                
48 Farocki, “Workers,” 238-9. 
49 Rancière, Future of the Image, 56. 
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polity…the community of capital behind all the separations of spheres and the class 
war behind all communities.”50 
 There is a second, complementary way in which Farocki employs dialectical 
montage in Arbeiter that is less a historical account of cinema than an analytical 
argument about capitalism. Anchoring this argument is the Lumières’ original 
Workers Leaving the Factory, which appears at both the beginning and ending of 
Arbeiter, and twice in between. Workers Leaving the Factory functions not only as a 
historical precedent, but also as a kind of visual ground-zero, presenting the titular 
subject with the stark simplicity of a single shot from a static camera. All of the other 
scenes chosen by Farocki subsequently appear as variations and elaborations on the 
basic visual theme presented by the Lumières (Figures 1.3 and 1.4). “One finds it 
used,” Farocki observes, “in documentaries, in industrial and propaganda films, often 
with music and/or words as backing, the image being given a textual meaning such as 
‘the exploited,’ ‘the industrial proletariat,’ ‘the workers of the fist,’ or ‘the society of 
the masses.’”51 The historical and visual relation of these textual embellishments to the 
first Workers Leaving the Factory also has a conceptual dimension. In a pointed 
reflection on the Lumières’ film, Farocki writes, “[t]he work structure [i.e. the end of 
the workday] synchronizes the workers, the factory gate herds them together, and this 
process of compression produces the image of a work force. The portrayal reminds us  
 
                                                
50 Rancière, Future of the Image 56-7.   
51 Farocki, “Workers” 239. 
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Fig. 1.3                                                                Arbeiter verlassen die Fabrik (1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.4                                                                Arbeiter verlassen die Fabrik (1995) 
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that the people passing through the gates evidently have something in common.”52 
What these myriad men and women have in common is of course their status as 
workers. More specifically, what they have in common is their ability to produce, that 
is, labor power, which Marx defined as “the aggregate of those mental and physical 
capabilities existing in the physical form, the living personality, of the human 
being.”53 But insofar as labor power is a capacity, a potential to do something, and not 
a thing itself, labor power arguably cannot be made visible. Rather, what is made 
visible here in image-form, or in what Farocki calls a “visual concept,” is a principle 
of equivalence based on labor power; it is labor power abstracted—Farocki thus goes 
on to describe the workers streaming through the gates as “standing in for the absent 
and invisible movement of goods, money, and ideas circulating in the industrial 
sphere.”54 A visual concept of abstract labor, Workers Leaving the Factory has a 
conceptual or, really, an ontological anteriority to the scenes illustrating the “industrial 
proletariat,” “the workers of the fist,” etc. As Hardt and Negri argue, “the concept of 
abstract labor—representing what is common to labor in different occupations—is 
what makes it possible to think the working class.”55 Behind the disparate images of 
workers, there is the common. 
                                                
52 Farocki, “Workers” 239. 
53 Marx, Capital, 270. 
54 Farocki, “Workers” 243. 
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 This aspect of Arbeiter edges toward the realm of another kind of montage, 
which Rancière describes as an “operation of communalization.”56 This operation 
corresponds to what Rancière calls symbolist montage. Rather than two entirely 
disparate methods, symbolist and dialectical montage are closer to different effects of 
combination that continuously flip back and forth. On this point, Rancière states: 
“these two forms themselves never stop intermingling their logics. They work on the 
same elements, in accordance with procedures that verge on the indiscernible.”57 
Interwoven in this way with dialectical montage, symbolist montage is “a machine for 
making something common, not to contrast worlds, but to present, in the most 
unexpected ways, a co-belonging.”58 Rancière first focuses on symbolist montage, and 
its close relation to dialectical montage, in a reading of a moment from the final 
episode in Histoire(s), “The Signs Among Us.” Here four visual elements are put into 
play. Two of these elements, Rancière suggests, are “readily identifiable” insofar as 
they “belong in fact to the store of significant images of twentieth century history and 
cinema:” the photo of a Jewish boy surrendering, arms in the air, in the Warsaw 
ghetto, and the visage of Murnau’s Nosferatu.59 Superimposed on the first is an image 
of a woman on a staircase holding a candle, while the second is overlaid with an image 
from King Vidor’s The Crowd (1928). In a dense reading of the sequence that 
elucidates the dialectical pole of the montage, Rancière draws on the narrative of the 
                                                
56 Rancière, Future of the Image, 34. 
57 Ibid., 60.  
58 Ibid., 58.  
59 Rancière, Future of the Image, 36.  
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film from which the image of the woman comes—The Spiral Staircase (1945)—in 
order to show how Godard draws a parallel between the captivation of the German 
crowds by Nazism and the captivation of the film-going crowds by Hollywood. Yet, 
Rancière quickly reverses, admitting that the woman on the stairs is “an actress as 
little known to viewers of Histoire(s) than the film itself [The Spiral Staircase].”60 
Something else, then, comes to the fore: the very ability for the image of the woman to 
come into contact with the image of the child, which “assumes the existence of a 
boundless Store/Library/Museum where all films, texts, photographs and paintings 
coexist.”61 This aspect of the montage steers toward the symbolist pole.  
 Rancière elaborates on the meaning of such coexistence by honing in on the 
seventh episode of Histoire(s), “The Control of the Universe.” In a section from this 
episode titled, “The Method of Hitchcock,” Godard presents a series of iconic images 
from Hitchcock’s films: the windmill in Foreign Correspondent (1940), the glass of 
milk in Suspicion (1941), Kim Novak floating in San Francisco Bay in Vertigo (1958), 
the knife across Janet Leigh’s abdomen in Psycho (1960), and a hand reaching for the 
crucial lighter in Strangers on a Train (1951), among others. This sequence thus 
loosely recalls the form of AMC’s series, “Shots Seen ’round the World.” If the 
images in the AMC series can be ranged under the title “America,” or “American 
History,” what unites the images here? What allows these images to be removed from 
                                                
60 Rancière, Future of the Image, 53-4.  
61 Ibid., 30. On the archival dynamics of Histoire(s), see also Trond Lundemo, “The Index and 
Erasure: Godard’s Approach to Film History,” in For Ever Godard, eds. Michael Temple, 
James S. Williams and Michael Will (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2004), 380-95.  
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their original context—something Godard exaggerates by separating each image with 
moments of black screen—and integrated into a new narrative about the history of 
cinema? As if in answer to this question, Godard directly follows this sequence on 
Hitchcock with an eclectic collection of seemingly unrelated images, also separated by 
moments of black screen, but tied together by the following voice-over:  
From insouciance to disquietude, from the impassioned 
and truculent first efforts to the hesitant but essential 
forms of the last, it is the same central force that governs 
the cinema. One follows it within cinema from form to 
form, with the shadow and the ray of light which circle 
around, illuminating one thing, hiding another, causing a 
shoulder to jut forth, or a face, or a raised finger, an 
open book, a forehead, or a little child in a manger…the 
headlight of a car, a sleeping face, darkness becoming 
animated, some beings leaning over a cradle on which 
all the light falls, a man executed in front of a dirty wall, 
a miry road running alongside the sea, a street corner, an 
obscure sky, a ray of light over some meadow land, the 
empire of the wind discovered in a flying cloud…It is 
there when the cradle is illuminated. It is there when the 
young girl appears to us leaning on the windowsill, with 
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eyes that do not know…It is there when she has aged, 
when her furrowed face is surrounded with a cap and 
when her bony hands cross at her waist to signify that 
she has no resentment against life for having dealt hard 
with her.62  
As Rancière points out, the text of this voice-over is lifted with slight alterations from 
Élie Faure’s epic five-volume History of Art. The “same central force that governs the 
cinema” is what Faure terms the “spirit of the forms.” For Faure, Rancière explains, 
“forms” refers to “both artistic forms and the cyclical forms of life in this universe;” 
the “spirit of the forms,” Rancière continues, “is the ‘central fire’ that welds them, the 
universal energy of collective life that does and undoes its forms.”63 This universalism 
expressed in Godard is perhaps akin to a film heritage “of mankind as a whole,” to use 
UNESCO’s phrase, rather than the type of cinematic national identity espoused by 
AMC.  
                                                
62 Qtd. in Rancière, “Fable Without a Moral,” 175. See Jean-Luc Godard, Histoire(s) du 
cinéma, vol. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1998). 
63 Rancière, “Fable Without a Moral,” 177. On the “spirit of the forms,” Faure writes: 
“Whether one feels it or not, whether one wishes it or not, a universal solidarity unites all the 
acts and all the images of men, not only in space but also and especially in time…the 
affirmation of this solidarity is by no means the fruit of a mystical intuition. This solidarity 
really exists. It belongs to the development of universal history of which it was one of the 
driving forces, perhaps the strongest and most supple of all.” Élie Faure, History of Art: The 
Spirit of the Forms, vol. 5, translated by Walter Pach (New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1930), xii. 
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Rancière suggests that Godard’s Histoire(s) points to a “neo-symbolist and 
neo-humanist tendency in contemporary art.”64 For example, Rancière locates 
symbolist montage in the work of Vanessa Beecroft, Bill Viola, and Ken Lum, among 
others. The thirteenth part of Deutsch’s Film ist., “A Girl and a Gun,” which draws 
from a huge range of material including pornography, historical documentary, nature 
films, and narrative drama, moves in this direction as well. In this regard, the titles of 
the five acts of “A Girl and a Gun” are telling: Genesis, Paradeisos, Eros, Thanatos, 
and Symposion. For this film, Deutsch jettisons the perceptual analytic of the first 
twelve parts of Film ist; the images, as Gunning puts it, “are pressed into a context that 
endows them with heavily symbolic roles and meanings.” Sexuality is presented as 
universal energy, and the material of a cosmology. Here, Gunning continues, Deutsch 
seeks to “fashion a cinematic myth in which the full course of time and history 
unwinds within a [sic] eternal process of union and division.”65 Morrison’s Decasia, 
which I will discuss in the next chapter, also relies on this type of montage.    
Rancière is somewhat hesitant about the expression of the common in 
Histoire(s). In The Future of the Image, for example, he notes that Godard largely 
presents the experience of a common humanity, and art’s ability to tap into this 
experience, in the form of a eulogy, “a funeral chant to the glory of an art and a world 
of art that have vanished, on the verge of the latest catastrophe.”66 In a later essay, 
Rancière’s prognosis is even more dire. Through analyses of two films from 2002, 
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65 Gunning, “From Fossils of Time to a Cinematic Genesis.” 
66 Rancière, Future of the Image, 67.
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namely Lars von Trier’s Dogville and Clint Eastwood’s Mystic River, Rancière shows 
how the invocation of a common humanity can detach from history, and frame those 
who struggle within and against the present order as either victims in need of 
liberation by a higher power, or worse, inhuman. This notion of humanity can thus 
generate as its obverse the specter of an absolute evil, and the Bush doctrine of infinite 
justice, becoming an alibi for capitalism, ‘progress,’ the defense of the present, and the 
maintenance of order.67  
The common in Arbeiter, as outlined above, circumvents these difficulties. By 
articulating the “central fire” of Godard’s Histoire(s) in terms of what Marx called the 
“living, form-giving fire” of labor, Farocki not only lends this common element a 
more concrete historicization—concomitant with the development of capital—he also 
renders it more pointedly political.68 The crystallization of abstract labor in the identity 
of the working class—“the exploited,” “the workers of the fist”—catalyzes the 
creation of a potent political agency and a motor for historical transformation. Indeed, 
in addition to scenes of workers leaving the factory, Farocki includes scenes of often 
violent confrontation at the factory gates. In one scene from an early film by Griffith, 
which Farocki describes as “probably the greatest shoot-out in front of factory gates in 
the hundred-year history of cinema,” police gather and open fire on striking workers.69  
                                                
67 Rancière, “The Ethical Turn.” For a similar line of argumentation, see Agamben, “Beyond 
Human Rights,” in Means Without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vicenzo Binetti and Cesare 
Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 15-26.  
68 Marx, Grundrisse, 361. 
69 Farocki, “Workers,” 240. 
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Moreover, the symbolist dimension of Arbeiter suggests a notion of the 
common that can be expanded to even more directly and specifically reflect the 
political-economic constitution of the present. If the dialectical pole of montage in 
Arbeiter suggests that what lies behind all the images of cinema is labor, and what is 
common to the exploited classes is labor in the abstract, the symbolist pole can be 
elaborated as the perhaps more unfamiliar proposition that what is common to all labor 
is the image. Farocki’s notion of an “archive of visual concepts” is key in this respect. 
In an essay co-authored with media archaeologist Wolfgang Ernst, Farocki describes 
Arbeiter as the first ‘entry’ in this archive, which he also refers to variously as a 
“dictionary in the realm of cinema,” “a cinematographic thesaurus,” an “illustrated 
book,” a “treasure trove of images,” and an “archive of filmic expressions.”70 While 
much of what is discussed in Ernst and Farocki’s essay is something on the order of a 
database, Arbeiter gives this notion of an archive of visual concepts a broader 
meaning. Again, Farocki’s essay on the film is illuminating: “It’s like a child repeating 
the first words it has learned to speak for more than a hundred years…Or as if cinema 
had been working in the same spirit as painters of the Far East, always painting the 
same landscape until it is perfected and eventually includes the painter himself within 
it.”71 Farocki is here expressing the dialectical aspect of the film that re-writes the 
history of cinema in terms of what is left out (the “first words” being the Lumières’ 
                                                
70 Ernst and Farocki, “Towards an Archive,” 273-83. The sections within this essay are 
specifically attributed to either Ernst or Farocki. All references here are to Farocki’s 
contributions.  
71 Farocki, “Workers,” 242.  
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Workers Leaving the Factory). Yet the reference to the child, which becomes the 
painter, goes further by alluding to a subject that generates this history. Aside from 
providing a nod to realism, and Bazin’s “myth of total cinema,” the image of the 
painter entering the painting (a parable also referenced in Benjamin’s “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Its Technical Reproducibility”) invites a reading of the workers we 
see in front of the camera as standing in for the workers behind the camera. The 
repetition of the visual theme of workers exiting the factory thus also reflects the 
extent to which the images from the Lumières’ film have been ingrained, as deeply 
ingrained as a child’s first words, in the minds of those working in the film industry. 
In this sense, the status of Workers Leaving the Factory as a visual concept not only 
indicates the way in which it visualizes and concretizes an abstraction, but also the 
way in which it exists as an abstraction, as a mental tool, that has concrete, material 
effects. Put differently, Workers Leaving the Factory has become part of the 
technology of cinema, if this technology is understood to encompass the ‘wetware’ of 
human bodies and their activity.   
This facet of Arbeiter creates a significant and productive ambiguity. Is the 
Lumières’ film being used to designate a particular image-tool, or labor in its 
abstraction and commonality? Do ‘the exploited,’ the ‘workers of the fist,’ and ‘the 
masses,’ stand in for the labor and laborers behind the camera, or is it the other way 
around? This ambiguity points to Virno’s elaboration on the idea of the culture 
industry. Virno argues that, in addition to serving as the industry of the means of 
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production, the culture industry is both an anticipation of, and paradigm for, 
immaterial labor. Alongside the “Fordization of the culture industry” described by 
Adorno and Horkheimer, it was, Virno argues, “necessary to maintain a certain space 
that was informal, not programmed, one which was open to the unforeseen spark, to 
communicative and creative improvisation: not in order to favor human creativity, 
naturally, but in order to achieve satisfactory levels of corporate productivity.” Virno 
continues: “The informality of communicative behavior, the competitive interaction 
typical of a meeting, the abrupt diversion that can enliven a television program (in 
general, everything which it would have been dysfunctional to rigidify and regulate 
beyond a certain threshold) has become now, in the post-Ford era, a typical trait of the 
entire realm of social production.”72 To this list of post-Fordist traits of work in the 
culture industry, we might also add film literacy. Of course, throughout the twentieth 
century the proletariat was also getting an education in cinema. Once the workers 
disperse from the gates and pursue their individual narratives, one thing most of them 
are sure to do is go to the movies. Farocki emphasizes the worker as the embodiment 
of film history by including scenes from Modern Times (1936) and Clash by Night 
(1952) that feature Charlie Chaplin and Marilyn Monroe, respectively, as workers at 
factory gates. The knowledge that Deutsch presents in abstract form in the first twelve 
parts of Film ist. is here endowed with a corporeality and the connotation of class. Yet 
it would take the development of the regime of immaterial labor, in full swing at the 
                                                
72 Virno, Grammar of the Multitude, 58-9. See Max Horkeimer and Theodor W. Adorno, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by Edmund Jephcott, edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr 
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time of cinema’s centenary, to actually put such knowledge to work in a more general 
and systemic fashion. The images of exit from the industrial factory may be thus seen 
as standing in for the historical exodus into the social factory, and the ongoing 
diffusion of labor into every facet of social life.73 At one point in Arbeiter, over a 
scene from Fritz Lang’s iconic Metropolis (1927), featuring uniform-clad workers 
marching in lockstep, Farocki narrates, “this vision of the future has not been fulfilled; 
nowadays one cannot tell with a glance whether a passer-by is coming from work, 
sports, or the welfare office.” 
In the contemporary moment, the archive of visual concepts, whatever else it 
may be, can also be understood as general intellect. The concept of the general 
intellect originally comes from Marx. In some brief pages in the Grundrisse that have 
come to be known as the “Fragment on Machines,” Marx envisions the production 
process taken over almost entirely by machines. Marx describes this system of 
machines as a concretization and objectification of the accumulated social and 
scientific knowledge of humanity, or the general intellect. The worker’s 
“understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social 
body,” as well as “all of the powers of science and of nature, as of social combination 
and social intercourse,” are transformed into the “great foundation stone of production 
and wealth.”74 Over the last three decades, Virno, and others linked to the tradition of 
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autonomist Marxism, have deployed the general intellect as a way to diagnose 
important changes in the contemporary mode of production. The core of this new use 
of general intellect is an attempt to transform it from a concept of fixed capital, or 
dead labor, as it appears in the Grundrisse, to a concept of living labor. In “Notes on 
the ‘General Intellect,’” Virno states:  
Today, it is not difficult to enlarge the notion of general 
intellect far beyond the kind of knowledge which is 
materialized in fixed capital, to include also those forms 
of knowledge which structure social communications 
and which impels the activity of mass intellectual 
labor…Within the processes of contemporary labor, 
there are entire constellations of concepts which 
function all by themselves as productive “machines,” 
without any need for a mechanical body or for a small 
electronic soul. What we call mass intellectuality is 
living labor in its function as the determining 
articulation of the “general intellect.” Mass 
intellectuality—as an ensemble, as a social body—is the 
repository of the indivisible knowledges of living 
subjects and of their linguistic cooperation.75  
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Like abstract labor, the general intellect designates something that is common to a 
diversity of occupations. However, this commonality is not merely presupposed by the 
labor market and verified in the process of exchange; it is directly integrated into the 
production process itself. Thus, Virno asserts, “the general intellect has nothing to do 
with the principle of equivalence. The models of social knowledge are not units of 
measurement; instead, they constitute the premise for operative heterogeneous 
possibilities.”76  
 In his writing on the archive of visual concepts, Farocki offers an anecdote that 
also serves as a sort of parable: “Cameraman Axel Block told me a few years ago how 
the directors who shoot a Tatort [a German/Austrian/Swiss television series] episode, 
watch a tape of a Hawks film the night before, in order to draw something from it for 
their own shoot.”77 While both the physical tape of the Hawks film and the shelves of 
tapes from which it is selected are repositories of cognitive and communicative 
procedures, it is in the collective dreams of the directors the night before the shoot and 
in the activity on the set the following day where the images foment as general 
intellect. As Hardt and Negri write in Multitude, just as “common knowledge is the 
foundation of all new production of knowledge,” and “linguistic community is the 
basis of all linguistic innovation,” so too, “our common social image bank makes 
possible the creation of new images.”78 This idea of the common stretches across a 
positive feedback loop whereby, for example, new images make their way into the 
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shared social image bank and in turn become the foundation for yet more new images, 
and so on. Moreover, this loop is generated in common through labor grounded in 
communication, cooperation, and collaboration. In the common the premises, 
processes, and products of labor are conflated. Similarly, neat demarcations between 
knowledge, language, and image are largely a heuristic device. The ‘contents’ of the 
general intellect are, as Virno puts it, “indivisible.” The general intellect is not simply 
“the aggregate of the knowledge acquired by the species, but the faculty of thinking; 
potential as such, not its countless particular realizations. The general intellect is 
nothing but the intellect in general.”79 The cinematic common is thus not simply a 
“common social image bank;” it is also, and more significantly, an attribute of the 
intellect in general. Virno suggests as much when he says of the general intellect, “one 
can locate its main characteristics in different functions within labor, but above all at 
the level of metropolitan habits, in linguistic usages, in cultural consumption.”80 What 
else has dominated these activities over the last century more than cinema? The 
cinematic common names the common of labor from the perspective of the social 
influence of cinema.  
 This formulation demands another explanation of the ambiguity in Arbeiter. Is 
the common based on abstract labor, or is it based on living labor? This question 
points to the role of capital in constructing the common. Abstract labor is directly 
organized by capital and inextricable from the quantification of labor in the wage 
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relation; abstract labor is labor actualized and expended in the production of surplus 
value. The image of workers leaving the factory is an apt image of abstract labor 
precisely because it shows labor that has gone through the process of exchange. Living 
labor, which here connotes the very faculty of thinking, or the potential for thought, 
has a more slippery relation to capital. Certainly, the potentiality that is living labor is 
thoroughly historical. The inseparability of cinema and the general intellect is the 
legacy of the development of the culture industry and the still ongoing development of 
post-Fordism. Yet, as potentiality, living labor cannot be reduced to its actualization in 
the creation of surplus value; living labor exceeds the relation of exchange, and thus 
the direct organization of capital. The ambiguity of the common in Arbeiter vis-à-vis 
abstract and living labor can be historicized through Hardt and Negri’s 
characterization of the contemporary mode of production as an “expropriation of the 
common.”81 Hardt and Negri contend that as the networks of immaterial labor grow 
more dense and flexible, they also tend towards greater autonomy. Whereas under the 
industrial regime of labor the walls of the factory and the limits of the workday framed 
the coordination and cooperation of work, with the rise of immaterial labor the rigidity 
of these constraints begins to loosen and cooperation is increasingly generated ad hoc 
within the tangle of social interactions. Capital steps further back from labor, as it 
were, capturing and expropriating the products of social relations that continually 
outpace direct orchestration. Capital, in other words, becomes less functionally 
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generative of surplus, and more parasitical.82 From this perspective, the interplay of 
the common of abstract labor and of living labor in Arbeiter reflects the push and pull 
between the relative autonomy of immaterial labor and capital’s nimble and ever-
evolving systems of expropriation, and strategies of control.      
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
The cinematic common may also name an aspect of the revolutionary project 
of liberating the multitude from capital. Once again, the official discourse of heritage 
provides a useful starting point. In 2003, UNESCO expanded its concept of heritage 
by adopting the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage. In 
the Convention, “intangible heritage” is defined as: 
the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, 
skills—as well as the instruments, objects and cultural 
space associated therewith—that communities, groups, 
and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their 
cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, 
transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly 
recreated by communities and groups in response to 
their environment, their interaction with nature and their 
history, and provides them with a sense of identity and 
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continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity 
and human creativity.83  
This heritage is then divided into five domains: “oral traditions and expressions, 
including language as a vehicle of the intangible cultural heritage;” “performing arts;” 
“social practices, rituals and festive events;” “knowledge and practices concerning 
nature and the universe;” and “traditional craftsmanship.”84 Some of the practices 
included on UNESCO’s official lists of intangible heritage include: weaving skills in 
the United Arab Emirates; the building and sailing of Iranian Lenj boats in the Persian 
Gulf; the gastronomic meal of the French; knowledge of the jaguar shamans of 
Yuruparí (Colombia); the Mediterranean diet; equitation in the French tradition; the 
collective fishing rite of the Sanké (Mali); and the design and practices for building 
Chinese wooden arch bridges.85  
 Intangible heritage is a broad and flexible enough concept to articulate film 
heritage in terms of both the contents of this or that studio vault, federal archive, or 
film library, as well as what I have called the cinematic common. Bodies and brains, 
tapes, reels and digital files are all laid out on the same material plane, and constitute 
components of the same social machinery. The “cultural space associated therewith” is 
not confined to the archives, the offices and backlots of the culture industry, or the 
space in front of a screen, but also encompasses the social environment in its full 
breadth and depth as “a repository and skill set of affects, social relations, habits, 
                                                
83 UNESCO, Convention for Safeguarding Intangible Heritage, Article 2. 
84 Ibid. 
85 UNESCO, “Intangible Heritage Lists.” 
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desires, knowledges, and cultural circuits.”86 Likewise, the constant recreation of film 
heritage stretches from the technical restoration of “classics,” such as Hitchcock’s 
Vertigo in 1996—another initial entry on the National Film Registry, and whose 
restoration I will analyze in chapter three—all the way to the systemic, self-generating 
re-production of social life (and the re-production of labor power), and thus the re-
production of the capitalist world order. But what might it mean to “recognize” film 
heritage, in this expanded sense, specifically as heritage? 
 Identity is central to this question. Indeed, the first part of the first sentence of 
the Recommendation on the Safeguarding and Preservation of Moving Images 
declares, “moving images are an expression of the cultural identity of peoples.”87 
Identity also appears at the beginning of Hardt and Negri’s theorization of revolution 
in the final part of Commonwealth. Hardt and Negri argue here that identity politics is 
a necessary starting point for any revolutionary project, as identity is such a firmly 
entrenched aspect of the present. In this context the first two tasks of identity politics 
are the rendering visible of a subordinated identity and its mobilization as a 
revolutionary weapon. Arbeiter works in both veins, overturning the exclusion of labor 
from the history of cinema, and showing proletarian identity forged in struggle. At this 
point, however, the framework of identity must be jettisoned; otherwise, identity can 
become a blockage to revolution insofar as it can easily slip into the logic of property, 
which capital will all too readily appropriate. The preamble of UNESCO’s 
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Recommendation, for example, goes on to describe heritage as “cultural property.” In 
the same opening section, the safeguarding and preservation of heritage is then 
framed, across the span of a single sentence, in terms of “due regard” for both “human 
rights and fundamental freedoms inherent in the dignity of the human being,” as well 
as “the legitimate position of copyright holders and of all the holders of other rights in 
moving images.”88 It is little surprise then that the idea of an American film heritage 
first took shape vis-à-vis Turner’s business plans, and a fight over ownership. 
 My previous description of film heritage as an instruction manual can here be 
reformulated as a strategy for controlling the production of the common. The AMC 
series “Shots Seen ‘round the World,” is exemplary in this regard. The series gathers 
together iconic images, which one can imagine circulating and incubating within the 
“common social image bank,” and tags them with the connotation of an essential 
American-ness. Such constellations of images, deemed as heritage, act like little 
command outposts scattered across the social environment that serve to legitimize the 
present order, and seek to regulate and guide social relations within acceptable 
boundaries. In Arbeiter, Farocki stresses how images both compose and police the 
common by returning several times to footage, conspicuously devoid of workers, of a 
high-tech gate and roadblock. Moreover, in one shot, footage from a surveillance 
camera catches anonymous figures trespassing on private property; in another shot 
from a test film, a truck smashes into a roadblock at 80km/h and disintegrates in slow 
motion. In this light, the film provides a lesson in identity politics. Capital is fine with 
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workers asserting their identity, so long as they remain workers. Identities are easy to 
control and surveil. 
 In the middle of Arbeiter, Farocki returns again to the Lumières’ film to 
complicate the picture. He returns to the footage here to point out a small, easily 
overlooked detail. As the workers stream out of the factory towards the camera, they 
part in two directions, some exiting frame left and some exiting frame right. Suddenly, 
the image freezes. An iris closes in on the lower right quadrant of the frame, blocking 
out the rest of the image. Within the iris, we see a woman, turned to exit the left of the 
frame, reaching out and grasping the skirt of another woman, turned to exit the right of 
the frame. With the iris still in place, Farocki, fascinated with this detail, twice 
rewinds the footage and lets it play in slow motion. He then rewinds a third time, and 
lets the film run at normal speed, the iris opening out as the woman reaches out, 
briefly tugging the skirt of her co-worker before the two part ways. For Farocki, this 
fleeting gesture serves as what Roland Barthes calls the punctum in the image. The 
punctum, Barthes writes, is an “element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it 
like an arrow and pierces me.”89 In Rancière’s words, the punctum is “the power of 
singularity.”90 In Arbeiter the Lumières’ film is therefore at once the site of the 
common as well as singularity.   
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The coincidence of the common and singularity is precisely how Hardt and 
Negri define the multitude.91 The linking of common and singular rescues the concept 
of the multitude from the familiar dyad of the One and the Many. The multitude does 
not coalesce into the homogenous identity of the One—e.g., the industrial proletariat, 
or the American people—nor does it disperse into an anarchic Many. It exists, rather, 
as a multiplicity characterized by the communication of singularities. On the one hand, 
this definition of the multitude is meant to describe what is new about the 
contemporary mode of production. In this sense, it registers the way diverse modes of 
activity are engaged in the production of the common, but without losing their 
distinctiveness. On the other hand, the multitude sets the parameters for a political 
project that may avoid the traps of identity and dismantle the logic of property, 
reappropriating the production of the common for the common good. “What identity is 
to property,” Hardt and Negri declare in Commonwealth, “singularity is to the 
common.”92 Singularity confounds the notion of property (and constitutes a properly 
revolutionary weapon) because it is not a thing to be possessed, but a ceaseless process 
of becoming. This becoming is always produced in relation to other singularities, and 
thus in common.  
   The communication and cooperation of singularities as a multitude that is 
capable of building a world beyond capitalism requires a new art of organization and a 
new mode of self-governance. Towards the conclusion to Commonwealth, Hardt and 
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Negri, long beset by charges of spontaneism, write: “Insurrection, in order to open a 
path for revolution, must be sustained and consolidated in an institutional process.”93 
As part of this process, the recognition of film as heritage might be reformulated as 
constructing an institution of the common. This would mean severing the links 
between film heritage and conservative social institutions like the nation (and taking 
UNESCO’s invocation of “cultural diversity and human creativity” as more than mere 
neoliberal drivel); in other words, mobilizing film heritage as an institution of the 
common would mean wresting it from those apparatuses that strive to police the 
common by consolidating identities and distributing them within hierarchies. The 
radical institutionalization outlined by Hardt and Negri, “does not reduce the 
multiplicity of singularities but creates a context for them to manage their encounters: 
to avoid the negative encounters, which diminish their strength, and prolong and 
repeat the joyful ones, which increase it.”94 
 As an institution of the common, film heritage, or the heritage of the multitude, 
might be described as an “autobiography of companions.” I borrow this phrase from 
Stanley Cavell’s The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film. For Cavell, 
to write (think, speak and live, that is, to labor) about, and with, films is to write about 
one’s self. But this self is always a multiplicity of selves, and a singularity; it is 
populated by companions and friends. These companions can be real and intimate. 
Cavell writes of watching films: “It is the nature of these experiences to be lined with 
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fragments of conversations and responses of friends that I have gone to movies with. 
And the times of sharing just afterwards.” These companions can also be the unknown 
multitudes of others who have seen the same film. Thus, Cavell concedes: “It is 
generally true of the writing about film which has meant something to me that it has 
the power of the missing companion.”95 In this context, Farocki’s prompt to make 
space for the films one refers to in one’s thoughts means to make space for 
companions—past, present, and future, closest to home, and furthest away. It is in the 
cultivation and dilation of this space, in step with the autopoiesis of the multitude, that 
film heritage can come to serve the common.  
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
 In The Film of Her, Morrison also provides an alterative history. The Film of 
Her is a fictionalized account of a real copyright clerk, Howard L. Walls. Morrison, 
affecting Walls’ West Virginian accent—Morrison interviewed Walls in preparation 
for the film—narrates much of the film in the first person. In addition to being an 
alternative history, The Film of Her is thus also a filmic autobiography. In 1942, Walls 
discovered the Paper Print Collection in a library vault. Before 1912 moving images 
could not claim copyright. In order to assure protection of their products, early film 
pioneers like Edison printed their films on paper and submitted them for copyright as 
series of photographs. After the Townsend Act of 1912, moving images could be 
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copyrighted, but prints were only very rarely delivered to the Library of Congress. 
After changes in copyright procedures, the Paper Print Collection faded from 
institutional memory. There are an estimated three thousand paper print titles in the 
collection—corresponding to roughly two and one half million feet of film. The 
collection contains more than fifteen hundred titles submitted by Edison—including 
The Sneeze, which is believed to be the first film submitted for copyright in 1894—
over four hundred titles submitted by Siegmund Lubin, and approximately two 
hundred titles directed by D.W. Griffith.96 Upon discovering the collection, 
Walls/Morrison states in The Film of Her, “I felt like Balboa, when he climbed over 
the last hill and he saw the Pacific Ocean…I felt like I found forever there, in that 
thing.” Walls was placed in charge of the collection and began cataloguing its 
contents. He then set to work restoring the prints, converting them to 35mm celluloid 
with an optical printer. In 1953, Walls was fired. Kemp Nivers took over his job, and 
in 1955 was awarded an honorary Academy Award for his work restoring the 
collection. No mention was made of Walls. In a thorough historiography of the Paper 
Print Collection, Gabriel M. Paletz details how Walls also faded from subsequent 
accounts of the collection. Nivers, whose obituary in American Cinematographer in 
1996 credited him as the first to restore the Paper Print Collection, also received the 
American Society of Cinematographer’s President’s Award, and a lifetime fellowship 
in the Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers. Walls, and the numerous 
technicians who collaborated with him, writes Paletz, “shrank before the myth of a 
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great man.”97 With The Film of Her Morrison uncovers the story obscured by this 
myth.  
 The film begins with a preamble: an extraordinary, increasingly breathless 
composition of images that lasts just over a minute, then fades to a black screen, 
followed by the title credit. In the first shot, a hand pulls down a reel from a shelf of 
films. The image dissolves to a man sleeping at a table, approached by a mysterious, 
hooded figure. A close-up of a candle then appears. The camera pulls back to reveal an 
archaic projector, and the lens being closed over the candle. We are then in outer 
space. A meteor rushes towards the camera and fills the frame with an explosion, 
followed by shots of the bubbling primeval soup, and the earth, covered by the 
familiar continents and clouds, hanging in space. In a quick series of shots, the sphere 
of the earth is replaced in the frame by a living cell, which gives way to a frame 
teeming with cells, an image of sperm, a fetus in the womb, and finally the face of a 
baby. Next, a rapid traveling shot of fallow fields is followed by time-lapse images of 
plants sprouting roots and pushing up through the soil. We see workers picking cotton, 
and then machines processing the crop. More machines appear, and the editing 
becomes quicker. A rush of images shows machines producing motion picture film. 
Finally, a hazy figure holds the celluloid before his eyes, and the screen fades to black. 
 In the span of scarcely more then a minute, we witness the big bang, the 
creation of the earth, the development of human life, and then agriculture and industry, 
which begets cinema. As Ursula Böser observes, the early image of the sleeping man 
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suggests a trope common to much American avant-garde cinema, wherein “a 
mediating character is introduced in the early portions of a film to mark the operation 
of style as representation of human consciousness.”98 This reading is reinforced by a 
description the copyright clerk’s “dreams of power and creation and making 
something of himself,” as well as the penultimate shot of the film: another image of a 
man sleeping at a table, who then awakes. In the preamble, the “power and creation” 
of the imagination literally creates the world, and is the living embodiment of the 
machinery that appears at the end of the segment. Yet the mind that ultimately dreams 
up and creates cinema is also preceded by cinema, as suggested by the film’s opening 
shot of a film can. Cinema begets consciousness, which in turn begets cinema. This 
loop between film and thought, which is crucial to what follows in The Film of Her, 
echoes in compact form the constant recreation of cinema in its broadest sense as 
intangible heritage.  
 The segment also partakes in the ‘making common’ that marks Rancière’s 
concept of symbolist montage. Film is presented in its materiality as a substance 
constructed by machines. Aided by the montage’s momentous compression of time, 
this materiality is strung together with the material stuff of cells, of human and plant 
life, and the basic elements from which the earth was first composed. A short 
sequence following the title credit has similar implications. In the span of less than a 
minute, we see a forest; the felling of trees; the workings of a lumber mill; the 
production of sheets of plywood, then paper, which is transported in huge rolls to 
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factories; the production of newspapers; and finally the creation of the type of paper 
prints submitted to the Library of Congress. This materialism provides another 
example of the potential dangers involved in the symbolist form of montage. The 
commonality of matter is here simply a metaphysical given, detached from any 
historical or political framework. 
The freewheeling monism of these opening segments is, however, tempered as 
the film transitions into the story of Walls, which provides a different notion of the 
common. Imitating Walls, Morrison narrates the story of the clerk in the past tense. 
The images are therefore presented as Walls’ recollections. The story proceeds in a 
straight-forward, chronological fashion. Walls arrives at the Library of Congress, and 
after working for some time as a clerk discovers the Paper Print Collection. The 
Second World War breaks out and Walls’ work on the collection slows, as he is 
charged with helping catalogue captured enemy films. After the war, Walls loses his 
job and one night, while sitting in a diner, sees the Academy Awards broadcast in 
which Nivers is honored.  
Despite the clarity of the narrative, this large section of the film has a peculiar 
effect. This effect is close to what Pier Paolo Pasolini describes in his seminal essay, 
“The Cinema of Poetry,” as “free indirect discourse.” According to Pasolini, “free 
indirect discourse” in the cinema describes instances in which the camera, and the 
filmmaker, assumes the mode of being of a character within the film, but without 
strictly identifying with that character. In the free indirect mode, which grounds 
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Pasolini’s notion of the “cinema of poetry,” the camera does not provide a subjective 
point-of-view shot, nor does it provide an objective view; the free indirect mode 
scrambles the two. As Deleuze puts it, “[i]n the cinema of poetry…the camera 
assumed a subjective presence, acquired internal vision, which entered into a relation 
of simulation…with the character’s way of seeing.”99 For example, in Il deserto rosso 
[Red Desert] (1964) Michelangelo Antonioni uses color to express Monica Vitti’s 
character’s experience of the world, but without aligning the camera with her point-of-
view. In The Film of Her, Morrison not only imitates the voice of Walls, he also 
expresses Walls’ recollections largely with images that cannot, strictly speaking, be 
attributed to either of them. Morrison also shot a few images for the film, but through 
optical printing these images are made indistinguishable from the older, archival 
footage.  While the film’s narrative provides a consistent frame of self-reflexivity as to 
the ‘found’ nature of the images, Morrison’s somewhat undercuts this effect by using 
footage from newsreels and educational films that neatly correspond with the content 
of the voice-over, and gives Walls’ story the feel of a documentary. Yet, there are 
moments in which the film’s play of simulation is gripping. After a short series of 
images of trains that suggest Walls’ journey to Washington D.C., Walls/Morrison 
begins to describe his new post. The description spans across several images, similar 
to those from Resnais’ Toute la mémoire du monde, showing stacks of books, and 
people working in the Library of Congress. Among these rather banal images, one 
quick shot jumps to the fore. The image is immediately identifiable as a gag from a 
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silent-era film: an inept clerk stumbles over a huge stack of books in slapstick fashion, 
while his boss looks on with exaggerated frustration. Whereas the surrounding images 
seem to offer an objective illustration of Walls/Morrison’s subjective recollections, 
this shot presents these recollections as themselves images. In other words, Morrison 
imitates Walls’ thoughts imitating the movies like a found-footage film of the 
imaginary—in an interview Morrison states, “I feel like the clerk, sitting and making 
these avant-garde films.”100 As in Cavell, the “I” of this autobiography is multiple or, 
to again quote Deleuze: “The Ego = Ego form of identity…ceases to be valid for the 
characters and for the film-maker, in the real as well as in the fiction. What allows 
itself to be glimpsed instead, by profound degrees, is Rimbaud’s ‘I is another’ [Je est 
un autre].”101 To give matters an additional twist, the Walls/Morrison voice-over is 
supplemented at points by a second voice-over in a South African accent in the third 
person and in the present tense. “Picking up issues from each other,” Böser writes, 
“these commentaries co-operate in gathering the imagery into a narrative fold.”102   
 This theme is also woven into Walls’ story through an element entirely 
invented by Morrison. Before heading to Washington D.C. both narrators describe 
how Walls was fascinated by movies as a child. In particular he was taken by an 
actress in an early stag film. This film is the “film of her.” The memory of this 
anonymous actress becomes Walls’ muse. His efforts to restore the Paper Print 
Collection are depicted as driven by his desire to find the “film of her” and see the 
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images once more. Walls eventually finds the film, restoring it along with others. The 
“film of her” provides a narrative mechanism that levers The Film of Her’s movement 
between the subjective and the objective, and as Böser suggests, the individual and the 
collective.103 The “film of her” appears five times throughout the film. The first two 
instances take place as Walls/Morrison and the second narrator describe Walls’ 
childhood visiting the movies. Images of “her” appear here along with a fast stream of 
images from the silent era. The second two times we see “her” occur after Walls has 
discovered the Paper Print Collection. We see a clerk searching through a massive 
shelf of paper prints. A close-up shows a pair of hands holding a strip of the paper 
images next to a reel, which then dissolves into a still from the “film of her” (Figures 
1.5 and 1.6). As the third person voice-over describes the restoration process, we see 
the clerk working at an optical printer. The “film of her” appears again, this time in 
motion. While the first two instances function largely as a memory of Walls’ 
childhood, the second two complicate this function. In the latter, the shots of “her” are 
at once Walls’ recollection as well as examples of the images in the collection. The 
fifth appearance of “her” repeats this ambiguity.  A shot of a man on a train connotes 
Walls’ departure from his job at the Library of Congress. Walls/Morrison wonders 
about the “film of her,” sitting somewhere in the library. The “film of her” briefly 
appears again, followed by an image of a man placing a can of film on a shelf, thus  
inverting The Film of Her’s opening shot. This image is followed by a rapid traveling 
shot of endless shelves of film cans, stretching from floor to ceiling.  
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Fig. 1.5                                                                                     The Film of Her (1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.6                                                                                     The Film of Her (1996) 
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 The shifting status of these images, which recalls the loop between film and 
consciousness in the film’s preamble, leads Böser to read the film in terms of the 
exteriorization and objectification of knowledge. The rows of films, the Paper Print 
Collection, and the Library of Congress more generally reflect the social brain as a 
system of objects, not unlike the general intellect in Marx’s original formation. Thus, 
Böser writes: “References to the activities of indexing and cross-referencing denote 
the cognitive pathways along which the stored knowledge is organized to create an 
interface for its reappropriation.”104 While this reading is perhaps suggested by the 
film, especially in the last three appearances of the “film of her,” it arrests the film’s 
intricate movements between the subjective and the objective, and the instability of the 
narrating “I.” Böser’s reading therefore needs to be supplemented by or, overlaid with, 
another reading. Rather than choose between the internal and the external, or the 
subjective and the objective, the film’s ambiguity as to the source of image and 
thought can be understood in its very ambiguity as suggesting, however crudely, 
something on the order of the cinematic common. Image and thought here challenge 
the notions of attribution and possession precisely because they are produced in a 
fabric of relations, and thus cannot be located in any one person or thing. Just as Marx 
proposed the exteriorization of knowledge in machines, the general intellect as living 
labor can also be understood as exterior insofar as it is social.105  Rather than a solitary, 
even rarified, activity, thinking unfurls and develops in relation with others and, to 
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return to the language of UNESCO, in relation with the environment, nature, and 
history.  
 The reemergence of the problematic of labor at this point is fitting. The Film of 
Her is, after all, a story of work. Walls’ disappearance from the history of the Paper 
Print Collection is an apt metaphor for the expropriation of labor. As Paletz suggests, 
“[t]he labors of restoration…gray against the silhouettes of individuals who oversaw 
the work and of the institutions that delegated and sponsored it.”106 Likewise, within 
the narrative architecture of the Library of Congress the cinematic common is 
associated with the machinery of the nation, and the regime of property in the form of 
copyright. Yet there is potential here. As the can of film, presumably containing the 
“film of her,” is placed on the shelf, Walls/Morrison reflects on “her” status, “waiting 
to be called up again, to be born again.” When the sleeping man awakes moments 
later, the second narrator anticipates the arrival of a new copyright clerk who also 
“dreams of power and creation.” Built from the past, the cinematic common contains 
the material for archaeologies of the future, and the future belongs to no one. 
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Chapter Two 
The Eye of Matter: Decasia and the Politics of Cinematic Perception 
 
 
 
 
  
Long live the class vision! 
Long live kino-eye! 
 —Dziga Vertov, “Kino-Eye”  
 
 
And can I even, at this level, speak of ‘ego,’ of eye, of brain, and 
of body? Only for simple convenience; for nothing can be 
identified in this way. It is rather a gaseous state. Me, my body, are 
rather a set of molecules and atoms which are constantly renewed. 
Can I even speak of atoms? They are not distinct from worlds, 
from interatomic influences.   
 —Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1 
 
 
 
 
 In this chapter I will delve deeper into an expanded understanding of film 
heritage as a way of seeing and experiencing the world, that is, as a mode of being. 
More specifically, I will articulate film heritage in terms of what Jameson calls 
“cognitive mapping.” In this sense film heritage describes a way of imagining the 
totality of capital. For Jameson, cognitive mapping is something like class-
consciousness in the form of an internal and automatic global positioning system, 
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however crude or poorly programmed.1 Just as we carry around in our heads a map of 
our town or city—as described by Kevin Lynch in The Image of the City, from which 
Jameson takes the idea of “cognitive mapping”—so too, Jameson argues, do we 
constantly map the globalized politico-economic structures in which we now live. 
Cognitive mapping is therefore not a rarefied intellectual, or artistic, pursuit. It is 
active on some register in all aesthetic forms; moreover, it is something all of us do all 
the time. If, as I argued in the previous chapter, the history of film has suffused the 
faculty of thought, then it has also colored the way we map the abstraction that is 
global capital. To be sure, cognitive mapping does not mean a simple representation, 
or mimesis, of the totality of capital. By the very nature of totality, Jameson argues, 
such representation is an impossibility. Rather, cognitive mapping implies an attempt 
to translate, or transcode, the abstract logics of global capital into the raw material of 
everyday life and “a mode of experience that is more visceral and existential than the 
abstract certainties of economics and Marxian social science.”2 Film heritage is a form 
of cognitive mapping that uses images from the history of cinema as raw material for 
constructing a vision of global capital. 
                                                
1 In “Marxism and Postmodernism,” Jameson states: “But ‘cognitive mapping’ was in reality 
nothing but a code word for ‘class consciousness:’ only it proposed the need for class 
consciousness of a new and hitherto undreamed of kind, while it also inflected the account of 
the direction of that new spatiality implicit in postmodernism (which Ed Soja’s Postmodern 
Geographies now places on the agenda in so eloquent and timely a fashion).” See Fredric 
Jameson, The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998 (London: 
Verso, 1998), 49.   
2 Jameson, “Class and Allegory,” 51. 
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This chapter will provide a case study of film heritage as cognitive mapping 
through a close analysis of Bill Morrison’s film, Decasia—cinema thus provides here 
both the material and the medium for such mapping. Decasia debuted at the Sundance 
film festival in 2002. Nearly seventy minutes in length, it is by far Morrison’s longest 
and most ambitious project. The film is composed entirely of found-footage in varying 
states of decomposition, and accompanied by an original symphony by Morrison’s 
frequent collaborator, and founder of New York’s “Bang On A Can” orchestra, 
Michael Gordon. Because a proper analysis of Gordon’s music would require more 
space than I have here, I will focus exclusively on the film’s images.3 Most of these 
images are from the first two decades or so of cinema, and represent a huge array of 
sources, from feature films to industrial films, and all manner of early “actualities.” 
Morrison discovered the film’s images in the archives at the Library of Congress, the 
Museum of Modern Art, the George Eastman House, and the Fox Movietone 
collection at the University of South Carolina. Decasia significantly expands the 
archival sensibility of The Film of Her, and the aesthetics of decay in the subsequent 
                                                
3 Gordon’s symphony was inspired by a few images Morrison had found in the archives. 
Morrison then made a loose edit of Decasia based on the symphony. The raw edit of Decasia 
debuted alongside the first live performance of Gordon’s symphony in Basil, Switzerland in 
2001. Morrison subsequently re-edited the film, and used a live recording of the symphony’s 
performance in Basil as the soundtrack. For an impressionistic analysis of the music, see 
Böser, “Inscriptions of Light;” and Tony Rayns, “Decasia” Sight and Sound 13.12 (2003): 33. 
For a history of “Bang on a Can,” see Steve Smith, “Looking Beyond a Milestone, for Some 
More Cans to Bang,” New York Times, April 20, 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/arts/music/bang-on-a-can-wraps-up-25th-anniversary-
season.html (accessed March 3, 2013).  
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shorts, The Mesmerist (2003) and Light is Calling (2004), and thus constitutes a major 
statement of some of Morrison’s core themes.   
 Furthermore, Decasia is not only Morrison’s most well-known and popular 
film; it is also one of the most popular experimental films of the last fifteen years. In 
The Village Voice, J. Hoberman, who included Decasia among his top ten films of 
2002, wrote, “Decasia is that rare-thing: a movie with avant-garde and universal 
appeal, occasioning two separate features so far in the New York Times.”4 The two 
New York Times pieces in question appeared in December of 2002. In the first article 
Sarah Boxer notes, “[t]here seems to be a growing aesthetic fascination with the 
deterioration of objects into matter, shape into stuff, form into deformity. There is a 
general celebration of breakdown itself.”5 The second article—which quotes 
documentary filmmaker Errol Morris’ hyperbolic declaration, “This may be the 
greatest film ever made.”—describes Decasia as “absolutely of the moment.”6  As 
Hoberman points out, Morrison is certainly not the first experimental filmmaker to use 
decaying footage—one distant cousin of Decasia is J.J. Murphy’s 1974 film, Print 
Generation, which is structured around the distress caused to one minute of footage by 
fifty re-printings. The enthusiastic reception of Decasia thus testifies to the film’s 
timeliness, reflecting what I referred to in my introduction to this dissertation as the 
“new materialism of cinema.” Indeed, the second New York Times piece includes a 
detailed description of nitrate film and its processes of decomposition.  
                                                
4 Hoberman, “Back to Nature.” 
5 Boxer, “Where a Film’s Gooey Bits.” 
6 Weschler, “Sublime Decay.” 
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 André Habib situates Morrison’s work in much the same way as Erika Balsom. 
In addition to the filmmakers in Balsom’s “cinephilic avant-garde,” Habib compares 
Morrison’s films with those of Peter Delpeut, Angela Ricci-Lucchi and Yervant 
Gianikian, and Jürgen Reble. The films of these directors, Habib writes, negotiate “a 
space between avant-garde practice and archival exploration,” producing a “poetic 
archaeology.”7 Like Balsom, Habib flags the anxiety over the obsolescence of 
celluloid and the discourses of the death of cinema as crucial for contextualizing the 
work of Morrison, Delpeut, et al. Habib also points to the rise of film heritage: “This 
process, via a series of shifts and mutations in the cultural significance of cinema, was 
to lead in the 1980s and 1990s to legal measures, institutional recognition…and a 
burgeoning discourse in different fields that all presented cinema as…a highly 
honored member of human ‘patrimony.’”8 The result, as Habib aptly puts it, is that the 
“nature of the medium and what it records now command an immediately passionate, 
quasi-religious response, as if it were lives that were in peril.” One outcome of this 
response is the “restoration craze” and “the irrational leaps of hope invested in the 
‘digital revolution.”9 Another outcome, as reflected in Decasia, is an embrace of the 
volatile materiality of film, and a formal meditation on the attendant shifts in the social 
implications of the medium. Before turning to Decasia, however, it will be helpful to 
first lay some conceptual groundwork for my analysis of the film. 
                                                
7 Habib, “Ruin, Archive, and the Time of Cinema,” 128. See also Habib, “Thinking in the 
Ruins.” 
8 Ibid., 121.  
9 Ibid., 122, 126. 
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*  *  *  *  * 
 
For Jameson, cognitive mapping designates a means of linking everyday life to 
the global totality of capitalism. In other words, such mapping coordinates the 
experiential, empirical dimensions of capital with its most abstract, planetary 
dimensions. Jameson locates the emergence of a need for cognitive mapping in the 
imperialist stage of capitalism, which precipitated “a growing contradiction between 
lived experience…and a more properly structural model of the conditions of existence 
of that experience.”10 Jameson elaborates:  
Too rapidly we can say that, while in older societies and 
perhaps even in the early stages of market capital, the 
immediate and limited experience of individuals is still 
able to encompass and coincide with the true economic 
and social form that governs that experience, in the next 
moment these two levels drift even further apart…At 
this point the phenomenological experience of the 
individual subject…becomes limited to a tiny corner of 
the social world, a fixed-camera view of a certain 
section of London or the countryside or whatever. But 
the truth of that experience no longer coincides with the 
                                                
10 Jameson, Postmodernism, 410. 
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place in which it takes place. The truth of that limited 
daily experience of London…is bound up with the 
whole colonial system of the British Empire that 
determines the very quality of the individual’s 
subjective life. Yet those structural coordinates are no 
longer accessible to immediate lived experience and are 
often not even conceptualizable for most people.11  
This situation is only exasperated in our current era of globalization. Not only has 
capital extended to every region of the planet, it has also come to saturate every nook 
and cranny of social life. We are thus faced with “a new and historically original 
dilemma, one that involves our insertion as individual subjects into a multidimensional 
set of radically discontinuous realities, whose frames range from the still surviving 
spaces of bourgeois private life all the way to the unimaginable decentering of global 
capital itself.”12 The complexity of this dilemma at once generates the need for 
cognitive mapping and renders it increasingly difficult. For Jameson, finding ways of 
mapping capital that are adequate to the present moment constitutes one of the 
frontlines of radical politics. As Jameson argues, in order for a global revolution to be 
thinkable, let alone successful, we must be able to imagine capital in its full breadth 
and complexity. Assessing and refining cognitive mapping is therefore a part of 
practical politics. 
                                                
11 Jameson, Postmodernism, 410-11. 
12 Ibid., 413.  
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 To reiterate, Jameson conceives of global capital as inherently defying 
representation. It is not just that the realities that structure lived experience have 
diverged from that experience, but also that these realities are “somehow ultimately 
unrepresentable or, to use the Althusserian phrase, are something like an absent cause, 
or what can never emerge into the presence of perception.”13 Like God or Nature in 
Spinoza, global capital is immanent to the social field, and only detectable in its 
effects. Thus, Jameson writes, “cognitive mapping cannot (at least in our time) involve 
anything so easy as a map; indeed, once you knew what ‘cognitive mapping’ was 
driving at, you were to dismiss all figures of maps and mapping from your mind and 
try to imagine something else.”14 Cognitive mapping is not a picture of some object or 
thing existing ‘out there;’ it is a kind of analog operation in which the abstract, global 
logics of capital are transmitted and transmutated through the diffracting prism of 
consciousness, and various assemblages of narrative and form. (As I stated in the 
previous chapter, Jameson identifies conspiracy in the American cinema of the 1970s 
and ’80s as one such assemblage.) What has become increasingly strained, then, is not 
the capacity to represent global capital—an impossibility—but rather the capacity to 
draw on the data of everyday experience in a way that gives some form to the abstract 
workings of the totality, which necessarily exceed this experience. To underscore the 
non-mimetic aspect of cognitive mapping, Jameson frequently turns to allegory. Yet, 
to my mind, this (often equivocal) reliance on allegory has the effect of creating too 
                                                
13 Jameson, Postmodernism, 411. 
14 Ibid., 409. 
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rigid of a separation between cognitive mapping and the social world in which it is 
inscribed, thereby loosening the analog nature of this practice. I prefer to think of 
cognitive mapping more along the lines of isomorphisms.15 From this perspective, 
such mappings are somewhat like fractals (in a broad sense of the term): they 
articulate patterns of self-similarity, or zones in which the structures of capitalism are 
loosely replicated in varying dimensions and scales of complexity.  
In “Totality as Conspiracy” and elsewhere, Jameson highlights media 
technology as particularly ripe content for cognitive mappings of the present. Because 
such technologies are so deeply embedded in, and inextricable from, global capital, 
they can “offer some privileged representational shorthand” for grasping the complex 
functions of the contemporary mode of production.16  However, such technologies 
pose a representational problem of their own:  
It is appropriate to recall the excitement of machinery in 
the moment of capital preceding our own, the 
exhilaration of futurism, most notably, and of [Filippo 
Tommaso] Marinetti’s celebration of the machine gun 
and the motorcar. These are still visible emblems, 
sculptural nodes of energy which give tangibility and 
figuration to the motive energies of that earlier moment 
                                                
15 For example, one might think of the way in which Foucault, in Discipline and Punish, 
details the resonances between the prison and other institutions, such as the school and the 
hospital. For a pithy discussion of isomorphisms in the context of a properly Marxist mode of 
analysis, see Hardt and Negri, Multitude, p. 142.   
16 Jameson, Postmodernism, 37-8.  
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of modernization…It is immediately obvious that the 
technology of our own moment no longer possesses this 
same capacity for representation: not the turbine, nor 
even [Charles] Sheeler’s grain elevator or smokestacks, 
not the baroque elaboration of pipes and conveyor belts, 
not even the streamlined profile of the railroad train—all 
vehicles of speed still concentrated at rest—but rather 
the computer, whose outer shell has no emblematic or 
visual power, or even the casings of the various media 
themselves, as with that home appliance called 
television which articulates nothing but rather implodes, 
carrying its flattened image surface within itself. 
In its function as cognitive mapping, film heritage’s turn to the comparatively older, 
but still exceedingly relevant, technology of the cinema as an object of representation 
can be seen as one way of trying to solve this problematic. In this regard, heritage, 
understood as a mode of cognitive mapping, should be contextualized in terms of the 
proliferation of discourses of film heritage in which cinema transcends its status as a 
particular entertainment and artistic medium among other mediums. With the added 
social weight and scope suggested by these discourses, cinema is made all the more 
amenable to imagining totality.  
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 In the analysis that follows, cinema not only functions as object, or content, but 
also, and perhaps more importantly, as the medium through which cognitive mapping 
is exercised. It is therefore useful at this point to further elaborate cognitive mapping 
in terms of an ontology of cinema. Key here is the relationship of the movement-
image to what Deleuze, following Bergson, calls the whole. Deleuze introduces this 
concept in the first chapter of Cinema 1. Here, Deleuze begins with the most famous 
of Bergson’s theses on movement: movement cannot be understood in terms of space 
covered. For Bergson the reduction of movement to spatial coordinates is an illusion. 
Real movement takes place in a temporal dimension. Real movement is a qualitative 
transformation, or a flux of duration. Deleuze argues that Bergson submits this thesis 
to a significant revision, which will be crucial to the movement-image. If movement 
through space is illusory, it is a necessary illusion. Seeing movement in terms of space 
is a fundamental part of our perceptual apparatus, and allows us to act—to jump out of 
the way of an oncoming car, for example. More importantly, and this is the core of 
Bergson’s revision, movement through space allows us to apprehend duration, or 
movement in time. Movement thus has a dual nature, both sides of which have their 
own reality. On the one hand, it is movement through space. On the other hand, it is 
the movement of time, which is grasped as a change in a whole. The whole in this 
sense is a temporal milieu. To explicate this point, Deleuze reiterates Bergson’s 
example of a hungry animal. In order to eat, the animal tracks and kills its prey. The 
hunt can be understood from the perspective of a movement from point A, where the 
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hunt begins, to where it ends, at point B. The hunt also indicates a qualitative 
transformation in which the animal goes from being hungry to being full. In this 
example the whole can be understood as the animal organism, as long as this organism 
is grasped not in terms of spatial location, but rather as a semi-stable milieu of 
duration.  
  The boundaries of this whole are, however, easily displaced. For instance, the 
qualitative transformation of the animal may coincide with a quieting of the 
surrounding forest, as smaller birds and insects react to the disruption of the hunt. As 
Deleuze suggests, the animal may also be hunting within a larger movement of 
migration, thereby linking the satiation of hunger and the quieting of the forest to 
atmospheric changes and to the rotation of the earth and its orbit around the sun. All of 
these spatial scales endure in time, which sweeps them together in an indivisible 
whole, creating a “thread that is transmitted down to the smallest particle of the world 
in which we live the duration immanent to the whole of the universe.”17 From a 
temporal perspective, even the tiniest movements in space can spur us to imagine 
transformation on a planetary, or cosmic, scale. Rather than a variety of wholes, 
Bergson thus prefers to speak of the whole as an open totality whose limits extend ad 
infinitum. The objects and spatial environs that we cut out from this totality—such as 
our exemplary animal and the forest in which it hunts—are not independent parts but, 
as Bergson puts it, “partial views of the whole.”  Yet, Bergson continues, “with these 
partial views put end to end, you will not make even a beginning of the reconstruction 
                                                
17 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 11.  
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of the whole, any more than, by multiplying photographs of an object in a thousand 
aspects, you will reproduce the object itself.”18 The whole can only be given indirectly 
because it is linked to our perception of the movement of objects in space. In other 
words, the whole is bound up in a dialectical relation in which movement relates 
objects and their corresponding spatial environments to an open totality of duration, 
and duration to the objects and environments it pulls open: “Through movement the 
whole is divided into objects, and objects are re-united in the whole, and indeed 
between the two ‘the whole’ changes.”19 Like cognitive mapping, movement for 
Bergson creates a totalizing gesture in thought that allows the global to course through 
the local. While Jameson presents totality as a decidedly spatial concept, in Bergson 
totality gains a temporal dimension. The “cognitive mapping” that can be gleaned 
from Bergson is therefore also a mode of thinking history.  
 The double nature of movement is the basis for Deleuze’s concept of the 
movement-image: 
 The movement-image has two sides, one in relation to 
objects whose relative position it varies, the other in 
relation to a whole—of which it expresses an absolute 
change. The positions are in space, but the whole that 
changes is in time. If the movement-image is assimilated 
to the shot, we call framing the first facet of the shot 
                                                
18 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 31. 
19 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 11. 
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turned towards objects, and montage the other facet 
turned towards the whole…it is montage itself which 
constitutes the whole, and thus gives us the image of 
time…Time is necessarily an indirect representation, 
because it flows from the montage which links one 
movement-image to another.20 
Between shots and montage, the dialectic of the whole is generated. Shots—as well as 
clusters of shots in sequences and scenes—divide the whole into parts, carving out 
partial views of a spatial environment, or system, through which objects and/or the 
camera moves. Montage opens these parts to an indivisible totality that transforms 
through time. As Deleuze shows, the construction of this totality and the principles by 
which it transforms vary according to styles, schools, and directors.  
For our purposes, the two most illuminating examples Deleuze provides are 
D.W. Griffith and Sergei Eisenstein. For both directors the whole corresponds to a 
social totality. According to Deleuze, Griffith’s innovation was “the composition of 
movement-images as an organisation, an organism, a great organic unity.”21 In Griffith 
this organism is America itself, and the transformation of the whole reflects a 
bourgeois conception of the birth of a nation. The unity is composed of different parts, 
such as the North and the South in Birth of a Nation (1915), or the different epochs 
and civilizations in Intolerance (1916). The development of the whole follows a 
                                                
20 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 34-5. 
21 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 30. 
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conflict between these parts and a threat to unity. This threat is ultimately vanquished, 
creating order, and a harmony between parts. One way Griffith produces this situation 
is through parallel montage and the convergence of action. Eisenstein takes Griffith’s 
idea of an organic unity, but he criticizes Griffith for presenting the parts of this unity 
as simply given. In Eisenstein the parts of the organism are produced from within, 
according to the development of capitalism. The parts are not only the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat, but also Man and Nature. In the transformation of the whole the totality 
divides itself into opposing parts, which then re-synthesize in a unity of a different 
order. While Griffith continually films the creation of the American nation and the 
harmony of difference, Eisenstein films the negation of capitalism and the 
construction of communism in its wake.  
 In Decasia the whole is constructed in two different ways, according to two 
different regimes of movement that I will analyze in turn. One regime of movement is 
created by the original content of the images; the other regime is created by the play of 
visible decay. There are moments when these two regimes correspond to different 
images: on the one hand, images that are virtually free of decay, and on the other hand, 
images in which decay overtakes the space of the frame completely. More often, 
however, these two regimes overlap. The decay creates a plane of movement in the 
extreme foreground, on the surface of the image, while the play of movement of the 
original content takes place across several planes, in depth. The divergence of these 
two systems of movement is indicated in the way the distinction between decay and 
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original content structures both Habib’s and Böser’s analyses of the film. For Habib, 
Decasia presents  “a conflict between the image and matter,” creating  “a tension 
between impression and decomposition, between history and nature, and between 
narration and ruination.”22 Habib ultimately sums up these oppositions in terms of a 
dialectic between Man and Nature. Similarly, Böser notes how the decay of the images 
and their original content create two competing rhythms. In order to render the marks 
of decay more dramatic and more easily detectable to the eye, Morrison stretch printed 
all of the footage so that each frame is repeated two or three times. The result is that 
the movement of the original content is slowed considerably, displaying, as Böser puts 
it, “unerring determination and willfulness.” In contrast, the decay creates “a more or 
less frenzied dance of abstract surface structures.”23 Building on this difference, Böser 
reads the film in terms of an overlapping series of oppositions between form and 
formlessness, meaning and noise, and representation and its dissolution. While Böser 
and Habib register the fundamental dualism of Decasia, the binaries they overlay on 
this dualism are somewhat too stark. These oppositions hang too loosely—like baggy 
clothes, to borrow an image from Bergson—on the movements in the film. Rather than 
place these two regimes of movement in a wholly negative relationship, one negating 
the other, I will analyze both in terms of their positive construction of totality. 
Ultimately, I will suggest that the original content of the images and their decay create 
                                                
22 Habib, “Thinking in the Ruins,” 1, 3.  
23 Böser, “Inscriptions of Light,” 314.  
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two modes of perception that correspond to the two dimensions of heritage discussed 
at the end of the last chapter, that is, identity and the common, respectively. 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
 Like The Film of Her, Decasia begins with a pre-credit sequence. The first 
image is a Sufi man. Framed in a medium shot, and with a neutral angle, the Sufi spins 
in place in slow motion. This spinning movement is highly significant in the film. As 
Deleuze states, “[c]ertain great movements are like a director’s signature, which 
characterize the whole of a film, or even the whole of an oeuvre, but resonate with the 
relative movement of a particular signed image, or a particular detail in the image.”24 
The signature movement of Decasia is undoubtedly the circle. Circles appear 
throughout the film in images of various types of wheels and circular machines. Most 
significantly, the image of the Sufi dancer is both the first shot of the film as well as 
the last. The circular movement of the dance is thus doubled in the circular movement 
of the film itself, and of the whole. Morrison emphasizes this larger circular movement 
by repeating several images in the final moments of the film before the Sufi reappears. 
The first repeated image is an extreme long shot of a caravan of men and camels. 
While in the first appearance of this image at the beginning film the caravan moved 
across the horizon from right to left, here it moves from left to right, as if completing a 
journey and returning home. This shot is followed by another repeated image to 
                                                
24 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 21.  
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similar effect. Here a group of nuns and children are shown entering a convent from 
which they had slowly exited earlier in the film.    
 From the start, this circular motion is equated with the cinematic apparatus. 
The first image of the Sufi is followed by a lengthy traveling shot through a film-
processing lab. Here dozens of reels of film mimic the spinning motion of the dancer 
(Figure 2.1). This shot is followed by another long take, drawn from the same source 
material, that slowly tracks alongside a chemical bath in which strips of celluloid are 
submerged. The title credit then appears, followed by a static close-up of the chemical 
bath. From the right edge of the frame, an arm reaches into the bath and pulls out a 
strip of celluloid, holding it up for inspection by the camera (Figure 2.2). The celluloid 
is subsequently dropped into the bath, and another strip is fished out and shown to the 
camera. This sequence situates Decasia in the same manner as Balsom and Habib 
situate Morrison’s work more generally, that is, as being about film at a time in which 
the celluloid—in all its materiality, as something that can be held in one’s hands—is 
becoming increasingly rare. Morrison thus calls attention to the images that follow as 
images, and images that are imprinted on celluloid in the archives in which they were 
found. Later in the film Morrison reiterates this self-reflexive gesture with more 
images of film processing, and a continuation of the shot of strips of celluloid being 
pulled from the bath and inspected. This sequence is framed by an image of a 
primitive, wheel-like loom and an image of a circular amusement ride (Figure 2.3), 
thereby again equating the circle with the film reel. In a different fashion, Morrison  
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Fig. 2.1                                                                                                  Decasia (2002) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2                                                                                                  Decasia (2002) 
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Fig. 2.3                                                                                                  Decasia (2002) 
provides another pointedly self-reflexive gesture with a series of images that, as Böser 
points out, reference classic film genres: a lengthy shot of a sheriff ready for action 
invokes westerns; in an image from a period piece, an officer on horseback woos a 
young maid, invoking romance; an image of a woman emotionally pleading before a 
judge and an image of a mother hugging her child allude to melodrama; a shot of a 
man and woman dancing with exaggerated awkwardness, followed by a shot of 
onlookers who burst into laughter, stands in for film’s comic tradition.25 
Between the title credit and the final image of the Sufi dancer, the linking of 
movement from shot to shot is established through a variety of means.26 A long 
                                                
25 Böser, “Inscriptions of Light,” 310.  
26 For a meticulous and exhaustive catalogue of these movements, see Böser, “Inscriptions of 
Light.” 
 
 
130 
sequence in the middle of the film is exemplary in this regard. The sequence begins 
with an image of a group of miners attempting to enter a collapsed mineshaft. Images 
of miners rescuing stricken co-workers appear intermittently for the next eleven 
minutes, creating a linear mini-narrative. This narrative is interspersed with a range of 
other types of imagery that nonetheless carry the movement of the film forward. For 
instance, Morrison cuts from an image of miners carrying a body towards frame left to 
footage of a river baptism. The congregation moves into the river from right to left, 
thereby creating a continuation of movement from the previous image, as well as a 
metaphor for the buried miners’ salvation. Similarly, Morrison creates a graphic and 
thematic match between an image of a miner, in center frame, being carried 
horizontally out of the mouth of the mineshaft, and a man praying over a prostrate 
body, also center frame, in a burial chamber. Later, a diver, or trapeze artist, ascends a 
ladder in a low-angle shot. An inversion of perspective and movement link this image 
to the next: a high-angle shot of a teeming anthill stirred by a stick intruding from 
above. This high-angle then carries into the next shot, which looks down on a busy 
city street, creating a metaphor between the roving ants and the urban populace. The 
activity of the street scene is then rhymed with the final image of miners who, as 
Böser aptly describes, “tumble from the opening of a mineshaft and make their hurried 
exit.”27    
 On a broader level, the film moves in a circle that maps the history of 
civilization. In this movement the whole inheres in a mythical account of the totality 
                                                
27 Böser, “Inscriptions of Light,” 309.  
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of humankind. In a short essay featured on the film’s website, Morrison writes of the 
transformation of this whole in terms of four “Movements:” 
Movement 1: Creation. This film is the meditation of a 
Sufi dervish dancer, the feed reel. It opens with the 
laboratory. I think of this as a type of heaven, where 
gods examine our lives as they are played out on various 
films. One is examining this film. This film is the dream 
of a Japanese goddess. There are first just clouds of gas 
and then revealing earth, sea, life and various migrating 
species, including Man. Movement 2: Civilization. Man 
sets up civilization and creates religion. He fears Death. 
Time passes, and man imitates God, turning wheels as 
God turns the wheels of the film he is printed on. 
Modern Man is born in a caesarean section shot by 
Eisenstein. He grows up and goes to school, the frontier. 
He invents Cinema in his likeness. Emotions are served 
up for mass consumption. Artifice becomes 
indistinguishable from reality. He pursues Women, first 
playfully and then aggressively and violently. 
Movement 3: Conundrum. In the name of advancement 
and industry, he has created a nightmare world of mines 
 
 
132 
and machines and cities full of scourge. His world 
collapses and his efforts to transcend it seem hopeless. 
Movement 4: Disintegration and Rebirth. But he is 
ultimately delivered. He disintegrates into that which is 
essential and indivisible and reforms into something 
waiting to be re-born anew. The Japanese Goddess 
awakes from her dream. The Sufi continues to whirl, the 
take-up reel.28 
This description touches on three of the themes discussed in chapter one. First, as with 
The Film of Her, a certain monism is expressed here. There is an equation of film and 
consciousness—the film is both the meditation of the Sufi dancer, and the dream of a 
Japanese goddess; and there is an equation of the film and celluloid—it is the filmstrip 
pulled from the chemical bath in the opening sequence. Celluloid and thought are thus 
arrayed on the same material plane. This material plane also encompasses the world, 
and civilization, and thus the whole. Second, Morrison’s description points to an 
aspect of Decasia that may be described as taxonomic, and which is similar to 
Deutsch’s Film ist. (1-12) and Farocki’s Arbeiter verlassen die Fabrik. In addition to 
the means discussed above, movement in Decasia also occurs through the succession 
of blocks of images that cohere thematically. These themes roughly correspond to the 
titles of the “Movements” indicated by Morrison. In “Creation,” for example, 
microscopic views of cells and images of butterflies serve as well-worn examples of 
                                                
28 Morrison, “Decasia.” 
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new life. At the close of the film a shot of a car speeding toward the horizon and a shot 
of a sunset provide equally generic markers of endings.29 Third, the narrative 
generated by this sequence of themes reflects a symbolist dimension to Decasia’s 
montage. It is worth recalling here Rancière’s explanation of Faure’s “forms” as “both 
artistic forms and the cyclical forms of life in this universe.”30 In Decasia, artistic 
form is mapped onto a loosely Christian, and vaguely biological, notion of the cyclical 
nature of life. The transformation of the whole is thus emptied of history; the “spirit of 
the forms,” which is the collective energy that animates history, is then reduced to the 
most facile notion of vitalism—an enigmatic notion of a common life that seems to 
transcend specific political or historical content.31 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
                                                
29 Böser, “Inscriptions of Light,” 308. 
30 Rancière, “Fable Without a Moral,” 177.  
31 Peter Delpeut’s film, Lyrisch nitraat [Lyrical Nitrate] (1996), to which Decasia is often 
compared and which Morrison has cited as an inspiration, displays similar taxonomic and 
symbolist qualities. Lyrisch nitraat is a 50-minute experimental film composed of found 
footage taken from films in the collection of early cinema distributor Jean Desmet, and made 
between 1905 and 1915. The film is divided into six chapters, each with a title credit: 
“Looking;” “Mise en scène;” “The Body;” “Passion;” “Dying;” and “Forgetting.” In the spirit 
of Deutsch’s Film ist. (1-12), the titles of the chapters reference a fundamental theme, or 
problematic, in the history of cinema. Each chapter provides a catalogue of examples of the 
titular theme. The symbolist dimension of Lyrisch nitraat largely inheres in the elucidation of 
these common themes. However, the close of the film offers a universalizing (and bourgeois) 
account of history that is akin to that featured in Decasia, though somewhat more ironic and 
playful. The final minutes feature a highly damaged sequence of images depicting Adam and 
Eve in the Garden of Eden. As the couple partakes of the forbidden fruit, the images are 
completely overwhelmed by the visible marks of decay, thereby equating the corruption of 
humanity with the entropy of celluloid. Thus, as Habib describes: “History expresses itself 
through nature’s process of decay.” “Ruin, Archive, and the Time of Cinema,” 131. 
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 My approach to the movement created by the decay of the image in Decasia 
diverges not only from the framework of negativity expressed by Habib and Böser, but 
also from an emphasis on indexicality. In the context of cinema, the index refers to the 
physical inscriptions of light and other phenomena—such as the wear caused by 
projection, or heat and humidity in the atmosphere—in the emulsion of celluloid. 
Indexically inclined readings of the decayed images in Decasia can be seen as part of 
the renewed interest in the photographic index in film studies more generally over the 
last two decades.32 This focus on the index can in turn be seen as one form of response 
to, as well as an ancillary component of, the new materialism of cinema. Perhaps the 
most well known example of this type of analysis of Decasia is Mary Ann Doane’s 
“The Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity.” This essay appeared in the 
journal differences in 2007 as part of a special issue on the index. As in Balsom’s take 
on the “cinephilic avant-garde,” Doane compares Decasia to the structural films of the 
’60s and ’70s. Doane argues that the question of the specificity of the medium of film 
is somewhat beguiling, due to its complex assemblage of components—“Is it the 
celluloid strip, the projected image, the viewer’s apprehension of the illusion of 
motion?”33 Reflections on the medium of film have therefore provided a constant 
refrain in film theory, as well as in experimental filmmaking. For structuralist 
filmmakers like Peter Gidal, Hollis Frampton, Michael Snow, and Paul Sharits, 
                                                
32 In addition to the works cited in this chapter, see for example Rosen, Change Mummified; 
D.N. Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film; and Mulvey, Death 24x a Second: Stillness and the 
Moving Image (London: Reaktion Books, 2006).  
33 Doane, “The Indexical,” 132.  
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“specificity lay in film’s most palpable and delineable features—its chemical base, the 
projection of light, and the grain of the film.”34 Doane contextualizes these 
explorations of the cinematic medium in terms of Peter Gidal’s insistence on the 
connection between the revelation of cinematic materiality and a Marxist critique of 
bourgeois norms of representation. While this may be an overly neat characterization 
of a varied set of films and filmmakers, Doane’s point is that today the question of 
medium specificity, whether in theory or in films such as Decasia, is largely pitched 
as a struggle with digital technology: “an emphasis on film’s chemical, photographic 
base now serves to differentiate the cinema from digital media and repeatedly invokes 
indexicality as the guarantee of a privileged relation to the real, to referentiality, and to 
materiality.”35 Doane continues: “the indexical image, through its physical connection, 
touches the real, bears its impression, and hence assures us that it is still there; while 
the digital image has the potential to abstract and isolate itself, severing any 
connection with an autonomous reality.”36 Citing critics of digital media, including 
Paolo Cherchi Usai, Doane chastises the hype of the digital as a Platonic fantasy that 
wants to be rid of the encumbrances of the material world.  
 While Doane’s focus lies elsewhere, namely in a dense semiological account 
of the index in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, one of the implications of her 
essay is that reflections on the medium of film are too often today detached from 
                                                
34 Doane, “The Indexical,” 132. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 141-2. See also William J. Mitchell, The Reconfigured Eye: Visual Truth in the Post-
Photographic Era (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).   
 
 
136 
questions of politics. Indeed, the dream of the immateriality of the digital is 
inextricable from the developments of the capitalist system with which this technology 
is so closely aligned. From this perspective, the relative abstraction and immateriality 
of digital images is part and parcel of what Jameson has famously diagnosed as the 
“waning of historicity,” that is, the atrophying of our abilities to historicize capitalism 
and imagine a radically different social formation. For Jameson, this eclipse of the 
historical imagination is on the one hand tied to the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
subsumption of all modes of production into global capital. On the other hand, the 
waning of historicity is a function of the domination of the image-as-commodity, 
which, as Jameson points out, Debord uncovered in Society of the Spectacle as the 
commodity par excellence—the image-as-commodity is totally evacuated of use-value 
and history. The spectacle, which Debord defined as social relations mediated by such 
image-commodities, thus constitutes “the material reconstruction of the religious 
illusion:” “Spectacular technology has not dispelled the religious clouds where men 
had placed their own powers detached from themselves; it has only tied them to an 
earthly base. The most earthly life becomes opaque and unbearable. It no longer 
projects into the sky but shelters within itself its absolute denial, its fallacious 
paradise.”37 The digital image, then, can be seen as an outcome of this process, 
wherein the mystification of the image-as-commodity is folded into its technical 
support.  
                                                
37 Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 7.  
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 What Doane finds interesting in the decayed images of Decasia is the way they 
combat the waning of historicity. Doane contends that the index has an inherent 
historicity in that it preserves a moment of the past.38 In this regard the images in 
Decasia are particularly effective in that they are largely drawn from the first decades 
of cinema, and thus from a past that is much different from our present. Yet, Doane 
places the greatest emphasis on the way the visible effects of decay intensify this 
historicity:  
The historicity of a medium is traced in the physical 
condition of its objects. This is why a film like Bill 
Morrison’s Decasia (2002) is so moving in its 
melancholic record of the slow death of the films once 
thought to immortalize their subjects, in its chronicling 
of the deterioration and disintegration of film…What is 
indexed here is the historicity of a medium, a history 
inextricable from the materiality of its base. In the face 
of the digital, the image is rematerialized through its 
vulnerability to destruction…It reveals more readily 
than the digital, with its dream of immateriality, the 
inescapable necessity of matter, despite its inevitable 
corrosion, decay, and degeneration.39 
                                                
38 See also Rosen, Change Mummified, especially 3-41. 
39 Doane, “The Indexical,” 144-6.  
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What is most significant, then, about Decasia is not that it provides a window onto a 
world different from our own, but rather that it indexes the passage of time in the 
decay of celluloid. In the context of the digital, the indexing of the deterioration of 
celluloid is also an indexing of the end of cinema as it was once known, that is, as 
film. Thus, Doane concludes, “what might be called the politics of the medium is an 
attempt to grasp and retain embodiment as a form of historical labor.”40  
 While this analysis has a lot of power in asserting the work of history, it is 
nonetheless quite limiting. The materialism proffered here is overly mechanistic. All 
of the complex dynamics of the material world are subsumed under the law of entropy. 
This limitation is, I think, thrown into even starker relief when considered from the 
point of view of the human body. As Doane points out, the index has long had a 
privileged relation to death—for example, the references to the Holy Shroud of Turin, 
the “mummy complex,” and the death mask in André Bazin’s “The Ontology of the 
Photographic Image,” and the image of Roland Barthes’ dead mother in Camera 
Lucida. In the index, past lives and past moments are “embalmed;” it is in their 
preservation as tracings on celluloid that the mortality and ephemerality of such lives 
and moments is illuminated and brought to the fore. In other words, in presenting a 
past time that is different from the present, the index provides a record of something 
that has itself passed out of existence—“something,” Barthes writes in Camera 
Lucida, “which once existed, no longer exists, but presents itself as a present sign of a 
                                                
40 Doane, “The Indexical,” 146.  
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dead thing.”41 In Habib’s view, Decasia intensifies this effect by creating a resonance 
between the decay of the body and the decay of celluloid. Habib writes: “Morrison’s 
wish is to bring the viewer’s [sic] into a state of reflection on human mortality…for 
which the decayed film serves as a memento (we will rot like the films).”42 The 
struggle between image and matter is here reconfigured as the struggle of humanity 
with its own mortality. For Habib, Decasia’s ‘signature’ image is thus that of a boxer 
who seems to be fighting a seething blob of decay: “this decayed image recycles the 
classical theme of the vanitas, the vain struggle of Man against Death—which makes 
this image even more ghostly.”43 
 Again, the materialism and concomitant historicism that the index provides 
remains chained to entropy. Furthermore, entropy is here reduced to the biological fate 
of the human organism. Just as the complex dynamics of matter are reduced to the 
process of degradation, so too, potentially, are the dynamics of collectivity. This is a 
crucial point, as Jameson’s diagnosis of the waning of historicity is tied to an 
assessment of, and attempt to re-imagine, the capacity for collective politics, which 
transcend the biological destiny of the individual. A historicism that precludes, or at 
                                                
41 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 154.  
42 Habib, “Thinking in the Ruins.” 
43 Ibid. Joel Katz has made a similar observation for early, nitrate film more generally: “Like 
memory, archival film tends to get grainier, scratchier and more distorted with age. Viewing 
early cinema can be an experience of ghostly, almost necrophiliac dimension—the 
corporeality of the images may seen nearly as tenuous as the nitrate’s grip on the film stock 
itself.” See Joel Katz, “From Archive to Archiveology,” Cinematograph 4 (1991): 91-103. In 
a different idiom, but with comparable implications, Laura U. Marks describes the affective 
experience of watching decaying images through the concept of melancholia. See Laura U. 
Marks, “Loving a Disappearing Image,” Cinémas: Journal of Film Studies 8 (1997): 93-111. 
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least deemphasizes, the dynamics of collectivity thus misses the point. In contrast, my 
approach to the movement articulated by decay (in terms of a construction of totality) 
aims at precisely the question of politics that frames Jameson’s approach to the 
cognitive mapping of the present. To be sure, this perspective does not negate the 
perspective of the index, or seek to invalidate death—death is a logical endpoint of, 
and pervasive reality within, the brutality of the capitalist system. Rather, my intention 
is to push beyond the limits of an indexical reading of decay, that is, beyond the limits 
of entropy and the fate of the individual, in order to ultimately clear a space, albeit a 
provisional and incomplete one, for a politics based in the common.   
 Considered from the point of view of their original content, movement within 
the images in Decasia adheres to the slowed and deliberate movement of solid objects 
and bodies. From the point of view of decay, there are no such stable forms; there are 
only the disembodied and erratic movements of the images themselves. These 
movements are extremely complex and varied. In the reviews of Decasia there is no 
shortage of poetic and inventive descriptions of the decay of the image. In her New 
York Times review, Sarah Boxer identifies “splotches, bubbles, honeycombs, 
snowflakes, gooey bits, wiggly chromosomal shapes, jazzy spots, jumpy spots, steady 
spots, Wonder Bread spots, black streaks and blinding white flashes that could trigger 
an epileptic fit.”44 These various shapes are subject to the ceaseless movement of the 
surface of the image—billowing, bubbling, shimmering, squirming, rippling, and 
sliding. As Jonathan Jones writes in a review of the film in the Guardian: “The effect 
                                                
44 Boxer, “Where a Film’s Gooey Bits.” 
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of the nitrate film’s decay is to make everything seem fluid, while creating a weird 
landscape of grotesque, pulsing shapes.”45 In this fluid world, the spatial orientation of 
the frame—up, down, left, right—appears arbitrary, and the depth of the image is 
almost entirely cancelled.  
  Opposed to the deliberate circular development of the whole traced out by the 
images’ original content, the transformation of the whole constructed from the 
movement of decay is much more complex. At times, the movement from one image 
to another is highly erratic—for example, broad undulations of bubbles of decay in a 
portion of the frame will give way to a sort of crackling vibration that textures the 
entire image like a brittle mineral. At other times patterns of movement appear, which 
cohere and fade away at varying speeds. Such patterns arise from resonances between 
different aspects of movement of the image—for example, between the concentration 
of movement in portions of the frame, or between the velocity, direction, or rhythms 
of movement. The movement between images thus does little to mitigate the 
disorienting effects of the movement within the images themselves. Each part of the 
whole, whether it is a single image or a cluster of images that form a brief pattern, is 
abstract to the point of being interchangeable with any other part. Instead of providing 
a more or less clear trajectory through space, the movement between parts seems to 
space itself into chaotic motion. The totality formed by the movement between parts is 
akin to the totality of particles and waves, or matter-energy, in the universe. Indeed, 
the nature of this totality, or whole, and its transformation in time is very close to the 
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way Deleuze describes what he calls the “materialist programme” of the first chapter 
of Bergson’s Matter and Memory, which descends to the level of  “a flowing-matter in 
which no point of anchorage nor centre of reference would be assignable.”46 Deleuze 
writes: “Every thing, that is to say every image, is indistinguishable from its actions 
and reactions…Every image is ‘merely a road by which pass, in every direction, the 
modifications propagated by the immensity of the universe.’” And, then: “It is a world 
of universal variation, of universal undulation, universal rippling,” which “constitutes 
a kind of plane [plan] of immanence.”47 By “plane of immanence,” Deleuze means 
that which has only itself as a cause or, put a different way, that in which cause and 
effect are one and the same. Without the mechanical links of thematic, narrative, or 
simply directional, lines of causality that open onto the grand cycle of birth, decline, 
and re-birth, the transformation of the whole from the perspective of the movement of 
decay is, rather, like the rotation of a kaleidoscope or, better, the surface of a choppy 
sea. “This is not mechanism,” Deleuze suggests, “it is machinism.”48 If the movement 
of the original content of the images presents history as the quasi-biological and linear 
development of humanity, here history is the immanence of the material substance of 
the world.  
 This latter construction of history and of the whole might seem ahuman and 
asocial, and therefore, in a way, ahistorical. However, this mapping of the whole can 
be seen as a more radical elaboration of the mapping carried out by the original 
                                                
46 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 81, 57.  
47 Ibid., 58-9.  
48 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 59.  
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content of the images. The self-reflexivity of this original content explicitly weds the 
whole to cinema. The totality is a cinematic totality; cinema and totality are 
coextensive. As I suggested at the outset of this chapter, this meshing of cinema and 
totality provides another way to understand film heritage. In this sense, heritage 
connotes a mapping of the social totality vis-à-vis the accumulated history of cinema. 
The movement of decay puts forward a similar notion. Yet here the integration of 
totality and cinema is affected not through the self-reflexivity of content, but through 
the identity of image and matter. The immanence of matter is also the immanence of 
images. Reflecting on the first chapter of Matter and Memory, Deleuze states: “The 
material universe, the plane of immanence, is the machine assemblage of movement-
images. Here Bergson was startlingly ahead of his time: it is the universe as cinema in 
itself, a metacinema.”49 Today, and in the context of Decasia, this “metacinema” is 
another name for film heritage: cinema not only supplies a set of conceptual and 
aesthetic tools for mapping totality; it is also indistinguishable from the very fabric, or 
“stuff,” of the world and of the social totality—“You may say that my body is matter 
or that it is an image.”50 This mapping of totality provides another version of the 
                                                
49 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 59. 
50 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 5. In The Death of Cinema, Cherchi Usai constructs a similar 
plane of immanence. Cherchi Usai couches his critique of film restoration in terms of a 
broader critique of what, following Stewart Brand, he calls the “digital dark age.” Spurred by 
the immateriality of digital information, the hallmark of this “age” is the sense of an eternal 
present, and a detachment from the vicissitudes of history and the material world. Cherchi 
Usai combats this version of the waning of historicity through a materialist ontology of 
cinema—“Cinema is the art of destroying moving images.” Yet, the most remarkable way The 
Death of Cinema expresses its materialism is through form. It is in the unique form of the 
book that Cherchi Usai constructs a plane of immanence. The power and peculiarity of this 
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monism evoked by Morrison’s description of Decasia, but escapes the trite, cyclical 
historical narrative of the film’s four “Movements.” Yet this vision of totality seems to 
lean towards Jameson’s spatial and synchronic understanding of mapping, and to lack 
any principle of social change. Put differently, it appears to lack a historical subject, or 
agent of politics. In order to extract such a subject from the film, it is necessary to 
transcode the two regimes of movement into modes of perception.  
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
 As Bergson states, movement provides a partial view of the whole. For 
Deleuze, then, the movement-image is also always a perception-image. The 
                                                                                                                                       
form owes to four separate, but mutually reinforcing, characteristics: 1. Cherchi Usai’s playful 
use of mathematics. Here, various components of the medium are dramatically flattened onto 
the same material plane; for example: “Let t be the running time of a moving image after a 
number n (wherein n≥1) of screenings through an apparatus that inflicts damage on the 
image…let p be the quantity of moving images eliminated from t in order to increase the 
potential number of viewings; let c be the amount of moving imagery suppressed for cultural 
reasons; let h be the coefficient of humidity in the viewer’s cornea that induces periodic 
blinking.” 2. The layout of the book, wherein the text is divided into aphorisms, each of which 
is presented opposite a single image. The book is thus evenly divided between image and text, 
neither of which is privileged over the other. The images are not referenced in the aphorisms, 
and do not simply illustrate the text (or vice versa)—often the relation between image and the 
text opposite is opaque. 3. These relations are made even more complex through an 
approximation of hypertext. Each image/text pair is ranged under a roman numeral, and many 
of the aphorisms are strewn with “links” to other image/text pairs in the form of bracketed 
roman numerals. These links create an increasingly complex web of cross-references that 
lends a sense of synchronicity to the image/text pairs. Rather than a linear argument, the book 
thus presents a shifting mosaic that approximates the type of machinic dynamics Deleuze 
describes in Cinema 1. 4. Drawing again on Brand, Cherchi Usai uses a 10,000 year date 
system—e.g. a still from Stanley Kurbick’s A Clockwork Orange is dated 01971. This 
massive, “geological” timescale emphasizes the subsistence of matter over and against narrow, 
linear accounts of the history of cinema. 
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perception-image in no way refers to the perception of a spectator. Rather, Deleuze 
articulates perception entirely in terms of formal dynamics. The perception-image is a 
basic avatar of subjectivity constructed through film form—Deleuze often uses the 
phrase “camera-consciousness” to describe this type of image. In his commentary on 
the first chapter of Matter and Memory, Deleuze argues that Bergson’s 
conceptualization of a material plane of immanence implies a corresponding mode of 
perception. Deleuze variously refers to this type of perception as gaseous, and 
molecular: “it is the pure vision of a non-human eye, of an eye which would be in 
things.”51 This is not a vision onto the plane of matter, but rather matter seeing itself. 
Deleuze thus also refers to this mode of perception as the “eye of matter.” Yet, 
Deleuze quips, “can I even, at this level, speak of ‘ego,’ of eye, of brain and of body? 
Only for simple convenience…It is rather a gaseous state. Me, my body, are rather a 
set of molecules and atoms which are constantly renewed.”52 The eye of matter is a 
fundamentally acentered perception, as it envelops the point of view of every 
imaginable point in space—“This is the definition of objectivity, ‘to see without 
boundaries or distances.’”53 Of course, in film each shot can only provide a limited 
point of view in space. The eye of matter is therefore largely a product of montage. 
Indeed, it is precisely through the type of machinic montage displayed by the 
movement of decay in Decasia that such an ‘objective’ vision is approximated. While 
not every point in space can be given simultaneously, the point of view provided by 
                                                
51 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 81.  
52 Ibid., 58.  
53 Ibid., 81. 
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each shot is laid out on a continuous plane and made to register a single global flux, 
that is, a modulation of matter that crosses each point and stirs them all together.       
 Deleuze’s principle example of the eye of matter is Dziga Vertov’s theory and 
practice of the “kino-eye.” Deleuze argues that Vertov lays out a plane of immanence 
similar to that of Matter and Memory: “Vertov was aiming to attain or regain the 
system of universal variation, in itself.”54 Thus: “Whether there were machines, 
landscapes, buildings or men was of little consequence: each…was presented as a 
material system in perpetual interaction…What Vertov discovered in contemporary 
life was the molecular child, the molecular woman, the material woman and child, as 
much as systems which are called mechanisms or machines.”55 For Deleuze, what 
distinguishes Vertov from Eisenstein (as well as from Pudovkin and Dovzhenko) is 
that Vertov replaces the dialectic of Man and Nature with a dialectic within matter. 
This version of the dialectic draws together the immanent plane of matter with a 
consciousness of this plane: “The correlation between a non-human matter and a 
superhuman eye is the dialectic itself, because it is also the identity of a community of 
matter and a communism of man.”56 The consciousness of the plane is thus a radical 
class-consciousness. “In Vertov,” Deleuze writes, “this is clearly a case of Soviet 
revolutionary consciousness, of the ‘communist deciphering of reality.’”57 As 
indicated by the relentless self-reflexivity of his masterpiece, Man with the Movie 
                                                
54 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 80. 
55 Ibid., 39.  
56 Ibid., 40.  
57 Ibid., 82.  
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Camera (1929), Vertov views this dialectic and its new form of class consciousness as 
inextricable from the cinema. The dialectic of matter and communism is the work of 
film montage, which Vertov broadly ranges under the concept of “kino-eye.” As 
François Zourabichvili observes, one way Vertov constructs the kino-eye in Man with 
the Movie Camera is through the proliferation of “spectacular false continuities:” “the 
awakening of a young woman coincides with the noisy passing of a locomotive that 
she nevertheless can neither see nor hear; we then go from her naked back to a camera, 
which we see aimed in this direction, but which is nevertheless located elsewhere, 
somewhere in the town, targeting other objects.”58 Here it is not only the jumping 
across space that is important, but also the way in which the forms present in the 
film’s images are shot through by the movement created by montage, which serves to 
“extract pure visual and dynamic values” from these forms, and integrates them into a 
totalizing movement of matter.59 In Zourabichvili’s example, Vertov’s montage does 
not only correlate the woman’s awakening with the violence of the locomotive, but 
also the vibrations of the camera mounted on the train with the jostling of the woman’s 
torso, which almost completely fills the frame.  
 At the end of his analysis of Vertov, Deleuze ponders the question of a politics 
of the eye of matter. The question, he concludes, “remains open since Vertov’s answer 
(Communist society) has lost its meaning.”60 Writing in the early 1980s, Deleuze is 
here referring to a decline in faith in the kind of formal party politics and teleological 
                                                
58 Zourabichvili, “The Eye of Montage,” 147.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 85.  
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historical materialism Vertov endorsed; it is significant that in noting the passing of 
Vertov’s ideals Deleuze refers to “Communist society,” the imposing uppercase “C” 
intimating the ultimate subsumption of Soviet experimentation in cinema within the 
official, monolithic project of Stalinism. Deleuze addresses this question of politics in 
the midst of identifying how (North) American experimental cinema in the ’60s and 
’70s took up the legacy of the eye of matter. Deleuze contends:  
A whole aspect of that cinema is concerned with 
attaining a pure perception, as it is in things or in matter, 
to the point to which molecular interactions extend. 
[Stan] Brakhage explores a Cézannian world before 
man, a dawn of ourselves, by filming all shades of green 
seen by a baby in the prairie. Michael Snow deprives the 
camera of any centre and films the universal interaction 
of images which vary in relation to one another, on all 
their facets, and in all their parts (The Central Region). 
[Jordan] Belson and [Ken] Jacobs trace coloured forms 
and movements back to molecular or atomic forces 
(Phenomena, Momentum.)61       
                                                
61 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 84. The reference to the baby comes from Brakhage’s well-known 
essay “Metaphors on Vision,” where the filmmaker states: “How many colors are there in a 
field of grass to the crawling baby unaware of ‘Green’?…How aware of variations in heat 
wave can that eye be? Imagine a world alive with incomprehensible objects and shimmering 
with an endless variety of movement and innumerable gradations of color.” See Stan 
Brakhage, Essential Brakhage: Selected Writing on Filmmaking (New York: Documentext, 
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Deleuze’s invocation of Brakhage is particularly significant. The effects of decay in 
Decasia have often been compared to Brakhage’s films. Habib, for instance, refers to 
Brakhage’s hand-painted films as a “perceptual-aesthetic model” for the “visual play 
of degradation that Decasia foregrounds.”62 In Allegories of Cinema: American Film 
in the Sixties, David E. James links Brakhage’s perceptual-aesthetic model to a poetic 
immanentism inspired by Wordsworth and practiced by contemporary poets such as 
Charles Olson, Robert Duncan, and Gary Snyder. The “primary imperative” of this 
model is “the dynamic experience of what is phenomenally present, the engagement of 
consciousness by nature when they most illuminate each other.”63 In Brakhage, James 
argues, perception gathers together the human body, the camera, and nature on a plane 
of immanence. In contrast to Vertov (or Eisenstein, in Annette Michelson’s 
assessment), this mode of perception seeks a detachment of subjectivity from the 
                                                                                                                                       
2001). For The Central Region (1971), Snow placed a camera in a barren region of northern 
Quebec. Snow designed a custom mount that allowed for a series of completely automated and 
highly complex camera movements—variously, and often simultaneously, swiveling, turning, 
raising, lowering, tracking in and out, and zooming and changing apertures. In a footnote, 
Deleuze further describes the film: “Snow films a ‘dehumanised landscape,’ without any 
human presence…[and] frees the eye from the condition of relative immobility and of 
dependence on co-ordinates” (Cinema 1, 230). Gene Youngblood’s description of Jordan 
Belson’s Momentum (1968) reads like some of the reviews for Decasia: “Flaming napalm-like 
clouds of gas surge ominously into the void, which suddenly is shattered with an opalescent 
burst of light. We move through various levels of temperature and matter…Moving deeper 
into the mass, images become more uniform with a textural quality like a shifting sea of silver 
silt.” See Gene Youngblood, “The Cosmic Cinema of Jordan Belson,” in the Film Culture 
Reader, edited by P. Adams Sitney (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000).    
62 Habib, “Thinking in the Ruins.” 
63 James, Allegories of Cinema, 40.  
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structures of history, class, and politics. The result of this idealism, James argues, was 
“to strand Brakhage in an ideologically complicit positivism.”64    
  In tracing the history of the eye of matter and its politics, Deleuze also invokes 
structural film. In a footnote to this discussion, Deleuze cites P. Adams Sitney’s 
seminal essay of 1969, “Structural Film,” and an array of filmmakers, including Tony 
Conrad, Paul Sharits, Ernie Gehr, and George Landow (a.k.a. Owen Land). Like 
Sitney, Deleuze zeros in on a few formal methods and effects shared by many of these 
filmmakers. One example is the flicker film—e.g. Conrad’s The Flicker and Sharits’ 
Ray Gun Virus, both from 1966—in which strobing monochromatic photogrammes 
create modulations of color and complex vibrations that subsume the space of the 
frame, and the photogrammes that pass through it, in a single flux of movement. 
Another example is loop printing. Loop printing displays one way of incorporating 
montage into the shot itself in order to engender molecular perception. For Deleuze, 
Vertov achieves this effect in Man with the Movie Camera by freezing the image and 
then returning it to motion (often in reverse, or with an acceleration or deceleration). 
                                                
64 James, Allegories of Cinema, 51. James contends that the political ramifications of 
Brakhage’s philosophy and aesthetics are most clearly seen in the films that attempt to deal 
with social structures. Thus, of eyes (1971), a film on the Pittsburg police, James writes: “the 
political relationship between the people and the police is blocked by two levels of 
empiricism: by the supposition that the function of these specific police can be comprehended 
through vision alone, and by the supposition that the function of the police system as a whole 
may adequately be registered by observation of these instances of it.” In 23rd Psalm Branch 
(1967), Brakhage’s film on Vietnam, James argues, “the war that is produced is a function not 
of a specific imperialist undertaking nor even of Western culture as a whole, but of nature as 
such, and its traumas are those of private consciousness and memory.” Allegories of Cinema, 
52-4. See also Annette Michelson, “Camera Lucida/Camera Obscura,” Artforum 11.5 (1973): 
30-7.        
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This momentarily still frame does not, Deleuze argues, merely stop movement; it also 
converts movement into a fundamental excitation of matter, which is then unleashed 
when the image is set back in motion: “It is the vibration, the elementary solicitation 
of which movement is made up at each instant, the clinamen of Epicurean 
materialism.”65 In the ‘canon’ of structural film, a particularly stunning instance of 
how loop printing presents a similar form of montage and movement is Landow’s 
Film in which there appear sprocket holes, edge lettering, dirt particles, etc. (1966). 
The film is constructed around a single shot from a color test—i.e. a portion of film 
showing the head and shoulders of a woman next to a color spectrum (referred to as a 
China Girl, or Kodak Girl) that technicians use to grade color. Landow reprints this 
shot so that the space between two frames is visible. The image is also pushed to the 
left side of the frame so that, on the right, we can see the edge of the filmstrip, 
including sprocket holes (Figure 2.4). While this composition remains largely static 
through the six-minute film, the space of the frame is shot through with movement. As 
in Decasia, the surface of the image is laden with dirt, dust, and scratches that 
shimmer intensely. This excitation of the image cuts across and links every point 
within the frame, and thereby extracts a common molecular movement from the 
human form of the China Girl and the physical structure of the filmstrip. The workings 
of the projector are also melded with this movement through the rapid blinking of 
letters at the edge of the filmstrip and a dull, mechanical pulse on the soundtrack. 
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Fig. 2.4                                                                Film in which there appear… (1966) 
In his analysis of structural film in Allegories of Cinema, James displays an 
uneasiness with a purely formalist approach—such as that of Sitney—and an emphasis 
on structures of perception and consciousness. James argues that a focus on the modes 
of perception offered by these films extends and perpetuates the abstraction of the 
films themselves and their tendency to exclude any (social) content. Significantly, 
James identifies this dynamic in the championing of Vertov by many of the structural 
filmmakers and critics like Michelson, who, he contends, emphasized the self-
reflexivity and materialism of a film like Man with the Movie Camera at the cost of 
suppressing its concrete historical and political framework.66  Thus, against an 
affiliation between Vertov and structural film, James stresses their divergence: “The 
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difference between Vertov and structural film, which appears as the presence of 
content in the one and its absence in the other, is a priori determined by the nature of 
the social relationships involved in their different modes of filmmaking.”67 The 
difference, in other words, is between an institutionalized Communism, and a 
capitalist system becoming increasingly intertwined with the image-as-commodity. In 
this context, and in light of the way these directors became aligned with a rarified art 
world, James insists that a political assessment of structural film must reject any 
positive notion of perception, and settle on radical negation. This is essentially the 
position Peter Gidal (an American émigré) espoused in the U.K. in the mid-’70s, as 
structural film practice in the U.S. was beginning to fade; yet, James suggests, 
“Gidal’s project retrospectively illuminated the social determination of structural film 
in general.”68 In this view the abstract minimalism, self-reflexivity, and materialism of 
structural film define themselves against the total corruption of the image and 
representation in the culture industry.  
 While James’ book is certainly not the final word on structural film, or on 
Brakhage’s massive oeuvre, it nonetheless testifies to the openness of the question of 
the politics of the eye of matter. Moreover, one might plausibly extend the 
comparisons of Decasia to Brakhage, or to structural film, towards a political 
assessment of the film in line with James’ respective analyses. However, the specific 
social and historical context of Decasia should not be forgotten. In The Cinematic 
                                                
67 James, Allegories of Cinema, 266.  
68 Ibid., 279. 
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Mode of Production, it is from within this context that Beller looks back to Man with 
the Movie Camera: “For those of us on the other side (historically speaking) of the 
Soviet experiment, Vertov’s film must take on a different significance. This 
significance is, in part, Vertov’s provisions for the groundwork of a political economy 
of the visual.”69 For Beller, Vertov’s conflation of image and matter prefigures the 
total suffusion of the social world by the image that Debord described as the “society 
of the spectacle,” and which seems to have come to full fruition with the end of the 
Soviet bloc and the globalization of capital. Because Beller sees the image solely in 
terms of the commodity, this historical situation also entails the evacuation of 
consciousness, which becomes an automated relay and converter for image-
commodities. An immanent plane of images has been constructed, but by and for 
capital, and thus without the corresponding form of revolutionary consciousness. 
Vertov’s eye has closed, and its concomitant politics shut down. How, then, are we to 
frame this mode of perception in Decasia? The picture is rather different if we 
understand the image not only in terms of the commodity, but also in terms of an 
expanded concept of film heritage, that is, as a shared substrate of cognitive and 
perceptual procedures with a positive ontological dimension. As I argued in chapter 
one, this aspect of heritage, which I term the cinematic common, has begun to 
coalesce as a productive force with the ongoing development of post-Fordism and the 
mobilization of the general intellect as living labor. From this perspective something 
of kino-eye remains open, if in a different form than that constructed by Vertov. 
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Today the eye of matter may denote the eye of the cinematic common. This does not 
mean a perception of the common, as of some external object, but rather perception 
spread through the very fabric of the common—the common seeing itself, or the 
proprioception of the common. In this sense the eye of matter remains fundamentally 
collective, and rooted in the social and historical realm of labor. Yet, in Decasia a 
politics proper to this perception is not articulated. Seen in terms of the movement of 
decay, the images in Decasia are as abstract as those in many structural films and 
much of Brakhage’s work. While the cinematic common may have an eye, it is not yet 
wedded to an organized political force and a revolutionary vision.  
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
  To further elaborate on a potential politics of the eye of matter in Decasia, the 
film’s other regime of movement—that generated by the original content of the 
images—must also be described in terms of a mode of perception. For Deleuze, the 
perception-image occupies a spectrum. Objective, molecular perception stands at one 
extreme pole of this spectrum, and normal, ordinary, or subjective perception stands at 
the opposite pole. Deleuze refers to this perception-image as “subjective” because the 
eye it constructs approximates the “I” of the human subject. While the decay in 
Decasia presents an eye of matter that leans toward the objective pole, the original 
content of the images presents an eye that approaches the subjective pole. Rather than 
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conflating perception with movement, this subjective type of perception-image 
discerns movement as that of something in space, and gives consciousness as 
consciousness of something. Movement passes before this image instead of seizing it 
and altering its fabric. In Decasia this mode of perception can first be grasped in the 
composition of the shot vis-à-vis the original content of the image. The camera is 
largely static, and movement is executed by objects or people in the field of vision. 
When the camera does move (and very slowly, due to stretch printing), it is to track 
the movements of these external entities. The spatial axes of the frame are affirmed by 
the content, such that the horizon, whether seen or implied, cuts horizontally across 
the image. Each image thus provides a view from a relatively stable point in space. 
This, Deleuze writes, “is the status of solid, geometric and physical perception.”70    
 In terms of montage, perception is linked to the movement or directionality of 
the subject of each image. This dynamic can clearly be seen in the mini-narrative of 
the miners discussed above. The eye of this mode of perception thus takes on the 
compact mass of these forms. Morrison emphasizes this relation between perception 
and subject in a sequence that begins with five images—four medium close-ups, and 
one medium shot—of individuals who look directly into the camera, their steady looks 
mirroring the eye of the device. The first four shots are of children, and, following the 
film’s biological trajectory of development, the last two shots are of adults. The series 
of direct addresses is followed by a medium shot of a woman in a bathing suit, seated 
in an early tanning machine, who looks off to the right of the frame. This image  
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Fig. 2.5                                                                                                  Decasia (2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.6                                                                                                  Decasia (2002) 
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gathers the five previous looks into the salacious view of the camera, which slowly 
pans down the woman’s body (Figures 2.5 and 2.6). As the camera comes to rest on 
the woman’s legs, there is a cut to an image of the two smokestacks of a ship, framed 
by an iris. This image is then alternated several times with the image of the woman’s 
legs. The graphic match of legs and smokestacks reinforces the more abstract 
resonance between the focalizing function of the iris—i.e. its “look here” aspect—and 
the looks at the camera. Furthering this play on sightlines, we then see a group  
of sailors who turn towards the camera. This image is followed by a return to the 
subject of the fifth direct address—a suited man in medium shot—who promptly 
begins to wave a farewell towards frame left.  
This sequence also shows how subjective perception tends to run counter to the 
sense of absolute synchronicity that the eye of matter approaches. Here each image, or 
group of images (in the case of the initial five shots), presents the leading edge of a 
perceptual, and loosely narrative, vector of movement. This leading edge marks out a 
privileged point of view that necessarily succeeds the movement that comes before, 
and precedes the movement after, thereby occupying a single point in space at any 
given time. All movement funnels into this single point: “When the universe of 
movement-images is related to one of these special images which forms a centre in it, 
the universe is incurved and organized to surround it.”71 The universal variation of the 
eye of matter becomes variation around a central axis.  On the broadest level, the 
progression of the four “Movements” in Decasia, each replacing the one before, 
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passes through this sliding pivot point. The eye that gains consistency at this center 
point embodies the generic humanity whose cyclical history is drawn out by these 
“Movements.”  
If the eye of matter presents heritage from the point of view of the common, 
this subjective “I” presents heritage from a point of view with a structure akin to 
identity, that is, a semi-stable center around which the world revolves, and which is 
wedded to a repetition of the same (Decasia’s circle). Like the eye of matter, this “I” 
is rather abstract; it does, however, have the more concrete aspect of a thoroughly 
conservative view of history. Importantly, the subjective eye is not a negation of the 
eye of matter. Deleuze describes the relation of the former to the latter as 
fundamentally subtractive. This mode of perception carves out a window within the 
global movement that defines the eye of matter, blocking out all that which does not 
pass before it. As Paola Marrati puts it: “In short, we perceive in the same way that a 
director determines a frame: by cutting out from the whole of the universe the part—
variable, of course—that interests us.”72 Subjective perception thus does not negate the 
eye of matter. On the contrary, the eye of matter supplies the material on which 
subjective perception performs its subtractive, or framing, operation. In Decasia there 
is an image that neatly visualizes the dynamic between these two divergent eyes. The 
image shows an amusement park ride composed of carriages designed to look like 
spaceships, which are attached to arms that spin around a central hub. The circular 
movement of the ride sweeps from left to right across the full breadth of the frame. On 
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the far left side of the frame a blot of decay swarms and vibrates. As the ride turns, the 
carriages encounter the blob, their forms disintegrating into nebulous movement, and 
then reforming as they pass out on the other side. Similarly, the circular development 
of the whole, formed by the movement of discrete objects and their attendant eye, cuts 
a path through the eye of matter, which nonetheless persists in its own right. In terms 
of heritage, the official discourse continually draws on the vital elements of the 
cinematic common in order to mold them into the confines of a national identity.      
While subjective perception should not be placed in a negative relation to 
molecular perception (as the latter’s negation), the reverse also holds. The eye of 
matter should not be unequivocally celebrated, with the subjective eye, the eye of the 
“I,” negated in turn. Deleuze is often accused of brazenly affirming the logic of 
molecular perception, especially in his collaborations with Félix Guattari.73 However, 
careful attention to even their wildest text, namely A Thousand Plateaus, reveals this 
accusation to be largely misguided. Here an analogue to the eye of matter can be 
found in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-molecular, or variously, 
becoming-imperceptible, and becoming-world. Becoming-molecular is one of the 
most extreme entries in the book’s oft-referenced taxonomy of becomings, including 
becoming-animal and becoming-woman. In becoming-molecular, one reaches “[a] 
plane of consistency [or, plane of immanence] peopled by anonymous matter, by 
infinite bits of impalpable matter entering into varying connections.” Here, 
                                                
73 See, for example, Slavoj Žižek, Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences 
(New York: Routledge, 2003). 
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“[p]erception will confront its own limit…the imperceptible itself becomes necessarily 
perceived at the same time as perception becomes necessarily molecular…Nothing left 
but the world of speeds and slowness without form, without subject, without a face.”74 
In enumerating the qualities of this mode of becoming and perception, Deleuze and 
Guattari also enumerate a host of related dangers, wrapping this concept in an air of 
extreme caution. Reaching the threshold of molecular perception can easily descend 
into undifferentation, meaninglessness, and the loss of any foothold from which to 
struggle. 75 Thus, they write: “You have to keep enough of the organism for it to 
reform each dawn…you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient 
quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality.”76 What Deleuze and 
Guattari call for is a braiding together of the subjective eye and the eye of matter that 
transforms the “I.” More specifically, they suggest that contact with the eye of matter 
can be conceived and organized in a way that increases the subject’s power, which is 
defined in a Spinozist vein as the capacity to affect and be affected—the power, for 
instance, to perceive new dimensions of the social world and to alter the dominant 
reality.  
                                                
74 Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 255, 282-3.  
75 “Tearing the conscious away from the subject in order to make it a means of exploration, 
tearing the unconscious away from significance and interpretation in order to make it a 
veritable production: this is assuredly no more or less difficult than tearing the body away 
from the organism. Caution is the art of all three; if in dismantling the organism there are 
times one courts death, in slipping away from significance and subjection one courts 
falsehood, illusion and hallucination and psychic death.” Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand 
Plateaus, 160, my emphasis. 
76 Ibid.  
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At the end of chapter one I suggested that one way film heritage might 
constitute a political project is through the kind of institutionalization of the common 
described by Hardt and Negri in Commonwealth. Perhaps another way to describe the 
abstraction of the eye of the cinematic common is that it currently lacks this 
institutional framework. To reiterate, Hardt and Negri conceive of radical 
institutionalization as a form for drawing on the resources of the common to foster the 
coordination and cooperation of singularities as a force against exploitation, and for 
the common good. In terms of cinematic form, and heritage as cognitive mapping, this 
institutionalization might be reformulated as a new mode of relation between the eye 
of the common and the subjective eye. In the final moments of Decasia, there is a 
short sequence that foregrounds the terrain of this potential politics of film heritage. In 
Morrison’s description of the film’s “Movements,” this is the point in which the 
human “disintegrates into that which is essential and indivisible and reforms into 
something waiting to be re-born anew.”77 The sequence starts with a relatively ‘clean’ 
image: a long take of the sun slowly setting over an empty landscape, signaling the 
end of (one phase of) human civilization. The frame then becomes entirely filled with 
intense decay, which blocks out any recognizable content for nearly half a minute. Out 
of this decay there emerges a vague image of a Japanese woman who appeared earlier 
in the film. The next image is the film’s last: a clear shot of the spinning Sufi dancer 
that opens the film. Here, then, the relation between the two eyes is narrativized. The 
descent into the “essential and indivisible” propels humanity into a new beginning, a 
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new dawn. The relation between the eye of the common and the eye of the “I” is 
thereby figured as a productive force. A crucial task for heritage as cognitive mapping 
is to seize on the productivity of this relation. Yet this productive dimension must be 
ripped from Decasia’s vision of abstract humanity and empty historical repetition, and 
grounded in labor’s constitution of the present as a dramatically open process—“the 
seed which splits open the paving stones…and which bears witness to life, in this 
world as it is.”78 
                                                
78 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 173. Here Deleuze echoes one of the slogans of the suixante-huitards in 
France: Sous les pavés, la plage! [Beneath the paving stones, the beach!]. 
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Chapter Three 
The Perfect Crystal: Vertigo and the Restoration-Image  
 
 
 
 
 
Time does things to movies and the way we see them.  
 —James C. Katz, in Obsessed with “Vertigo” 
 
 
The crystal-image, then, is the point of indiscernability of the two distinct 
images, the actual and the virtual, while what we see in the crystal is time 
itself, a bit of time in the pure state, the very distinction between the two 
images which keeps on reconstituting itself.  
 —Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2 
 
 
 
 
In an article published in 2004 in The Moving Image, the journal of the 
Association of Moving Image Archivists, Leo Enticknap critiques film studies for a 
lack of attention paid to the specificity of film restorations. Enticknap takes as his 
starting point a review by Peter Wollen of the restored version of Alfred Hitchcock’s 
Vertigo (1958). The restoration of Vertigo, financed by Universal, was released in 
1996 and was both heavily publicized and widely lauded—in January 1997, the film’s 
restorers received an award for their work from the New York Film Critics Circle. In 
his review, Wollen largely ignores the fact of the film’s restoration, and characterizes 
concerns over the technical process of restoration and the potential introduction of 
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differences from Hitchcock’s “original” as mere quibbling.1 Enticknap summaries 
Wollen’s tack: “By dismissing the technical issues raised specifically by the rerelease 
of Vertigo…Wollen is not just suggesting that they are unimportant; they are 
deliberately excluded from his reading of the film.” For Enticknap, Wollen’s position 
reflects “the humanities academic’s characteristic disinterest in all matters technical.”2 
Indeed, much of Enticknap’s article is devoted to a now familiar critique of the 
‘textual’ concerns of film theory. Enticknap rails against the “feminism, left-wing 
extremism, and other ideological dogma” of the film theory of the 1970s, which he 
argues is responsible for moving scholarly concerns away from the scientific and 
technical elements of cinema.3 These elements, Enticknap suggests, are now more 
important than ever, as film is increasingly seen and studied on formats other than 
celluloid. Furthermore, the veritable explosion of restoration as a popular form has 
supplied a huge range of films defined precisely by the nature of their re-production. 
Thus, of the restored Vertigo, Enticknap writes, “we have the Hitchcock that the film 
studies establishment has spent the last three decades relentlessly canonizing, but 
repackaged through a complex and intricate set of technical processes that many of its 
leading figures neither understand nor consider significant.”4 
 Despite its reactionary tone, Enticknap’s article makes at least one good point: 
film restorations have not been studied as restorations. The task of this chapter, as well 
                                                
1 Wollen, “Compulsion,” 14. See also Lynne S. Vieth, “Restored to Color: Ghosts of Art Past 
in Hitchcock’s Vertigo,” Stanford Humanities Review 7.2 (1999): 137-49. 
2 Enticknap, “Some Bald Assertion,” 130.  
3 Ibid., 131.  
4 Ibid., 138.  
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as chapter four, will thus be to provide two extended examples of analysis of 
restorations as such. In both, I will focus on high-profile restorations with commercial 
releases. This chapter will examine the restored Vertigo, heeding Enticknap’s call for 
an attention to the technical process of restoration. I will, however, draw on this 
process in a way that diverges from Enticknap’s methodology, which has three 
principle, and related, shortcomings. First, while Enticknap urges an approach to 
restoration that links technical concerns with aesthetic and textual concerns, his 
analysis of the restoration of Vertigo fails to forge such a connection, and remains 
exclusively on the level of the technical. This shortcoming of the analysis is ironic 
given Enticknap’s descriptions of the work of Barry Salt, who is perhaps best known 
for his book, Film Style and Technology: History and Analysis. While Enticknap 
praises this book as untainted by the dogma of “theory,” he accuses Salt of an 
empiricism—“essentially a data-gathering exercise”—that has little to offer in the way 
of textual analysis.5 It is exactly this sort of empiricism that Enticknap himself ends up 
recapitulating. Second, technology and the labor of restoration are presented in a way 
that is divorced from ideology and politics—here Enticknap takes to task Stephen 
Heath’s essay, “The Cinematic Apparatus: Technology as Historical and Cultural 
Form,” for linking technology and politics.6 The result in Enticknap is a technological 
determinism and an idealism that imagines restoration to exist outside of any social 
and political context. Third, Enticknap mentions, but does not seriously account for, 
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6 See De Lauretis and Heath, The Cinematic Apparatus, 1-13.  
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the fact that the technical side of restoration is a fundamental aspect of the marketing 
of these films. This is especially true for the restored version of Vertigo, which I will 
refer to from this point as Vertigo (1996) to denote its specify. A crucial part of the 
restoration’s publicity campaign was a documentary on the restoration process titled, 
Obsessed with “Vertigo:” New Life for Hitchcock’s Masterpiece, which premiered at 
AMC’s annual film preservation festival in 1997. The documentary was also produced 
by AMC, and later aired on the channel along with numerous trailers. 
 This aspect of the marketing of restorations, particularly of Vertigo (1996), 
provides an entry point for a methodology of analyzing restorations that is able to 
overcome the limits of Enticknap’s approach. In this marketing, the textual and the 
technical come together and are articulated to politics. In her analysis of AMC in 
Beyond the Multiplex, Klinger makes a useful move in this direction. In relation to the 
marketing of Vertigo (1996), including the Obsessed with “Vertigo” documentary, 
which I will discuss further below, Klinger writes:  
Universal and the restorers rescue the past from the 
ravages of time as well as from any imperfections in its 
original design owing to dated technologies…Even a 
trace of heroic discourse is present in this commentary, 
particularly in relation to the ability that capital and 
technology have to triumph over the various limitations 
and liabilities of time. From this perspective, Hollywood 
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and its personnel can be seen as protagonists in an epic 
historical drama, in which skill and powerhouse 
technological capabilities enable the preservation of the 
past…The remembrance of films past is an experience 
permeated by the spectacle of Hollywood as the 
embodiment of advanced technoculture and therefore as 
exemplary of the capitalist enterprise…This spectacle is 
present, then, not only on Hollywood’s special effects 
extravaganzas such a Titanic (1997), which was often 
seen worldwide as representing the extraordinary 
capabilities of U.S. capitalism and technological 
advancement; it is amply portrayed in the promotions 
for recycled Hollywood products as well.7   
What is missing from this account is, of course, an analysis of Vertigo (1996). In order 
to engage with the film in the terms initiated by Enticknap, and extended by Klinger, 
the relation between the promotion of the process of restoration and the product of this 
process, that is, the film itself, needs to be conceptualized and formalized.  
 Before continuing with this question of methodology, though, it will be useful 
here to briefly outline what actually constitutes the process of restoration. Vertigo was 
carried out by The Film Preserve Ltd., run by Robert A. Harris and James C. Katz. 
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Harris collaborated with Kevin Brownlow on the restoration of Gance’s Napoleon, 
and oversaw the restoration of David Lean’s Lawrence of Arabia (1962/1989). Katz, a 
former producer, was the president of Universal’s “Classics division,” which re-
released five of Hitchcock’s films in the early 1980s. Prior to Vertigo, Harris and Katz 
worked together on the restorations of Stanley Kubrick’s Spartacus (1960/1991) and 
George Cukor’s My Fair Lady (1964/1994). All of Harris and Katz’s restorations, 
including Vertigo, have relied for the most part on analog rather than digital means. 
Masters are created either through contact printing, where raw stock is exposed via 
physical contact with developed stock, or through optical printing, where raw stock is 
exposed via an automated camera that photographs developed stock. The parameters 
of the printing process determine the visual difference between the original state of the 
film on developed stock and its restoration on raw stock. The actual printing work is 
performed by lab technicians—for Vertigo, DeLuxe Laboratories was employed to 
strike new materials.8 Harris and Katz’s role is a sort of amalgamation of the roles of 
director and cinematographer on a film production. They create a coherent aesthetic 
vision for each restoration project, and map out protocols to create a photographic 
image in line with this vision. To do so, they need to be both historians and 
technicians, with a detailed knowledge of the aesthetic and technological aspects of 
film history, as well as the capabilities of contemporary film laboratories.   
                                                
8 Many restorations also use “wet-gate printing” (usually optical), where developed stock is 
immersed in a solution that smoothes over superficial starches and abrasions. For an account 
of the work of lab technicians in restoration, see Gabriel M. Paletz, “The Finesse of the Film 
Lab: A Report from a Week at Haghfilm,” The Moving Image 6.1 (2006): 1-32.  
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While film restoration can vary wildly according to the nature of the project, 
the process invariably begins with an assessment of existing materials—“look at it on 
a rewind; measure it; and give a shot by shot, blow by blow readout of the damage.”9 
Most restorationists work with preprint materials—original negatives, and/or 
intermediate positives and negatives. Major structural defects, such as torn 
perforations or peeling splices, are usually repaired by hand, and all the materials are 
cleaned, either by hand or using an ultrasonic wash. For Vertigo, Harris and Katz 
began with the original negative, and the three tinted positive “separations” (one each 
in yellow, cyan, and magenta) that were used in the Technicolor printing process. 
These materials posed two major difficulties making rote reproduction impossible. 
First, Hitchcock filmed Vertigo in a relatively short-lived widescreen format known as 
VistaVision. In this format—first used for Michael Curtiz’ White Christmas (1954), 
and last used for Marlon Brando’s One-Eyed Jacks (1961)—35mm film is run 
horizontally through the camera, creating a frame of 24mm by 36mm (with an aspect 
ratio of approximately 1.5:1). The majority of films shot on VistaVision were optically 
printed to 35mm, as the format required expensive and complex projectors that 
theaters were unwilling to install, and which were rapidly phased out of production. 
Harris and Katz therefore decided to print the film to 65mm. The second, and more 
vexing, difficulty was widespread and variable color fading on the negative. While the 
color separations were not faded, they had shrunk and shriveled to various degrees, 
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drastically distorting the image. Therefore, where the separations could not be 
consulted, Harris and Katz researched a huge amount of additional material, from 
release prints and the original timing cards, to production reports, camera reports, 
cloth samples from the original costumes, and paint samples from the green 1957 
jaguar that Kim Novak’s character drives in the film. All of this information was then 
against the properties of contemporary film stocks.10  
Two additional problems faced the restoration of Vertigo. The first concerned a 
scene that occurs towards the end of the film, where a flashback reveals 
Madeleine/Judy (Kim Novak) faking her jump from the bell tower. The scene was not 
included in the first cut of the film. After preview audiences expressed confusion over 
the film’s plot, Hitchcock added the scene for clarification. Hitchcock was then 
persuaded by his assistant to cut the flashback before the first rounds of prints were 
sent to theaters. At the insistence of Paramount, the scene was then reinstated to the 
film. Harris and Katz discovered that this scene was not on the original negative, and 
separations. They eventually located the scene on separations made from a dupe 
negative struck from the original separations. This facet of the project points to a 
subset of restoration called reconstruction. While terms within restoration are highly 
fluid, reconstruction generally refers to the use of a variety of source materials to 
create the restored film. Brownlow’s Napoleon, which reportedly drew from over a 
                                                
10 For a thorough account of color restorations, including a litany of examples, see Belton, 
“Getting it Right;” for a technical account of Turner’s restoration of Gone with the Wind, see 
R.P. May, “Scarlett returns in a refreshed Gone with the Wind,” American Cinematographer 
70.4 (1989): 36-9.  
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hundred different sources, is often cited as the paradigmatic reconstruction. The 
second additional problem was Vertigo’s soundtrack. Harris and Katz (and Universal) 
felt that the film’s mono channel soundtrack would be unacceptable to audiences 
accustomed to stereo and digital sound. The mono soundtrack combined six 
elements—a dialogue track, and effects track, a foley track, and Bernard Hermann’s 
famous score, which was originally recorded in three-track stereo. Harris and Katz 
recovered the stereo recording of Hermann’s score, as well as the original isolated 
dialogue and effects tracks. However, no original foley track could be found. Thus an 
entirely new foley track was created. All six tracks were then used to produce a new 
six-channel Dolby digital soundtrack.  
It is estimated that the restoration of Vertigo took two years, and cost over one 
million dollars. Even for a studio-backed restoration with a commercial release, the 
scope of the project is extraordinary. Most restorations are done more quickly and 
with less money. Moreover, most restorations for commercial release are now 
performed by digital effects boutiques. The first digitally restored film was Snow 
White and the Seven Dwarfs (1938), released in 1993. Like Vertigo, Snow White was 
one of the first twenty-five films to be placed on the National Film Registry, and thus 
officially deemed as “heritage” by the Library Congress.11 The restoration of Snow 
White was part of a project announced by Disney in 1987 to restore its entire film 
                                                
11 As Harrison Ellenshaw, the head restorer, states: “We were conscious of the fact that we 
were dealing with more than a valuable Disney asset. Snow White is a national treasure, and 
we were determined to see that it was treated as such.” Qtd. in Fisher, “Off to Work We Go,” 
52. 
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library. The vice president of Disney’s visual effects department oversaw the 
restoration in collaboration with the head of Kodak’s Cinesite digital film center. After 
an initial two week inspection of the original color separations, each of the film’s 
119,550 frames were scanned to digital files using a datacine—Cinesite estimates they 
handled around 15 terabytes of data.12 The restoration was carried out by 
approximately 60 employees of Cinesite, working on individual computers with 
software developed by Kodak. The technicians were divided between “dust-busters” 
and “painters.” The dust-busters were charged with removing imperfections caused by 
dust trapped in the animation stand and photographed into the image. The painters 
“were responsible for correcting colors, repairing scratches, scuffs, misalignments and 
certain light flares, and similar tasks.”13 The restored film was then printed onto color 
intermediate film. 
How, then, do portrayals of this type of work in the marketing for restorations 
relate to the texts of restored films? I propose that this relation be understood through 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s concept of the analogon (translated as “analogue”), which is 
perhaps best known via Jameson’s essay, “Class and Allegory in Contemporary 
Culture: Dog day Afternoon as a Political Film.” The analogon appears in Sartre’s The 
Psychology of Imagination, which offers a somewhat idiosyncratic and highly intricate 
account of what constitutes an image. Simplifying a bit, the image contains two 
elements. On one hand the image is a physical object containing an array of perceptual 
                                                
12 Fisher, “Off to Work We Go,” 54. 
13 Ibid., 50. 
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data, such as lines, shapes, and colors. On the other hand, the image is what Sartre 
terms a “layer of knowledge,” or psychic material, that arises spontaneously in relation 
to the object, and “is chosen for its equivalent relationships to the material of the 
object.”14 It is this knowledge that Sartre designates the analogon. An example Sartre 
returns to often is a photograph of his friend, Peter. In this case, the analogon is 
Sartre’s knowledge of the life of Peter, which is not strictly identical to that life, but 
rather a shifting and nebulous constellation of impressions and affects. This 
knowledge infuses and animates the photograph such that the particularity of the 
object is apprehended in terms of the larger being that is Peter: “We are likely to 
remark: ‘Yes, he does smile like this,’ implying that this smile is but typical of the way 
Peter smiles. We apprehend these various qualities of the material as representatives, 
each one of which stands for a mass of qualities that Peter now possesses or used to 
possess.”15 The analogon, Sartre suggests, is not something that “is added to an 
already constituted image in order to clarify it;” rather, it is the relation between the 
analogon and the material object, a relation that can take an infinite array of forms, 
that constitutes “the active structure of the image.”16 
By way of further illuminating the analogon, it is worth noting here the way in 
which it functions in the aforementioned essay on Sidney Lumet’s Dog Day Afternoon 
(1975). Here, Jameson is interested in the way Lumet’s film maps power relations, 
particularly in terms of the antagonistic relation between Sonny (Al Pacino) and the 
                                                
14 Sartre, Psychology of Imagination, 74.  
15 Ibid., 72-3.  
16 Ibid., 81.  
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lead FBI agent, Sheldon (James Broderick). Of this pair, Jameson argues that Sonny’s 
embodiment of the marginalized/exploited is the least interesting, due in large part to 
Pacino’s blazing performance, which “by its very brilliance thrusts the film further and 
further back into the antiquated paradigm of the anti-hero and the method actor;” in 
other words, the terms in which the working-class is figured seem out-dated and 
nostalgic.17 On the other side there is the FBI agent, who is “so depersonalized as to be 
little more than a marker—in the empirical world of everyday life, of fait divers and 
newspaper articles—of the place of ultimate power and control.”18 The relation 
between the diegetic positions of the two characters is thus overlaid with a “dialectic 
of connotations on the level of the style of acting:” Pacino’s “febrile heroics” set 
against the “starkly blank and emotionless” countenance of the FBI agent, which thus 
forms “a kind of silence or charged absence in a sign-system in which the other modes 
of performance have programmed us for a different kind of expressiveness.”19 
Jameson contends that this embodiment of authority is something new, and is an 
attempt to grapple with the faceless and beguiling power of multinational 
corporations. For Jameson what undergirds the antagonism between these two poles is 
precisely the analogon, whereby “the external, extrinsic sociological facts or system of 
realities finds itself inscribed within the internal intrinsic experience of the film,” and 
which here takes the form of “our identification and decoding of the actors’ status as 
                                                
17 Jameson, “Class and Allegory,” 58.  
18 Ibid., 69. 
19 Ibid., 67-8. 
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such.”20 In other words, Jameson argues that it is James Broderick’s status as a 
virtually unknown actor next to Pacino’s status as an ascending star that ultimately 
charges the antagonism between the characters, and makes the anonymity of the FBI 
agent’s authority so chilling.     
With film restoration the layer of knowledge that comprises the analogon is the 
knowledge, however distorted or inaccurate, of the process of restoration provided by 
marketing materials. On the one hand, this knowledge is specific to the marketing of a 
particular film. In the case of Vertigo (1996), this aspect of the analogon is furnished 
by the documentary on the restoration. On the other hand, this knowledge is a general 
agglomeration of the information provided by the marketing of restorations in general. 
In the case of the former, that is, the marketing of a particular restoration, the circuit 
created in the relation of the analogon to the film itself is often materially inscribed on 
the DVD (and other home format) versions of the film—the laserdisc and DVD 
versions of Vertigo (1996), for example, both include the restoration documentary as a 
“bonus material.” I term “restoration-image” that image which is created in the 
relation between the analogon and the restored film. Ultimately, I will argue below 
that the restoration-image can be given a more cinema-specific and formally rigorous 
articulation as an instance of Deleuze’s concept of the “time-image.” In the next 
section, I will examine the content of the marketing of restorations, with a focus on 
Vertigo (1996).   
                                                
20 Jameson, “Class and Allegory,” 72. 
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*  *  *  *  * 
 
Towards the end of the 30-minute documentary, Obsessed with “Vertigo”, an 
image appears with the label “before restoration” across the bottom of the frame. The 
image is from Hitchcock’s Vertigo. Framed in medium shot, Scottie (James Stewart) is 
seated, gazing out a window. A muted green glow pours through the sheer curtains 
across the window. As he rises and turns, the camera tracks in to a medium close-up. 
The image dissolves into a quick reverse shot: Judy (Kim Novak) emerges through a 
doorway. She is surrounded by, and seems to emerge from, a cloud of green light. The 
color of the reverse shot is noticeably denser and of higher contrast than the previous 
image. The label “after restoration” appears at the bottom of the frame, and remains 
across a cut back to an enraptured Scottie. The return here to the composition of the 
first shot in the series dramatically highlights the differences in image quality. The 
green light from the window is richer and more intense; Stewart’s skin tone is 
noticeably warmer, boldly contrasting with the famous icy blue eyes, which had been 
completely washed out in the first image, and the dark blue of his suit. Throughout this 
series of shots, a voice-over states: “With breathtaking clarity of picture and sound, 
Vertigo has been given new life, its magnificent images no longer worn and faded. 
Thanks to this painstaking labor of love, the haunting vision of a master filmmaker 
will astonish and obsess movie audiences for generations to come.”  
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This portion of Obsessed with “Vertigo” provides an example of what is 
commonly known as a “restoration demonstration.” The restoration demonstration, 
either by itself or as part of a short documentary, is commonly included as a “special 
feature” on DVDs of restored films. The most common visual form of these 
demonstrations is the split screen. The split screen can divide a single image, or 
separate two versions of the same image. In some demonstrations the image is still, 
while in others the image is in motion. Invariably, one side of the frame contains 
material before the restoration process, while the other side contains material after 
restoration (Figure 3.1). In another common form, a vertical line sweeps over a 
damaged and/or faded image, leaving a restored image in its wake. In these restoration 
demonstrations, the analogon component of the restoration-image is itself effectively 
condensed into a single image, or visual emblem. I will refer to this visual emblem of 
restoration as the “demonstration-image.” The demonstration-image is essentially a 
‘flat’ image that de-emphasizes the diegetic and the photographic aspects of the image 
in favor of a non-diegetic and graphic component. Put differently, the pro-filmic 
events recorded on the image and arranged into a narrative universe are pushed into 
the background in order to stress the plasticity of the image itself as a field of technical 
manipulation. As Murray Pomerance puts it: “Restoration involves records, not 
events.”21 Here, Lev Manovich’s description of the language of new media in terms of  
 
                                                
21 Pomerance, “Man Who Wanted to Go Back.” 48.  
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Fig. 3.1                                restoration demonstration for La Dolce Vita (1960/2004) 
a shift from “Kino-Eye to Kino-Brush” is apt.22 Although Manovich refers specifically 
to digital paint programs, such as those used to touch up the images of Snow White, 
the metaphor of a ‘kino-brush’ also fits with demonstrations for analogue restorations 
insofar as these features emphasize the image as a malleable surface to be looked at 
rather than a window to look through.  
Echoing Klinger’s assessment of the marketing of Vertigo (1996), Nathan 
Carroll writes of restoration demonstrations: “viewers are meant to be in awe of the 
invested effort and quality of the restored content.”23 Thus, Carroll continues, 
restoration demonstrations “help construct DVD market demand by developing 
consumer appreciation for restored product, employing a spectacular strategy of asset 
                                                
22 Manovich, Language of New Media, 307.  
23 Carroll, “Unwrapping Archives,” 19. 
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revitalization through plastic surgery.”24 Carroll argues that this appreciation of the 
work of restoration is not only linked to the quality of the image, but also to anxiety 
and nostalgia surrounding the ubiquitous discourse of the obsolescence of celluloid 
and the end of the “authenticity of cinema as an art.”25 In this sense, the side by side 
comparison of images before and after restoration also functions to suture together the 
past and the present, generating historical continuity through spatial and/or temporal 
proximity—side by side and/or one after the other—and allowing for ease of 
movement “from one historical situation to a different cultural context.”26 Put 
differently, the presentation of the “before” image provides a link to an analog past 
(from within the non-filmic realm of the DVD) and a nebulous notion of a past of 
cinematic quality and artistry—the “vision of a master filmmaker,” e.g.—that can then 
be recovered for the present. Historical difference is thereby ostensibly transcended 
through technology.  
In Obsessed with “Vertigo,” the sense of historical continuity put forward by 
the restoration demonstration is reinforced through the film’s broader narrative. Much 
of the documentary is in fact dedicated to a standard behind-the-scenes account of 
Vertigo’s original production, as told largely through talking-head interviews with, 
among others, Kim Novak, Barbara Bel Geddes (who plays Scottie’s friend Midge in 
the film), Henry Bumstead (art director), Herbert Coleman (associate producer), Peggy 
Robertson (script supervisor), and Hitchcock’s daughter, Patricia. Additionally, 
                                                
24 Carroll, “Unwrapping Archives,” 21-26.  
25 Ibid., 18.  
26 Ibid., 18.  
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images of original storyboards, sketches for costumes and set design, and other 
production materials, are juxtaposed with images from Vertigo, and conjoined with an 
expository voice-over. Of course, there are also numerous images of Hitchcock 
himself and anecdotes of the “genius” at work. This behind-the-scenes narrative is 
interwoven with the narrative of the film’s restoration, relayed in part through 
interviews with Harris and Katz. Much of this narrative is also told in voice-over, 
accompanied by repeated close-ups of strips of celluloid on which images of Vertigo 
are clearly visible (Figure 3.2), and shots of Harris and Katz examining reels of film. 
Like the living bodies of many of those who worked on film, the survival of this 
physical artifact functions as guarantor of continuity.  
 Carroll argues that it is in terms of this relation to history that restoration 
demonstrations go beyond the promotion of a particular product and the interests of a 
specific corporate entity to construct “ideological allegiance to the archival paradigm 
and restoration practices in general.”27 Carroll does not, however, provide a cogent 
explanation of what constitutes this “paradigm,” and what constitutes the driving 
forces behind its promotion, and the promotion of film restoration in general. In 
Change Mummified, Philip Rosen provides a much clearer and more compelling 
approach to this problematic. Much of this book can be seen as providing a prehistory 
of the discourses surrounding digital images, which Rosen refers to as the “digital 
utopia.” Rosen’s account of this utopia is similar to that described by Doane in “The  
                                                
27 Carroll, “Unwrapping Archives,” 27. 
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Fig. 3.2                                                                      Obsessed with “Vertigo” (1997) 
Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity,” that is, he is particularly concerned 
with discourses of digital imagery that claim a severing of any referential tie to 
material reality. The digital utopia is thus grounded in what Rosen terms a 
“historiography of conquest:” in its abstraction, the digital purports to overcome the 
fluxes of time and history.28 Not only is the digital touted as being immune to time, it 
can also conquer and subsume images of past media—digitizing, storing, and 
restoring—and make them available to the present.  
 In one of Change Mummified’s many narrative threads, Rosen traces this 
conquest of history to the nineteenth century debates on restoration and preservation, 
exemplified by the positions of Viollet-le-Duc and Ruskin-Morris. Despite the 
                                                
28 Rosen, Change Mummified, 322.  
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differences in these positions, Rosen contends that they share a fantasy of “temporal 
transcendence,” that is, a desire to come into contact with the past (be it “preserved” or 
“restored”).29 In this respect, these debates have an affinity with the time-travel 
narratives in literature that were becoming popular at the same moment. As Rosen 
points out, Morris himself published a time-travel novel, Notes from Nowhere, in 
1890. Rosen’s main example of this paradigm of temporal transcendence is the 
conception and construction of “museum villages” in the United States in the 1920s, 
particularly Colonial Williamsburg in Virginia and Greenfield Village in Michigan. 
These two museums represent the poles of restoration and preservation, respectively. 
From its inception in 1924, the project of Colonial Williamsburg was to restore the 
edifices of a colonial-era village in order to present a unified replica of colonial life—
to this end, buildings built later than the 1790s were razed. Greenfield Village, which 
opened in 1929, preserves a mélange of tools, artifacts, and buildings—including 
Thomas Edison’s Menlo Park laboratory—with the aim of documenting and 
celebrating “the activities of inventors and entrepreneurs, who embodied the 
individualistic work ethic rooted in pioneer virtues associated with a previous age.”30 
Rosen connects these projects, and the discourses and practices of restoration and 
preservation more generally, to capital’s attempt to quantify and organize the flux of 
time as a way to measure and discipline the flux of labor. Drawing on the work of 
historian Mike Wallace, Rosen argues that these villages complement the increasingly 
                                                
29 Rosen, Change Mummified, 83.  
30 Ibid., 62. 
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precise control of labor—epitomized by Ford’s factory model—by seeking to 
“immobilize historical temporality;” thus, Rosen writes, “the ideological impulse 
behind the founding of the museum village genre is realized in a drive to defang the 
possibility of transformation inherent” in industrialization itself.31 In fact, 
Williamsburg and Greenfield Village were originally overseen by two of America’s 
most famous capitalists: John D. Rockefeller and Henry Ford, respectively. 
  The “ideological allegiance” that Carroll identifies in restoration 
demonstrations can be understood in a similar vein. Here, the ‘defanging’ of change is 
aimed, as Carroll suggests, at the historical transformation inherent in the prodigious 
expansion of digital technologies and the concomitant pronouncements of the death of 
cinema. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, this historical transformation 
can be situated within the context of the wider, and still ongoing, development of a 
post-Fordist phase of capital. As the museum villages in the first half of the twentieth 
century are an attempt to neutralize the massive historical changes of industrialization, 
so restoration demonstrations are an attempt to neutralize the seismic shifts in the 
mode of production taking shape in the century’s last decades. Yet, the demonstration-
image does not offer a simple disavowal of history. This disavowal of history is itself 
historicized: in presenting an image that conveys a domination of historical change, 
the demonstration-image also foregrounds the way the very fabric of this image is 
woven by labor. In digital restoration, for example, history is (literally) erased via new 
                                                
31 Rosen, Change Mummified, 72.  
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modes of labor associated with computer technology. As the president of Cinesite, Inc. 
says of the restoration of Snow White: “The most difficult challenges were learning to 
efficiently manage the massive flow of data, and hiring and training workstation 
operators…Some of them had optical camera experience…Others had video 
workstation experience. Many came from disparate fields, including stockbrokers.”32 
Many restoration demonstrations actually include images of these kinds of operators—
mostly white men—sitting at their computers, with frames of film pulled up on their 
screens. In the final minutes of Obsessed with “Vertigo”, the technical wizardry put 
on display by the demonstration-image is linked less to machines than to living 
knowledge. Nowhere in the film do we see the printers at DeLuxe that exposed raw 
stock to create the restored elements. Instead, the behind-the-scenes narrative presents 
the restoration process as a mobilization of the expertise and historical knowledge of 
those who worked on the original film. In the passage from the “before” image to the 
“after” image, it is as if all of this knowledge has been injected into the frame.    
                                                
32 Qtd. in Fisher, “Off to Work We Go.” Hardt and Negri summarize the role of new 
technology in immaterial labor as follows: “One face of immaterial labor can be recognized in 
analogy to the functioning of a computer. The increasingly extensive use of computers has 
tended progressively to redefine laboring practices and relations, along with, indeed, all social 
practices and relations. Familiarity and facility with computer technology is becoming an 
increasingly general primary qualification for work in the dominant countries. Even when 
direct contact with computer is not involved, the manipulation of symbols and information 
along the model of computer operation is extremely widespread. In an earlier era workers 
learned how to act like machines both inside and outside the factory. We even learned (with 
the help of Muybridge’s photos, for example) to recognize human activity in general as 
mechanical. Today we increasingly think like computers, while communication technologies 
and their model of interaction are becoming more and more central to laboring activities…The 
computer and communication revolution of production has transformed all laboring practices 
in such a way that they all tend toward the model of information and communication 
technologies.” Empire, 291.  
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  There is another aspect to the demonstration-image in Obsessed with 
“Vertigo,” which is announced by the voice-over as a “painstaking labor of love.” 
This invocation of emotional investment points to an aspect of immaterial labor that 
Hardt and Negri term “affective labor.” In one respect, affective labor refers to labor 
that produces affective states—e.g., a sense of ease, comfort, and/or security. For 
example, service industry jobs like flight attendants and hotel clerks, as well many 
jobs in the health care industry are a form of this labor. Work in the culture industry 
can also be considered affective labor. Whatever else they may be, the products of this 
industry are certainly emotions. In another respect, Hardt and Negri use affective labor 
to highlight the incorporation of affects into production. Robert Harris alludes to this 
meaning of affective labor when he remarks: “If you’re not passionate about 
[restoration]—if it’s just a job and you’re going to forget about it at five o’clock and 
go home, then you might just as well be working on an assembly line making rubber 
combs or something.”33 In Empire, affective labor is used in this way to surmount 
what Hardt and Negri see as a shortcoming in much of the work on post-Fordism, 
particularly that on the general intellect: “The danger of the discourse of general 
intellect is that it risks remaining entirely on the plane of thought, as if the new powers 
of labor were only intellectual and not also corporeal.”34 In this second usage, then, 
affective labor is meant to designate the way the regime of immaterial labor in general 
engages the full spectrum of subjectivity—the head and the heart, as it were. (Franco 
                                                
33 Qtd. in Belton, “Getting it Right,” 409. 
34 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 364. 
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Berardi makes a similar claim when he refers to the regime of immaterial labor as the 
“soul at work,” wherein the soul, as Jason Smith summarizes it, constitutes “a web of 
attachments and tastes, attractions and inclinations:” “The soul is not simply the seat 
of intellectual operations, but the affective and libidinal forces that weave together a 
world: attentiveness, the ability to address, care for and appeal to others.”35) 
Moreover, Hardt and Negri’s use of the concept of affective labor indexes a historical 
shift. As Hardt points out in an essay published just before Empire, “I do not mean to 
argue that affective labor itself is new or that the fact affective labor produces value in 
some sense is new. Feminist analyses in particular have long recognized the social 
value of caring labor, kin work, nurturing, and maternal activities.” What is new about 
affective labor is “the extent to which it has become generalized through wide sectors 
of the economy. In effect, as a component of immaterial labor, affective labor has 
achieved a dominant position of the highest value in the contemporary informational 
economy.” 36  
 The affective component of restoration invoked in Obsessed with “Vertigo” is 
established immediately. In the film’s opening scene, Harris and Katz are shown 
standing at Fort Point, the place in Vertigo where Madeleine throws herself into San 
Francisco bay. This place, Harris proclaims, is “hallowed ground to movie buffs.” By 
                                                
35 Smith, “Preface,” 10.  
36 Hardt, “Affective Labor,” 97. For an example of affective labor in feminist analyses, see 
Mariarosa Dalla Costa, “Women and the Subversion of Community,” in Dalla Costa and 
Selma James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community (Bristol, England: 
Falling Wall, 1972); and Leopoldina Fortunati, The Arcane of Reproduction, translated by 
Hilary Creek (New York: Autonomedia, 1995).  
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introducing the two restorers in this space, the film suggests that they are not mere 
technicians, but also “movie buffs,” that is, cinephiles. The allusion to the cult of 
Hitchcock, which makes the site “hallowed ground,” intimates the potential depth of 
this cinephilia as a kind of quasi-religious devotion. Indeed, drawing on a personal 
conversation with Harris, Pomerance writes:  
It was precisely as a film lover who had seen Vertigo 
many times and felt its power, but had also failed to 
comprehend it deeply and who therefore needed to 
remember, to re-vise or see again, that Robert Harris 
entered into a project with James Katz to restore this 
film in the mid-1990s, a time when so much of human 
history was being reseen, reorganized, revised itself in 
memory of the twentieth century…The intention of 
finding the original production materials and recrafting a 
print from them swept Harris into his own time trip, a 
systematic hunt through long-unopened boxes and 
rendezvous with now aged collaborators with both 
precise and faulty memories of their own early 
experiences working on this film.37 
                                                
37 Pomerance, “Man Who Wanted to Go Back,” 45. 
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The title of the film, which appears after this brief opening scene, reiterates this idea 
by presenting Harris and Katz’ devotion to the film as an obsession. After the title 
credit, scenes of an interview with Martin Scorsese—with the credit, “Film 
Foundation” at the bottom of the screen—make this connotation of the documentary’s 
title glaring. Recalling his first viewing of Vertigo, Scorsese states: “Over the years, I 
kept being drawn and drawn to the picture, like being drawn into a whirlpool of 
obsession.”  
 The last third of the documentary, which focuses almost exclusively on the 
restoration, further elaborates this theme of affective labor, while also condensing 
many of film’s aspects I’ve discussed above. This section begins in a darkened movie 
theatre. The camera frames the big screen, on which a scene from Vertigo plays, then 
slowly tracks back to show Harris and Katz sitting behind a massive sound board. In 
this scene, then, Harris and Katz are situated simultaneously as moviegoers practicing 
their cinephilia by consuming a film, as well as technicians. The conflation of these 
two roles is the nexus for the “obsessive” work of restoration indicated by the 
documentary’s title. Furthermore, this scene anticipates the demonstration-image that 
will appear moments later. In several shots, the camera is positioned behind Harris and 
Katz, so that the image encompasses the restorers and the soundboard in the 
foreground, and the images they are watching onscreen in the background. This 
composition echoes the images featured alongside demonstrations for digital 
restoration of workstation operators sitting at their computers. Here, the soundboard 
 
 
190 
takes the place of the keyboard and the movie screen takes the place of the monitor. 
The screen is thereby presented as a field of technical manipulation, and the canvas for 
the restorers’ “labor of love.”  
 After this scene, there is a long take that slowly zooms in on a piece of 
celluloid. Several frames of Saul Bass’ famous opening credit sequence of Vertigo are 
visible on the filmstrip. As I suggested earlier, the repeated shots of celluloid prints of  
 
Fig. 3.3                                                                       Obsessed with “Vertigo” (1997) 
Vertigo creates a tangible link between the past and the present. Again, the fact that 
this physical remnant of the past is celluloid is all the more important considering 
Obsessed with “Vertigo’s” run on television, and its inclusion on VHS, DVD, and 
laserdisc formats for home viewing. As such, these images function similarly to how 
Carroll describes the “before” image in restoration demonstrations, that is, 
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comfortably suturing film’s celluloid past with its multimedial present. The images 
that appear throughout the documentary of Harris and Katz examining strips of film by 
hand ensure that this link to the past is at the center of the restoration process (Figure 
3.3). These images are also cues for the “kino-brush” aspect of the demonstration-
image: rather than the recording function of the camera, it is the tactile function of the 
hand that defines the nature of the image. This touch of the hand is, moreover, a 
transmission of affect. As Bazin states in “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 
“[n]o matter how skillful the painter, his work was in fee to an inescapable 
subjectivity.”38 Here, this inescapable subjectivity is the passion of the restorers for 
their work. 
 The restoration demonstration then follows the shot of celluloid. While the 
demonstration-image deemphasizes the diegetic function of the image, and pushes it 
into the background (literally and figuratively), it does not completely eradicate it. I 
will elaborate below on the nature of the relation of the demonstration-image to what, 
for the sake of brevity, I will call the “diegetic-image.” Here I want to simply point out 
that there is an interplay between these two aspects of the image. This interplay is 
apparent in the scene chosen for the restoration demonstration in Obsessed with 
“Vertigo.” Vertigo is the story of John “Scottie” Ferguson, a retired detective who has 
                                                
38 Bazin continues: “The fact that a human hand intervened casts a shadow of doubt over the 
image. Again, the essential factor in the transition from the baroque to photography is not the 
perfecting of the physical process (photography will long remain the inferior of painting in the 
reproduction of color); rather does it lie in a psychological fact, to wit, in completely 
satisfying our appetite for illusion by a mechanical reproduction in the making of which man 
plays no part.” Bazin, “Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 12. 
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left police work because he suffers from acrophobia that causes vertigo. Gavin Elster 
(Tom Helmore) hires his old friend Scottie to follow his wife, Madeleine (also Kim 
Novak), who has been behaving strangely. After following Madeleine, and falling in 
love with her, Scottie witnesses her suicidal leap from a bell tower in an old Spanish 
mission. The incident causes Scottie to have a mental breakdown. Later Scottie 
encounters a woman on the street named Judy, who has an uncanny resemblance to 
Madeleine. Totally obsessed with his lost love and unable to let her go, Scottie forces 
Judy to make herself up to look exactly like Madeleine. Ultimately Scottie discovers 
that Judy was in fact hired by Elster to play Madeleine, whom Elster murdered. The 
aim of this ruse was to get Scottie to witness the woman’s suicide—faked by Judy—in 
order to cover up Elster’s crime. When Scottie figures out that he has been duped, he 
becomes enraged and takes Judy back to the scene of the apparent suicide, where she 
accidentally falls to her death and the film ends.          
 The scene presented in the restoration demonstration takes place in Judy’s 
room at the Empire Hotel. At this moment Judy’s transformation into Madeleine is 
complete—her hair is dyed blonde, and pinned up in the iconic spiral, and she dons the 
grey suit that Madeleine wears throughout the first part of the film. The first “after 
restoration” image is also the first shot of Judy-as-Madeleine in the film, quickly 
followed by Scottie’s reaction. The use of this scene highlights a parallel between 
Scottie’s quest to bring Madeleine back from the dead and the restoration process. 
Pomerance points to this symmetry when he observes that, as the restorers “had to 
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calculate ways of rerecording and remixing sound, of reprinting imagery that made 
practical use of institutionalized resources already available, Scottie had to recalibrate 
a costume, reform a hairstyle, reconstruct a performance embodying a certain display 
of intent.”39 Scottie’s obsession with Madeleine thus works as yet another iteration of 
the passion of the restorers. In combination with the film’s presentation of the 
restoration up to this point, and paired with the voice-over’s invocation of a “labor of 
love,” the rhyming of Scottie with the restorers super-charges the demonstration-
image with an affective resonance. 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
 To summarize, the restoration-image is an image with two sides, or two 
aspects. One side is composed of the diegetic-image, while the other side is composed 
of the analogon. The diegetic-image is the image in its function as part of the formal 
and narrative machinery of a film. The analogon is an amalgamation of the marketing 
of restorations, and finds its most pointed expression in the demonstration-image. The 
demonstration-image is the image in its function as an example of restoration, both in 
general and specific to a given film. The demonstration-image foregrounds the 
plasticity of the image as a material plane or surface. The technical manipulation of 
this ‘flat’ image articulates a conquest of time and history, but also historicizes this 
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conquest by grounding it in contemporary forms of labor. In the demonstration-image 
of Vertigo (1996) this labor is presented as a mobilization of knowledge that is 
inextricable from a mobilization of affect.  
 In this section I will elaborate on the nature of the restoration-image through 
Deleuze’s concept of the time-image. Again, the movement-image is defined as a 
regime of the cinematic image that presents time indirectly through movement in 
space and movement between images. The time-image, in contrast, presents time 
directly—space is subordinated to time, and the latter appears within the image itself. 
In Cinema 2 Deleuze describes a variety of species of time-image; the type of image 
that corresponds most closely to the restoration-image is what Deleuze calls the 
“crystal-image.” Deleuze presents the crystal-image as giving cinematic form to three 
related theses on time found in Bergson. The first two of these theses are, in Deleuze’s 
words: “the past coexists with the present it has been,” and “the past is preserved in 
itself, as past in general (non-chronological).”40 One of the main facets of the crystal-
image is thus that it tends toward a coalescence of the present and the past, that is, of 
perception and recollection, the real and the imaginary, or what Deleuze refers to as 
the actual and the virtual. “The essential point,” Deleuze writes, “is that the two 
related terms differ in nature, and yet ‘run after each other,’ refer to each other, reflect 
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each other, without it being possible to say which is first, and tend ultimately to 
become confused by slipping into the same point of indiscernibility.”41  
 Deleuze says “ultimately” here since, leading up to the discussion of the 
crystal-image, he first describes various ways these two theses of Bergson are 
presented in cinema according to the dictates of the movement-image. While, as I will 
show shortly, Vertigo (1996) belongs to the regime of the time-image, Vertigo falls 
within the regime of the movement-image. Vertigo is particularly interesting in this 
regard for two reasons. First, Hitchcock occupies an important place in Deleuze’s 
schema in the two Cinema volumes. For Deleuze, Hitchcock pushes the movement-
image the furthest without fully breaking into the realm of the time-image. In 
Hitchcock’s cinema, Deleuze argues, the movement-image is made to spatially render 
movements that do not in themselves conform to the physical logic of space. In this 
sense Deleuze describes the image in Hitchcock as “an image which takes as objects 
of thought, objects which have their own existence outside thought…It is an image 
which takes as its objects, relations, symbolic acts, intellectual feelings.”42 Second, 
one of the explicit themes of Vertigo is the coextensiveness of the past with the 
present. In the first half of the film, this theme is presented through the mystery Scottie 
uncovers as he trails Madeleine: she seems to be obsessed with and/or possessed by 
her great-grandmother, Carlotta Valdes (who committed suicide).  
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 The first scene at the Palace of the Legion of Honor illustrates how this theme 
is expressed through Hitchcock’s version of the movement-image. Madeleine (played 
by Judy) sits before a large portrait of Carlotta while Scottie looks on in secret. The 
scene begins with a short series of shot/reverse-shots alternating between medium 
shots of Scottie looking off screen and long shots of Madeleine, framed from behind, 
gazing at the portrait. A second series of shot/reverse-shots then pairs medium shots of 
Scottie looking with two different close-ups. The first close-up begins on a small 
bouquet of posies on the bench to the left of Madeleine and then tracks up and in on an 
identical bouquet held by Carlotta in the portrait. The second close-up begins with a 
slow zoom in on the back of Madeleine’s head, focusing on the spiral in her hair, and 
then tracks up and in on the same spiral in Carlotta’s hair. These shots not only show 
the objects of Scottie’s perception, but also the development of his interpretation of 
how these objects fit into the puzzle of Madeleine’s relation to the past. The abstract 
movement of thought is thereby mapped onto the movement, performed by editing and 
by the tracking of the camera, between physical points in space. 
In the second half of Vertigo, the preservation of the past as an aspect of the 
present is thematized in Scottie’s attempt to make Judy over into Madeleine. There are 
two moments in this part of the film that exemplify the formal mechanics Deleuze 
describes by way of a prelude to the crystal-image. The first moment occurs after 
Scottie has spotted Judy on the street and followed her to her hotel. When Scottie 
finally leaves—Judy having agreed to dine with him—a close-up on Judy’s face 
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slowly dissolves into a flashback of Madeleine’s apparent suicide. The flashback 
reveals the truth of the incident, that is, the woman Scottie knew as Madeleine Elster 
was actually Judy in disguise, and the body that fell from the bell tower was Elster’s 
already dead wife. Another dissolve then takes us back to Judy’s face in the hotel 
room. Deleuze describes flashbacks like this as a large, distended version of the 
“circuit” that links the past and the present, and allows them to reflect each other. The 
‘largeness’ of the circuit owes to the way the coexistence of past and present is 
rendered here by the movement from one image to another: simultaneity is rendered 
sequentially, and thus indirectly. Later in the film, Hitchcock provides a tighter 
version of this circuit. Moments after the shot used in the restoration demonstration, in 
which Judy appears in the Empire Hotel fully restored as Madeleine, the ‘re-united’ 
couple embrace and the camera begins a 360-degree pan around them. Midway 
through this shot, the set around the couple goes completely dark. As the camera 
continues to circle, the lights go up and the set has changed into the livery stable of the 
mission where Scottie thought Madeleine committed suicide. The effect lasts only a 
few seconds before the set goes dark again, and the hotel reappears. In this stunning 
shot, Hitchcock is able to move from the present to the past without a traditional cut. 
Yet even here, as in the flashback, the past must literally replace the present. The past 
is therefore given the same ontological and perceptual status as the present. In other 
words, the persistence of the past can only be rendered by completely pushing out the 
present that succeeds it and from which it is recalled.  
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The crystal-image, in contrast, presents the tightest possible version of this 
circuit, wherein the past and present are drawn into simultaneity and indiscernability 
with the same image. Thus, Deleuze writes of the crystal-image: “There is a formation 
of an image with two sides, actual and virtual.”43 Deleuze elaborates on the nature of 
the virtual image, distinguishing it from the images of flashbacks (“mental images”), 
as follows:  
Bergson calls the virtual image ‘pure recollection,’ the 
better to distinguish it from mental images…In fact, the 
latter are certainly virtual images, but actualized or in 
the course of actualization…And they are necessarily 
actualized in relation to a new present, in relation to a 
different present from the one that they have been: hence 
these more or less broad circuits, evoking mental images 
in accordance with the requirements of the new present 
which is defined as later than the former one, and which 
defines the former one as earlier according to a law of 
chronological succession…In contrast, the virtual image 
in the pure state is defined, not in accordance with a new 
present in relation to which it would be (relatively) past 
but in accordance with the actual present of which it is 
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the past, absolutely and simultaneously: although it is 
specific it is none the less part of the ‘past in general,’ in 
the sense that it has not yet received a date. As pure 
virtuality, it does not have to be actualized, since it is 
strictly correlative with the actual image with which it 
forms the smallest circuit…It is the virtual image which 
corresponds to a particular actual image, instead of 
being actualized, of having to be actualized in a different 
actual image. It is an actual-virtual circuit on the spot, 
and not an actualization of the virtual in accordance with 
a shifting actual.44  
In the crystal-image, the relation of this virtual to the actual—of the image of the past 
to the image of the present—is then one of “reciprocal presupposition, or 
reversibility:” “In fact, there is no virtual which does not become actual in relation to 
the actual, the latter becoming virtual through the same relation: it is a place and its 
obverse which are totally reversible.”45 While the actual and the virtual are distinct, 
the material that occupies these sides is constantly shifting; one is continually pulsing 
through the other, as in a figure-ground illusion. In other words, it is not only that the 
one side cannot exist without the other—Deleuze, following Bachelard, also refers to 
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the crystal-image as a “mutual image”—but also that there is no way to definitively 
say what in the image is actual and what is virtual.  
This restlessness of the crystal-image points to the third of Bergson’s theses on 
time that Deleuze invokes: “at each moment time splits itself into present and past, 
present that passes and past which is preserved.”46 On this point, Deleuze explains:          
What is a mutual image? Bergson constantly posed the 
question and sought the reply in time’s abyss. What is 
actual is always present. But then, precisely, the present 
changes or passes. We can always say that it becomes 
past when it no longer is, when a new present replaces it. 
But this is meaningless. It is clearly necessary for it to 
pass on for the new present to arrive, and it is clearly 
necessary for it to pass at the same time as it is present, 
at the moment that is the present. Thus the image has to 
be present and past, still present and already past, at 
once and the same time. If it was not already past at the 
same time as present, the present would never pass on. 
The past does not follow the present that it is no longer, 
it coexists with the present it was. The present is the 
actual image, and its contemporaneous past is the virtual 
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image, the image in a mirror. According to Bergson, 
‘paramnesia’ (the illusion of déjà-vu or already having 
been there) simply makes this obvious point perceptible: 
there is a recollection of the present, contemporaneous 
with the present itself, as closely coupled as a role to an 
actor.47 
Thus, Deleuze continues:  
What constitutes the crystal-image is the most 
fundamental operation of time: since the past is 
constituted not after the present that it was but at the 
same time, time has to split itself in two at each moment 
as present and past, which differ from each other in 
nature…Time has to split at the same time as it sets 
itself out or unrolls itself: it splits in two dissymmetrical 
jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while 
the other preserves all of the past. Time consists of this 
split, and it is this, it is time, that we see in the 
crystal…What we see in the crystal is therefore a 
dividing in two that the crystal itself constantly causes to 
turn on itself, that it prevents from reaching completion, 
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because it is a perpetual self-distinguishing, a distinction 
in the process of being produced; which always resumes 
the distinct terms in itself, in order to constantly 
relaunch them.48 
In the crystal-image time is thus not merely a passive archiving of the past, but also a 
productive, self-differentiating force. 
 The two sides of the crystal-image can be filled by any sort of content, and do 
not have to be explicitly marked as ‘present’ or ‘past.’ What counts is that the image 
maintains its dual zones, and the circuit between them; it is the form of the image that 
is temporal. For example, Deleuze discusses the films of Tod Browning—who created 
films of the circus and theater, using real sideshow performers—in terms of crystal-
images built on an oscillation between the public and the private: “The virtual image 
of the public role becomes actual, but in relation to the virtual image of a private crime 
which becomes actual in turn and replaces the first image. We no longer know which 
is the role and which is the crime.”49 Deleuze’s take on Browning resonates strongly 
with Jameson’s reading of Dog Day Afternoon. Indeed, for Jameson the power of 
Lumet’s film lies precisely in the way film and analogon, that is, role and actor, 
revolve around a point of indiscernability within the image—‘on the spot,’ as Deleuze 
puts it. In the same fashion the restoration-image also forms a crystal-image. The 
restoration-image is at once diegesis and demonstration: part of a film and part of an 
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ad campaign for restoration. Each of these sides of the image virtualizes the other, as 
the one sews up the diegetic fabric of a film while the other tears it open. “When the 
virtual image becomes actual,” Deleuze writes, “it is then visible and limpid…But the 
actual image becomes virtual in turn, referred elsewhere, invisible, opaque and 
shadowy, like a crystal barely dislodged from the earth. The actual-virtual couple thus 
immediately extends into the opaque-limpid, the expression of their exchange.”50 In 
the restoration-image, then, the demonstration-image necessarily impinges on the 
limpidity of the diegetic-image, and vice versa.   
 While Vertigo belongs to the regime of the movement-image, Vertigo (1996) 
belongs to the regime of the time-image. In Vertigo (1996) the diegetic-image is 
locked into continual exchange with a demonstration-image along a circuit between 
the actual and the virtual. The movement on this circuit is not spatial, but temporal 
(intensive rather than extensive), and directly renders the coexistence of the past and 
present. This movement, moreover, presents the ceaseless dynamism of time, or what 
Deleuze describes as the “powerful, non-organic Life which grips the world.”51 Yet to 
say that Vertigo (1996) is a film of the time-image does not, in itself, say much. While 
any sort of content can travel on the circuit between the actual and the virtual, the 
nature of the content gives the time-image a particular inflection. There are, Deleuze 
writes, “different states of the crystal, depending on the acts of its formation and the 
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figures we see in it.”52 To deepen our analysis of Vertigo (1996), the specificity of its 
crystal-image needs to be elaborated. Such an elaboration requires a re-articulation of 
the specificity of the demonstration-image, which I discussed in the last section, in 
terms of the specificity of the diegetic-image in the film. This re-articulation will bring 
the time-image into contact with contemporary capitalism—something that Deleuze 
touches on only briefly. This point of contact is generated by a conflation of the 
powerful Life that is time, and the “form-giving fire” that is labor. 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
 I have already alluded to how, in the case of Vertigo (1996), the content of the 
diegetic-image and the demonstration-image reflect each other. The demonstration-
image can be described as an image that is about (its own) restoration. As Pomerance 
suggests, the diegetic-image of Vertigo (1996) can also be seen as being about 
restoration. Scottie’s brutal makeover of Judy into Madeleine becomes a self-reflexive 
gesture, which the restoration demonstration in Obsessed with “Vertigo” explicitly 
foregrounds. As I suggested, the use of the Empire Hotel scene for the restoration 
demonstration in Obsessed with “Vertigo” is also one of many ways in which the 
work of restoration is presented in the documentary as a mobilization of affect, or 
affect put to work. Scottie’s desire, and the “passionate” work of the film’s 
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restoration—the “labor of love”—refer back to each other. In this sense, the content 
that travels along the circuit between the actual and the virtual in the restoration-image 
in Vertigo (1996) is affective labor.  
 This presentation of affective labor can be further elaborated through Virno’s 
use of the concept of individuation. Individuation, which Virno takes from the work of 
the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon, poses the subject as “the permanent 
interweaving of pre-individual elements and individuated characteristics;” in this 
view, the subject is “a composite: ‘I,’ but also ‘one,’ unrepeatable uniqueness, but also 
anonymous universality.”53 The “pre-” of pre-individual in this formulation is thus in 
no way temporal; rather, it denotes an ontological differentiation between the common 
and the singular. Virno articulates this concept of the subject to post-Fordism as 
follows:  
In advanced capitalism, the labor process mobilizes the 
most universal requisites of the species: perception, 
language, memory, and feelings…The entire realm of 
productive forces is pre-individual. It is social 
cooperation in the form of action in concert, the totality 
of poietic, ‘political,’ cognitive, emotional forces. It is 
the general intellect, the general, objective, external 
intellect. The contemporary multitude is composed of 
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individualized individuals, who have behind them also 
this pre-individual reality.54 
The general intellect forms a common fabric, or backdrop, out of which particular 
forms and instances of immaterial labor are individuated, that is, made actual, 
concrete, and singular—individuation is thus another way of describing the relation of 
the common and the singular in the post-Fordist multitude that I discussed in chapter 
one. These singular, individuated instances of immaterial labor do not exhaust or 
negate the common, pre-individual ‘toolbox’ of the general intellect, but continually 
draw from and are interwoven with the latter. Individuated and pre-individual coexist 
side by side. The open manifestation of this coexistence is concomitant with the 
setting into motion and direct appropriation of the general intellect as a productive 
force.  
 In Vertigo (1996) the interweaving of the pre-individual and the individual is 
figured in the oscillation, and reciprocal presupposition, of the demonstration-image 
and the diegetic-image. In the demonstration-image, the affective labor of restoration 
is abstracted and depersonalized. The demonstration-image is in this way affective, but 
asubjective. Here affect is detached from any body or bodies, and instead suffuses the 
material substance of the image itself; the passionate aspect of the work of restoration 
is free-floating, constituting the very matrix or world of the image. In the 
demonstration-image, the physical delineation of objects and bodies in space is 
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deemphasized in favor of the common physical material of the image—the object of 
the restoration process being the artifact of the filmstrip, not the figures and events 
portrayed by the film. In contrast, in the diegetic-image the affective nature of this 
work is individuated in Scottie. Scottie’s pathos embodies the obsession infused in the 
image through its restoration. While the demonstration-image presents an obsession 
with the image, the diegetic-image presents obsession in the image, mooring it to the 
discrete physical location of Scottie’s person and the particular actions he performs. 
 Moreover, the restoration-image in Vertigo (1996) registers Virno’s assertion 
that individuation in post-Fordism “manifests itself as disharmony, pathological 
oscillation, and crisis.”55 Pomerance points to this aspect of the film when he reflects 
that, in addition to being about its own restoration (and thus the “passion for digitality 
and computerization that by the end of the twentieth century had swept the world”), 
Vertigo (1996) is also, in its focus on Scottie’s pathos, “a comment on the vertiginous 
panic of contemporary thought, self-conscious about narrativity itself and thus 
incapable of penetrating narrative.”56 The reference here to “contemporary thought” is 
to what generally goes by the name of postmodernism, with its resistance to grand 
narratives and mise-en-abyme of self-reflexivity. As Jameson has argued, 
postmodernism, whether in the realm of theory or aesthetics, is inextricable from what 
he calls late capitalism, and which I have chosen throughout this dissertation to 
identify as post-Fordism. Thus, if Scottie is a maniac, as François Truffaut once put it, 
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one way this mania can be read in Vertigo (1996) is through the appropriation of post-
Fordist labor. Indeed, Virno argues that the exploitation of the general intellect 
produces “terrifying effects." The pre-individual, under control of others, threatens to 
“nullify every trace of individual identity,” and feeds the fear of “becoming 
conditioned and overwhelmed by others.”57    
 Throughout the film, there is a palpable sense of unease that surrounds Scottie. 
This unease is largely articulated around the film’s four falls. The first fall occurs in 
the first scene of the film, as Scottie and a fellow officer chase a criminal across the 
rooftops of San Francisco. Moments into the chase, Scottie slips and winds up hanging 
from a gutter far above the street. The fellow officer tries to help, but falls to his death 
as Scottie looks on helplessly. The scene ends with Scottie still hanging from the 
gutter, staring in terror into the abyss below (Figure 3.4). In his seminal study of 
Hitchcock, Robin Wood argues that ending the scene in this way frames the film 
thematically: “There seems no possible way he could have got down. The effect is of 
having him, throughout the film, metaphorically suspended over a great abyss.”58 The 
linking of Scottie’s literal vertigo with an existential vertigo—what Wood describes as 
the film’s theme of “discontent with the actual world”—is then intimated in the 
following scene in Midge’s apartment.59 Here we learn that Scottie has been forced, to 
his lament, to end his career as a detective. He cites his acrophobia as the cause, but 
then quickly adds that he is having nightmares of seeing the police officer fall, to  
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Fig. 3.4                                                                                                Vertigo (1996) 
which Midge responds that that he is not to blame and should “go away for a while.”  
Thus, as the film gets under way, Scottie is somewhat unhinged: his future is uncertain 
and he is clearly traumatized by his experience on the roof, going so far as to assure 
Midge that he will not “crack up.”   
 This instability helps explain why Scottie becomes so quickly and deeply 
enmeshed in the mystery of Madeleine Elster, and why he reacts so strongly to the 
ostensible suicide of Madeleine (the second fall). In the scene of the public inquest 
that follows this fall, Hitchcock lingers on the discomfort on Scottie’s face as the lead 
investigator absolves him of any wrongdoing in Madeleine’s death while also 
bemoaning the fact that his vertigo prevented him from being able to stop her, just as it 
had prevented him from helping his fellow police officer. The third fall comes in the 
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subsequent dream sequence, in which Scottie peers into an open grave before himself 
falling from the bell tower. This dream pushes him into a catatonic state, and he is 
institutionalized. Once released, Scottie returns to the places around the city where he 
had watched Madeleine. It is at one of these places that he spots Judy, and so embarks 
on his restoration project. In the fourth fall, Judy actually falls from the bell tower and 
dies. Hitchcock conveys Scottie’s devastation at this point by abruptly, and rather 
shockingly, ending the film here, with the final shot showing Scottie again staring into 
the abyss.   
In his analysis of Hitchcock at the end of Cinema 1, Deleuze provides a formal 
schematic for understanding this pervading dread. Further elaborating on the way 
Hitchcock’s images trace abstract relations, Deleuze writes: “in Hitchcock’s films an 
action, once it is given (in present, future or past), is literally surrounded by a set of 
relations, which vary its subject, nature, aim, etc. What matters is not who did the 
action…but neither is it the action itself: it is the set of relations in which the action 
and the one who did it are caught.”60 In Vertigo (1996) the central action is 
Madeleine’s apparent suicide, with the web of relations formed by Elster’s plot. As 
Scottie struggles to untangle the mystery of Madeleine, which links her to Carlotta and 
the “old San Francisco” through various points—the portrait (alongside the flowers 
and hair), Carlotta’s grave at the Mission Dolores, the McKittrick Hotel (Carlotta’s 
former house), etc.—he is ensnared in a wider web of relations of which he knows 
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nothing, and which links Judy, Elster, and the real Madeleine. This type of situation 
leads Deleuze to observe that, in Hitchcock’s films, “[t]he characters can act, perceive, 
experience, but they cannot testify to the relations that determine them.”61 Hitchcock 
neatly visualizes this point in a shot immediately following Madeleine’s “suicide,” and 
thus at the height of Scottie’s manipulation by Elster. Here the church and part of the 
mission grounds are shown in a high angle long-shot along the side of the bell tower. 
The image is one of the film’s boldest, creating an abstract composition around the 
geometric hulk of the bell tower, which thrusts downward through the middle of the 
frame (Figure 3.5). On the right side of the tower, Scottie emerges from the church as 
a mere speck in the shot’s overall design. Hitchcock adds to this diminution by staging 
a simultaneous action on the left side of the tower, where a priest and a group of nuns 
climb onto the church roof. The independence of these two actions and their visual 
separation further dramatizes the epistemological limitations of those caught within 
the larger design.  
Scottie’s existential vertigo is thus ultimately framed by his role as an object of 
manipulation and exploitation. As Charles Barr puts it in his short monograph on 
Vertigo, “[t]he shadow of Elster hangs over it all.”62 Scottie is, as is Judy (who pays a 
far higher price), little more than a cog in the machinery of Elster’s plot. It is fitting, 
then, that Elster is a wealthy industrialist. Hitchcock emphasizes this fact in the first 
image of Elster, who is positioned in front of a large window through which a  
                                                
61 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 201.  
62 Barr, Vertigo, 98.  
 
 
212 
 
Fig. 3.5                                                                                                Vertigo (1996) 
shipyard can be seen. Moreover, Hitchcock makes his cameo in the scene immediately 
before Elster’s introduction—walking through the shipyard as Scottie approaches—
hinting that Elster’s power is as pervasive as that of the director. In Barr’s words, “it is 
plausible…to align Hitchcock and Elster, as directors of the calculated apparatus of 
illusion to which Scottie and the viewer are submitted.”63       
 One way to describe this ensnarement in a web of relations is conspiracy. 
Indeed, following the section on Hitchcock in Cinema 1, Deleuze turns to conspiracy 
in the American cinema of the 1970s. It is worth recalling here that it is precisely 
conspiracy in the American cinema of the 70s and early 80s that Jameson examines in 
first chapter of The Geopolitical Aesthetic as a form of cognitive mapping. For 
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Jameson, conspiracy films of this time register a sense of waning political 
empowerment, and an accompanying dread and paranoia, in the face of capital’s 
proliferation into every facet of life. Deleuze sounds a similar note when he writes: 
“We hardly believe any longer that a global situation can give rise to an action which 
is capable of modifying it—no more than we believe that an action can force a 
situation to disclose itself, even partially;” and, later: “If things are like this, how is it 
possible not to believe in a world-wide, diffuse conspiracy, an enterprise of 
generalized enslavement which extends to every location…spreading death 
everywhere?”64    
 In Cinema 2, the theme of conspiracy is taken up in the chapter on the crystal-
image, and in terms that are explicitly that of political economy. Here, Deleuze writes:  
The cinema as art itself lives in a direct relation with a 
permanent plot [complot], an international conspiracy 
which conditions it from within, as the most intimate 
and indispensable enemy. This conspiracy is that of 
money; what defines industrial art is not mechanical 
reproduction but the internalized relation with 
money…In short, the cinema confronts its most internal 
                                                
64 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 206, 214. 
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presupposition, money, and the movement-image makes 
way for the time-image in one and the same operation.65  
In a similar fashion, the restoration-image confronts its internal presupposition, not as 
money, but as labor. In Vertigo (1996) this internalized relation with labor is mirrored 
in the diegetic-image, with its new self-reflexivity vis-à-vis restoration. The diegetic-
image, in its extreme proximity to and continual exchange with the demonstration-
image, also lends the latter its air of conspiracy. As it travels the circuit between the 
actual and the virtual, conspiracy colors the circuit itself and envelops the relation 
between the two sides of the image. The restoration-image in Vertigo (1996) thus 
assumes a malevolence that hints to the condition of possibility of affective labor as an 
“enterprise of generalized enslavement” or, to borrow Barr’s phrase, a “calculated 
apparatus of illusion.”  
 
*  *  *  * * 
 
 This insidious link between labor and capital in Vertigo (1996) deepens and 
becomes genetic, as it were, when viewed from the perspective of time. In Deleuze’s 
formulation, the conspiracy of the crystal-image is the imbrication of art and 
commerce in the cinema. The fact that the image’s most direct presentation of the 
relation with money occurs through the same operation as the direct presentation of 
                                                
65 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 77-8.  
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time makes visible what Deleuze calls “the old curse which undermines the cinema,” 
that is, “time is money.” But the real sting of this “old curse” is another torment, 
which Deleuze refers to as the “harsh law of cinema,” that is, “a minute of footage 
costs a day of collective work.”66 Time is money because time is the measure of labor. 
The conspiracy that for Deleuze is the commodification of art thus opens onto the 
commodification of labor. In the restoration-image, it is the image’s internal relation 
with labor, rather than money, that overlaps with the direct presentation of time. Time 
and labor are thus conflated: time is the substance of labor. 
 In “The Constitution of Time,” published in English as the first half of Time 
for Revolution, Negri describes the conflation of time and labor as fundamental to 
global capital. Here, Negri writes: “time itself becomes the fabric of the whole of 
being, because all of being is implicated in the web of the relations of production: 
being is equal to product of labour: temporal being…At the level at which the 
institutional development of the capitalist system invests the whole of life, time is not 
the measure of life, but is life itself.”67 If there is no longer a substantial outside to the 
capitalist system, and if all social activity is potentially within the realm of immaterial 
labor, then the line between non-labor time and labor time becomes increasingly 
blurred. In this situation the paradigm of capitalist exploitation becomes ontological.68 
Time no  
                                                
66 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 77. 
67 Negri, Time for Revolution, 34-5.  
68 Negri suggests that this was always the case (and can be detected in Marx’s analysis), but is 
only openly manifested with the total subsumption of society by capital. 
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longer steps in to mediate the conversion of labor into abstract and quantified units of 
value; this mediation has become, in Negri’s words, “a before with respect to events, 
with respect to actions, not an after…mediation precedes being, it pre-forms it, it pre-
constitutes it.”69 In other words, the system of exchange is always already in place. 
Time still functions as measure, but this function is now tautological; time measures 
itself, everywhere and at all times. Rather than a dialectical machine of conversion, 
capital becomes immanent to time and life as such. The transformative powers of 
labor are thus controlled from the ‘inside;’ capital seeks to “excavate” and pacify 
productive relations from a point of “ontological zero.”70  
 As I argued above, restoration demonstrations make visible an attempt to 
dominate what Rosen calls “historical temporality,” or time as qualitative 
transformation. In these demonstrations such transformation is given as something 
external: it is located in the visible degradation of the “before” image, which is then 
vanquished by the “after” image. The demonstration-image thus presents itself as an 
image of labor that has subsumed historical difference within a sort of eternal present, 
which has rid itself of time. Yet, in a restored film, when the demonstration-image is 
                                                
69 Negri, Time for Revolution, 36, 51. Negri elaborates: “The constitutive thought of capital 
does not set out from individuals so as to form the criteria of obligation as in Hobbes, it beings 
with the obligation; it does not begin with the contrast between all and the general will as in 
Rousseau, it starts rather from the general will…The economic plan of the State does not 
resolve the class contradictions but rather it encircles them, it systematizes and dominates 
them. Time-as-measure, mediation and equilibrium are the will and foundation of an analytic 
of Power, of a prior and arbitrary monetization of the real, of an aggressive coining of being. 
Occupying in advance the whole of social space so as to measure it through the abstraction of 
time…This is the problem that capital must resolve.” Time For Revolution, 51.  
70 Negri, Time for Revolution, 111. 
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fully articulated to a diegetic-image, time is reinstated in that specific form of the 
crystal-image that I have termed the restoration-image—“what we see in the crystal is 
time itself, a bit of time in the pure state, the very distinction between the two images 
which keeps on reconstituting itself.”71 In the restoration-image time and labor flow 
together. In Vertigo (1996), the form of the restoration-image illustrates how the 
possibility of transformation is neutralized internally, that is, from within the 
conjunction of time and labor. This defanging of change emerges through the pairing 
of the stasis of the demonstration-image with a diegetic-image that centers on 
repetition. Most glaringly, the film ends where it begins, with Scottie poised over the 
abyss. This circular structure forms the outer envelope for a host of other repetitions. 
The fall of the police officer in the first scene is repeated in the “suicide” of 
Madeleine, which is repeated in Scottie’s dream, and then in the climatic and deadly 
fall of Judy-as-Madeleine. In the first half of the film, Madeleine’s behavior is 
presented as a repetition of the life of Carlotta Valdes. Madeleine copies the hairstyle 
and bouquet in the portrait of Carlotta, haunts the places where Carlotta lived, and 
repeats Carlotta’s suicide. In the second half of the film, Scottie repeats his love affair 
with Madeleine using Judy as a stand-in. When Scottie (and the viewer) learns of 
Elster’s plot, Judy’s makeover as Madeleine is revealed to be an even stricter 
repetition than first intimated: Judy was also ‘playing’ Madeleine (playing Carlotta) 
the first time around. Thus, Deleuze states: “what is vertiginous, is, in the heroine’s 
                                                
71 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 82.  
 
 
218 
heart, the relation of the Same with the Same which passes through all the variations 
of its relations with others (the dead woman [the real Madeleine, but also Carlotta], the 
husband [Elster], the inspector [Scottie]).”72  
 This dizzying series of repetitions compounds, on at least two registers, the 
mirroring of the content of the demonstration-image and the diegetic-image. As 
Pomerance suggests, Scottie’s makeover of Judy as Madeleine can be seen as doubling 
the restoration of the film, and vice versa. This makeover also doubles Elster’s 
makeover of Judy as Madeleine in the first half of the film. The first half of the film 
thereby also takes on the self-reflexive aspect of the second half, and vice versa, 
creating a feedback loop that extends across both the breadth of the narrative and the 
circuit between the two sides of the image. Furthermore, and somewhat more 
abstractly, there is a doubling of permanence, or “the relation of the Same with the 
Same.” In the narrative’s repetition of falls, death is presented as permanent in two 
respects: it is both ever-present and unchanging. The finality of death and the abyss 
over which Scottie is suspended persists, from the first fall to the last. While the 
diegetic-image presents this permanence extensively, that is, by circling back again 
and again to the same action, the demonstration-image renders it intensively. As the 
diegetic-image traces out its circles, the demonstration-image persists without change. 
Not only does the content of the demonstration-image remain the same, from the 
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beginning of the film to the end, this content is, in itself, a display of the neutralization 
of change.  
 In this way the crystal-image in Vertigo (1996) assumes the form, or state, of 
what Deleuze calls the “completed crystal,” or the “perfect crystal.” To the question, 
“And what do we see in the perfect crystal?,” Deleuze answers: “Time, but time which 
has been rolled up, rounded itself, at the same time as it was splitting.”73 While time 
and labor flow in the restoration-image, in Vertigo (1996) this image is evacuated of 
the possibility of radical change; nothing new is allowed to enter into the constant 
splitting of time into actual and virtual elements. The restless, and potentially unruly, 
ontology of time and life is flattened into equilibrium. This type of “de-
potentialization of time” shows how the conflation of time and labor can overlap 
directly and immediately, that is, ontologically, with the conflation of time and 
money.74 Completely uniform, temporal being provides the medium and matter for the 
analytic circulation of exchange-value. Negri refers to this mode of temporality as the 
“time of command,” or “time zero:” “Here nature and history are filtered by the 
system and expressly lead to possibility zero.” This time is marked by a “creeping 
                                                
73 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 83-4, my emphasis. Deleuze’s examples of the perfect crystal come 
from the films of Max Ophüls: “Ophüls’s images are perfect crystals. Their facets are oblique 
mirrors, as in Madame de…And the mirror are not content with reflecting the actual image, 
but constitute the prism, the lens where the split image constantly runs after itself to connect 
up with itself, as on the circus-track in Lola Montez. On the track or in the crystal, the 
imprisoned characters bustle, acting and acted on…One can only just turn in the crystal: hence 
the round of episodes, and also of colours (Lola Montez), of waltzes and also of earrings 
(Madame de…), of the master of ceremonies’ visions in the round in La ronde.” Cinema 2, 83.  
74 Negri, Time for Revolution, 48. 
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conjugation of being and non-being;” time and life are subjected to the persistence of 
the same, and thus assume the quality of a kind of living death.75  
  There is, however, a flaw or crack in this otherwise perfect crystal. This crack 
is constituted by the flashback that was removed from the first cut of the film and then 
quickly reinstated. Of this flashback, Wood proclaims: “Few moments in cinema 
produce a greater frisson.”76 The power and peculiarity of the scene is twofold. First, 
the flashback reveals the main secret of the film, that is, the fact that Judy was playing 
Madeleine to begin with. This secret is revealed to the viewer, but not to Scottie, a full 
thirty minutes before the film ends. The tension of this final half hour is then based on 
an anticipation of Scottie’s discovery of the truth, and his reaction. For this reason, the 
revelation given by the flashback has been seen as one of the film’s notable 
Hitchcockian flourishes.77 Second, the flashback is the first and only substantial scene 
of the film that is structured around the experience of someone other than Scottie. 
Indeed, almost every shot in the film either includes Scottie or shows what he is 
seeing. In contrast, the flashback is presented as Judy’s memory: after Scottie leaves 
the Empire hotel, the camera lingers on a close-up of Judy, which then dissolves into 
the flashback. In Vertigo (1996), the frisson of the flashback is bolstered by a third 
factor. As mentioned above, this scene was not included on the original negative or on 
the color separations that Harris and Katz used for the remainder of the restoration. 
                                                
75 Negri, Time for Revolution, 111. 
76 Wood, Hitchcock’s Films Revisited, 125. 
77 Barr, Vertigo, 10.  
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The filmic elements from which the scene was recovered had a different profile of 
degradation than the negative and separations, and could not be restored to the same 
level of visual quality. Thus, as one reviewer puts it, when the flashback occurs, “what 
we now see is eighth-generation footage that stands out like a sore thumb from the rest 
of the film.”78  
 The flashback is thus a piece of the past that has not been absorbed and 
assimilated by the technology of the present. The fissure produced by this remnant of 
the past is a flash of difference within the sameness that dominates the perfect crystal 
and the time of command. This difference lodged within time points to another form 
of temporality, which itself intimates a potential line of escape, or line of fracture, 
within the apparatus of the new materialism of cinema. As I stated in the introduction 
to this dissertation, such lines denote subterranean and subversive forces that open 
paths of creation and becoming and thereby open the apparatus to a radically different 
future—“acting against time, and thus on time, for the sake of a time one hopes will 
come.”79 In the next chapter, I will follow this line of fracture further with the aim of 
articulating an image of this other time, which runs against the time of command, and 
illuminates a time to come.  
                                                
78 Brown, “Back From Among the Dead,” 5. 
79 Deleuze, “What is a dispositif?” 164-5. 
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Chapter Four 
The Virtual Metropolis: Restoration as Simulacrum 
 
 
 
 
Purely actual objects do not exist. Every actual 
surrounds itself with a cloud of virtual images.  
 —Gilles Deleuze, “The Actual and the Virtual” 
 
 
What is found at the historical beginnings of things is not the  
inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other  
things. It is disparity. 
 —Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” 
 
 
 
 
 The story seems destined to become a film. In the summer of 2008 a 16mm 
dupe negative of Fritz Lang’s Metropolis (1927) was discovered in storage at the 
Museo del Cine Pablo Ducrós Hicken in Buenos Aires. On these reels was a 
“complete” version of Metropolis believed to be lost forever. Upon its discovery the 
press consistently referred to this version as the “holy grail” of film restoration. Such 
reverence reflects the film’s status as one of the great monuments of silent cinema and 
(arguably) German Expressionism, and the work of one of cinema’s most celebrated 
auteurs. Furthermore, the initial version of the film was only in theaters for a matter of 
months, thereby making it a veritable “lost object” for fans and scholars from the very 
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beginning. Thus at the time of the discovery in Buenos Aires the lure of realizing 
Lang’s original vision had already produced four major restorations. The first 
restoration was created by Eckart Jahnke at the State Film Archive in East Berlin 
between 1969 and 1972. The second restoration was completed in 1987 by Enno 
Patalas, director of the Munich Filmmusuem. The third restoration, the “Murnau 
Stiftung Version,” was the first of the Metropolis restorations to employ digital tools, 
and was released in 2001. This restoration was overseen by Martin Koerber under the 
auspices of the Friedrich Wilhelm Murnau Stiftung in Wiesbaden, which owns the 
rights to the film.1 Now we have yet another restoration, The Complete Metropolis. 
This restoration, also financed by the Murnau Stiftung, enjoyed a lavish (and 
simulcast) premier at the 2010 Berlin International Film Festival, and was then 
released as a two-disc DVD set from Kino. The crowning achievement of the most 
celebrated crusade in film restoration, the release of this latest Metropolis also caps 
three decades in which the popularity of restoration has expanded prodigiously.  
 The critical reaction to The Complete Metropolis is exemplary of the way that, 
despite the explosion of interest in film restoration, there remains a widespread 
tendency to overlook the specificity of this practice in favor of what is purportedly 
being restored. Unlike most of the restorations currently flooding the DVD market, 
this newest restoration of Lang’s film is far from pristine. For The Complete 
Metropolis the footage found in Buenos Aires was used only to fill in shots and 
                                                
1 On these three restorations, see Elsaesser, Metropolis, 34-42; and Martin Koerber, “Notes on 
the Proliferation of Metropolis (1927),” The Moving Image 2.1 (2002): 73-89. 
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sequences missing from the 2001 restoration. This strategy has created striking 
moments of disjuncture. While the images from the 2001 restoration are nearly 
flawless, the images from Buenos Aires are of a drastically lower quality. Yet, nearly 
all discussion of the latest restoration has eschewed the effects created by these 
differences in favor of celebrating some essential Langian-ness. This view is neatly 
summarized in a review of the film in the Guardian: “Metropolis aficionados will be 
concentrating less on the streaky screen—which in parts resembles a heavy 
downpour—and more on the unfamiliar way the film unfolds as Lang intended.”2 
 In this chapter, as with chapter three, I will push beyond this approach to 
provide an analysis of The Complete Metropolis that engages the film in its 
particularity, that is, as a restoration. More specifically, my goal is to draw on The 
Complete Metropolis as a way to conceptualize restoration as a politically radical form 
of cinematic practice. In conceptualizing restoration as such, I break from the critique 
of restoration, particularly in Paolo Cherchi Usai’s The Death of Cinema. For Cherchi 
Usai, restoration is part of a wider phenomenon marked by an increasing separation 
from the vicissitudes of the material world and an atrophying of the ability to imagine 
historical difference. Cherchi Usai presents this phenomenon as largely the result of 
the ubiquity of digital information, including images, and the assumption that such 
data is immune to the flux of time. As I argued in chapter two, this account of what 
Cherchi Usai calls the “digital dark age” can be placed within the still wider frame of 
                                                
2 Connolly, “Metropolis.” 
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what Jameson calls a “waning of historicity,” or a widespread sense of stasis linked to 
capital’s eradication of all alternative systems. While Cherchi Usai’s critique of 
restoration is sound and laudable, it overlooks the potential for restoration to offer 
something different. Restoration, if pursued through different means, has the capacity 
to actually challenge the stasis of our current age. I contend that it may illuminate the 
limitless potential that cuts through every moment of time and thereby help open the 
present to the possibility of an alternative world.  
 While some of the formal elements of The Complete Metropolis are invaluable 
for conceptualizing an alternative practice of restoration, the film is by no means a 
fully-fledged incarnation of such an alternative. By all accounts the look of the film is 
due to circumstance—the limits of the existing technology in the face of the material 
conditions of the Buenos Aires footage—rather than a radically new approach to 
restoration. Thus, before turning to the film, I will first articulate this new vision of 
restoration within somewhat more abstract and general terms. Crucial in this regard is 
the fact that film restoration, unlike other forms of art restoration, always produces a 
new object. Moreover, this new object is created not through mechanical duplication, 
but rather through a complex set of “technical, editorial and intellectual procedures.”3 
While this new object is framed in the marketing of restored films in terms of 
technological enhancement, it is more reservedly acknowledged by restorationists in 
terms of an approximation, or a representation, of the original. It is by way of the 
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precise meaning of such representation that I develop a new concept of restoration: 
restoration as simulacrum. I invoke here Deleuze’s concept of the simulacrum, 
particularly as it is articulated in “Plato and the Simulacrum,” the opening section of 
the first Appendix to The Logic of Sense. While Jean Baudrillard has made famous an 
understanding of the simulacrum as operative in the “waning of historicity,” Deleuze’s 
concept—part of the reversal of Platonism most explicit in his early work—runs in the 
opposite direction, avowing a powerful sense of transformation.4 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
Film restoration is a fluid term, with a variety of connotations that continue to 
evolve. There is, however, one dominant definition of restoration, particularly in the 
case of high-profile restorations for the commercial market, such as Vertigo (1996) 
and The Complete Metropolis. The most clear and succinct formulation of this 
definition is that of Raymond Borde. Borde writes: “Restoration is the application of 
specific technologies to materials degraded by time and man in order to return a film 
as closely as possible to its original state.”5 Within this definition of restoration, the 
“original” has divergent meanings. The most common usage of the term equates the 
original with the intentions of the director—there is thus quite a bit of overlap between 
                                                
4 See Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, translated by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).  
5 Borde, “Film Restoration: Ethical Problems,” 90.  
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the rise in popularity of restoration and the contemporaneous rise in popularity of so-
called director’s cuts. The original also suggests the version of a film first seen by 
audiences. While marketing teams and reviewers seem to love the first definition, 
within the field of restoration the second definition seems preferable, as it has a bit 
more historical specificity. For the most part though the choice between these 
definitions is nominal because the premier version is most often aligned with the 
intentions of the director. For example, it is widely believed that the cuts to the 
premier version of Metropolis were made against Lang’s wishes. In a 2006 article in 
The Moving Image, Andreas Busche attempts to formulate a more detailed and 
materialist understanding of the original. Busche uses the term “film artifact,” rather 
than simply “film,” in order to stress how the original is inextricable from the physical 
properties of the image—the image defined as “a visual manifestation within a 
granular structure composed of silver halide crystals.” Thus, Busche argues, the idea 
of the original, whether conceived in terms of a film’s premiere or the intentions of a 
direction, must heed the fact that the “film artifact has specific aesthetic characteristics 
shaped by its material constitution (such as the film stock, the chemical composition 
of the emulsion, or the exposure values and the processing time that are both inscribed 
in the emulsion and therefore contribute to the visual appearance of the image.)”6   
 As Busche points out, there is a broad distinction in film restoration between a 
textual, or philological, approach to the original, and an ontological approach. The 
                                                
6 Busche, “Just Another Form of Ideology?” 17, 11.  
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textual approach focuses on what Busche calls “sequential lacunae,” that is, missing 
frames, shots, or scenes, and thereby seeks to restore a film to its original running 
time. Most of the restorations of the 1970s and 80s, including Brownlow’s restoration 
of Napoleon and the first two restorations of Metropolis, were based on this approach. 
The ontological approach focuses on the loss of visual information within the frame, 
such as lacunae formed by scratches and tears, or the degradation of color. Turner’s 
restoration of Gone With the Wind in 1989, which was aimed at correcting color 
fading, is one of the first major examples of this approach. This approach has become 
increasingly prevalent with the development of various digital cleaning programs, and 
with the promotion of DVDs and now Blu-ray in terms of image quality.7 The 2001 
version of Metropolis, which digitally cleaned the film’s images without adding a 
substantial amount of new material, is another example of the ontological approach to 
restoration. With its combination of images from the 2001 restoration and new 
material from the footage found in Buenos Aires, The Complete Metropolis is a rare 
example of a high-profile restoration in which the textual approach and the ontological 
approach are combined in a way that is easily visible in the finished product—linking 
a desire for narrative completeness with a desire for immaculate images. 
Despite these varying approaches to the original, the dominant definition of 
restoration corresponds to a single mode of representation within the framework of 
Platonism. One of the unique aspects of Deleuze’s reading of Plato is a shift in focus 
                                                
7 On the links between image quality, DVDs, and cinephilia, see Klinger, Beyond the 
Multiplex, 54-90. 
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from the classic distinction between the world of essences and the world of 
appearances to the distinction between two different modes of representation and two 
corresponding forms of the image, namely the copy and the simulacrum. The 
dominant mode of restoration follows the logic of the copy. The copy is constructed 
around two related types of similitude. The first type of similitude is between the copy 
and its model; it is an imitative similitude, or likeness. The goal of restoration is to 
replicate the original as closely as possible. The goal, in other words, is to maintain the 
“spirit” of the original in spite of the differences introduced by the process of 
restoration.8 Thus the marketing of technological enhancement in restoration is 
carefully couched in terms that suggest an overriding fidelity to the original. Any 
differences between restoration and original are subordinated to a fundamental 
likeness. The second type of similitude is what Deleuze calls exemplary similitude, or 
sameness. This type of similitude is only found in the Platonic Idea, that is, the 
transcendent essence of a thing. The Idea is generic and immutable, and is thus wholly 
and purely identical with itself—the Idea of a chair, for example, does not contain 
anything other than the essence of being a chair. What a copy tries to imitate in an 
object is that object’s Idea, rather than its earthly vagaries. In restoration the original 
has a similar function. The notion of the original, wherever its stress may fall, always 
denotes an identity. The original is an integral entity, lacking nothing and with nothing 
superfluous. What guides restoration is not only the similarity between the restoration 
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and the original, but also the exemplary similitude of the original to itself. It is this 
notion of the internal identity of the original that provides the measure by which a 
restoration can be evaluated.    
 As discussed in chapter three, the first type of similitude in restoration has 
been criticized for the ways in which it suggests an identity between the present and 
the past. In Nathan Carroll’s analysis of restoration demonstrations, for example, the 
proximity of the past and the present, represented by the “before restoration” image 
and “after restoration” image, respectively, allows for a smooth passage “from one 
historical situation to a different cultural context.”9 The pursuit of this ostensible 
transcendence of historical difference is compounded (and legitimated) by the 
affirmation of the second type of similitude, that is, the exemplary similitude of the 
original. In The Death of Cinema, Cherchi Usai offers the most sustained critique of 
this second type of similitude by way of what he terms the “model image.” The model 
image is Cherchi Usai’s name for the way restoration understands the original. As 
D.N. Rodowick writes, the model image is “the perfect or normative image—an 
eternal and Platonic form perfectly consistent with aesthetic norms of photographic 
beauty and pleasure.”10 The model image is an image that is missing nothing; it has 
suffered no damage or decay, has no lacunae, and is thus fully complete. For such an 
image, the decay of celluloid is inessential and secondary. The variously degraded 
                                                
9 Carroll, “Unwrapping Archives,” 18.  
10 Rodowick, Virtual Life of Film, 20.  
 
 
 
231 
prints on which a film exists are only crude indicators of the Idea of the model image. 
The model image is therefore ultimately idealized as outside the flow of time, making 
its pursuit through restoration “tantamount to a denial that the moving image has a 
history.”11 While Busche’s more materialist conception of the original certainly 
mitigates this flight into transcendence, it nonetheless presupposes an originary 
wholeness, or “oneness”—an idea Busche borrows from Cesare Brandi’s theoretical 
work on restoration—and thus also affirms the logic of identity at the expense of 
difference.12  
 In the case of Cherchi Usai’s critique of the model image, the broad distinction 
between the Platonic realm of Ideas and the realm of the earthly precludes a more 
nuanced account of practices of representation. In contrast, in one of the most vital 
essays on restoration, Giorgio Bertellini gestures towards what might lie beyond this 
sort of critique. Bertellini outlines a new type of film history that draws inspiration 
from the work of Foucault. One of the basic tenets of such a history is what Bertellini 
calls the “constitutive multiplicity of the film text.”13 As Foucault puts it, “what is 
found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; 
it is the dissention of other things. It is disparity.”14 One way of thinking of this 
                                                
11 Cherchi Usai, Death of Cinema, 67.  
12 See Cesare Brandi, Theory of Restoration, translated by Cynthia Rockwell (Rome: Nardini 
Editore, 2005). 
13 Bertellini, “Restoration, genealogy and palimpsests,” 279. For a similar formulation of film 
history, see Thomas Elsaesser, “The New Film History as Media Archaeology,” Cinémas 
14.2/3 (2004): 71-117.  
14 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 353. 
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multiplicity is with respect to the various versions of a film. Metropolis is an 
instructive example. Within a year of its initial release there were three separate 
versions of the film. The first version premiered in Germany in January of 1927. This 
version was pulled from circulation by April of the same year. A month before the 
first version was taken out of theaters, a second version had already appeared in New 
York. This American version was drastically shortened and re-edited. Finally, in 
August of 1927 a third version of Metropolis was released in Germany. This version 
was edited based largely on the edits of the American version. To complicate matters 
further, there were three different negatives created during the shooting of the film 
using either different cameras or different takes.15 It is unclear what negative was used 
in each of the three versions that appeared in 1927. 
 In Silent Cinema Cherchi Usai articulates a similar approach to film history. In 
light of the multiple versions of a film Cherchi re-defines the notion of the original: 
“The ‘original’ version of a film is a multiple object fragmented into a number of 
different entities equal to the number of surviving copies.” The “different entities” that 
form this multiplicity are not only the different versions of a film, but also the 
different prints. For Cherchi Usai, every print is unique because it has a singular 
internal history, which is “the history of the changes that have taken place within the 
object in the course of time.”16 This is a history of the motley flux of celluloid. It is a 
                                                
15 Elsaesser, Metropolis, 32. 
16 Cherchi Usai, Silent Cinema, 160, 12. 
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history of the wear and tear caused by projection, storage, transport, natural and man-
made catastrophes, and the variable rates of decay of the emulsion and base. Thus, as 
Foucault states, “[t]he forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny or 
regulative mechanisms, but the luck of the battle. They do not manifest the successive 
forms of a primordial intention and their attention is not that of a conclusion, for they 
always appear through the singular randomness of events.”17   
Unlike Cherchi Usai, Bertellini takes this notion of film history towards the 
possibility of a new type of restoration. This type of restoration would affirm the 
multiplicity and materiality of film and its capacity for transformation, and give these 
qualities cinematic form. This idea puts us within the realm of the simulacrum, which, 
Deleuze asserts, “is built upon a disparity or upon a difference. It internalizes a 
dissimilarity.”18 Rather than the Idea of an object, what the simulacrum strives to 
reproduce is the ability of the object to become something else. The simulacrum not 
only presents itself as a metamorphosis of the object; the simulacrum, as Cesare 
Casarino puts it, also “resembles the object insofar as it is able to retain the object’s 
immanent potential for difference.”19 Instead of participating in a similitude that is 
measured against the self-identity of the Idea, the simulacrum and its object share an 
internal dissimilitude. “If the simulacrum still has a model,” Deleuze states, “it is 
                                                
17 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 361. 
18 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 258.  
19 Casarino, “The Simulacrum of AIDS,” 62, my emphasis.  
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another model, a model of the Other (l’Autre) from which there flows an internalized 
dissemblance.”20 
 Bertellini takes Giorgio Moroder’s version of Metropolis (1984) as an 
intimation of a new type of restoration. Working with a print of the second German 
version of the film, Moroder re-edited and colorized the images, and set them to a pop 
score performed by Freddie Mercury, Pat Benatar, and Adam Ant, among others. Of 
this version Bertellini writes, “we shall not dismiss Moroder’s commercial experiment 
as an irreverent, disrespectful exploitation, but rather as a model for an archeological 
approach which maintains a distance from the past, and treats its documents as 
‘discovered objects.’”21 What Bertellini embraces is the film’s complete denial of the 
sovereignty of the original—in fact, one of the epigrams to Bertellini’s essay is 
Moroder’s declaration, “I didn’t touch the original because there is no original.” In this 
respect the vision of restoration Bertellini offers resonates with Deleuze’s concept of 
the simulacrum. However, there are some instructive differences. For one, Bertellini 
stresses the relation between historiography and subjectivity. Moroder’s version is 
noteworthy because it foregrounds the epistemological confines of the present. While 
this emphasis on epistemology is not unimportant for the simulacrum, it is secondary 
to an ontology grounded in metamorphosis.  Moreover, while Moroder’s film need not 
be seen as an affront to Lang or to a prior version of Metropolis, it is hard to look past 
                                                
20 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 258 
21 Bertellini, “Restoration, genealogy and palimpsests,” 287.  
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its commercialism. In other words, an epistemological argument for Moroder’s film 
provides too much leeway for celebrating a mere “update” based on the vapid cycles 
of popular fashion. To think of the simulacrum in these terms would be ruinous to the 
concept. Indeed, it should be remembered that Deleuze, like many of his colleagues, 
pursued his reversal of Platonism in the context of the surge of radical politics during 
the 1960s. (I will return to the politics of the simulacrum vis-à-vis restoration and the 
present historical conjuncture later in this chapter.) 
 Bertellini’s use of Moroder’s film is also instructive in terms of the internal 
dissimilarity of the simulacrum. While Bertellini generally stresses the broad historical 
difference between Moroder’s Metropolis and previous manifestations of the film, he 
briefly points to an internal difference within the former when he writes, “the contrast 
between the old footage and the soundtrack draws attention to the bod(ies) of the film 
itself and its own image-ness in the best tradition of the ‘recycled images’ film style.” 
The shortcoming of this notion of internal difference is that it essentially takes the 
broad historical distinction between past and present and shifts it onto film form in 
terms of what Bertellini summarizes as the distinction between “silent and electronic.” 
22 For Deleuze the internal difference that is crucial to the simulacrum does not 
manifest itself simply as the difference between specific things. The internal 
difference Deleuze emphasizes is an undetermined difference. It is absolute difference: 
“In short, there is in the simulacrum a becoming-mad, or a becoming unlimited…a 
                                                
22 Bertellini, “Restoration, genealogy and palimpsests,” 285, 286. 
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becoming always other…able to evade the equal, the limit, the Same or the Similar: 
always more and less at once, but never equal.”23 In terms of restoration, this means 
that the simulacrum is not confined to drawing attention to the empirical distinctions 
between past and present, and between existing versions. The simulacrum pushes 
these distinctions to a more radical level, indicating an infinite capacity for difference. 
 In order to further specify this rather perplexing limitlessness of the 
simulacrum it is necessary at this point to turn to the concrete example of The 
Complete Metropolis. Turning to the film, it is also necessary to articulate the concept 
of the simulacrum in terms more finely tuned to film form. Deleuze offers precisely 
such terms in Cinema 2, particularly in the second half of the volume. In this latter 
part of the book, Deleuze shifts away from the Bergsonian conception of time 
articulated in the chapter on the crystal-image, and especially in the pages on the 
‘perfect’ crystal-image. In the crystal-image, two aspects of the image alternate 
between actual and virtual dimensions in a reciprocal exchange. This structure creates 
a symmetry in which the two dimensions of the image seem to be doubles of the other. 
In the case of the perfect crystal, this doubling forms a closed circuit that evacuates 
time of novelty. In the latter half of Cinema 2, this symmetry is broken. The actual 
constitutes only the finest edge of an unlimited virtuality, like a particle emitted from a 
universe of possibility, “populated by effects which haunt it without ever filling it 
                                                
23 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 258. 
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up.”24 The present, as a singular point of actualization, is pinned directly to the eternity 
of time’s ceaseless and indifferent transformation. The flushing of the actual with the 
virtual is thus rendered as an expression of “the incommensurable.”25   
 In the analysis of The Complete Metropolis that follows, my method for 
reading the film mirrors my concept of a new practice of restoration. The former, as 
much as the latter, is fundamentally concerned with the production of simulacra. In 
other words, in order to say more about what a restoration that aims to produce a 
simulacrum might look like, it is necessary to produce an image of The Complete 
Metropolis not as a copy, as it purports to be, but as a simulacrum. This production of 
the simulacrum as mode of analysis presents another aspect of how restorations may 
be read for their specificity, as well as another aspect of the distinction between copy 
and simulacrum. In “The Simulacrum of AIDS,” Casarino argues that, in addition to 
be being two different types of image, the copy and the simulacrum also function as 
“two different and reversible properties of the very same image, two incommensurable 
instantiations of the relation between identity and difference in the image.” Every copy 
thus has the potential to be turned into a simulacrum (and vice versa). From this 
perspective, which Casarino articulates through an analysis of Hervé Guibert’s novel 
To the Friend Who Did Not Save My Life, the problem Deleuze pursues in “Plato and 
the Simulacrum”—i.e. “How does the simulacrum work?”—is supplemented by the 
                                                
24 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 165. 
25 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 214. 
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problem of “how to extricate the simulacrum from the copy.”26 Casarino’s careful 
reading of Guibert’s novel makes clear that the nature of this extrication depends 
heavily on context and the nature of the images at hand. Yet, Casarino provides a good 
indication of the way the simulacrum can function as time-image when he describes 
how Guibert constructs a “future which is immanent in the present, which constitutes 
difference in the present, which makes the present different and strange.”27 At this 
point it will suffice to add that such a production of the simulacrum can be seen as one 
expression of the utopianism Deleuze describes elsewhere as an attention “to the 
unknown which knocks at the door.”28     
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
 An important part of this latest Metropolis is the inclusion of nearly all of what 
is commonly known as “Scene 103,” or “Hel’s Room.” This scene was famously cut 
from the second version of the film (the American version). In an article in the New 
York Times in March of 1927, the excision of the scene was explained as a way to 
                                                
26 Casarino, “The Simulacrum of AIDS,” 63. Indeed, Deleuze states in Difference and 
Repetition: “Art does not imitate, above all because it repeats; it repeats all the repetitions, by 
virtue of an internal power (an imitation is a copy, but art is simulation, it reverses copies into 
simulacra.) Even the most mechanical, the most banal, the most habitual and the most 
stereotyped repetition finds a place in works of art, it is always displaced in relation to other 
repetitions, and it is subject to the condition that a difference may be extracted from it for 
these other repetitions.” Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 293, my emphases.  
27 Casarino, “The Simulacrum of AIDS,” 70.  
28 Deleuze, “What is a dispositif?” 165. 
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avoid unwanted connotations of the name Hel for English speaking audiences.29 The 
scene was absent from the third version of the film as well, and subsequently from 
every known version and print thereafter. As gleaned from a few surviving images, 
Thea von Harbou’s script, production stills, and censorship cards, the content of this 
scene has long been of interest to scholars of Metropolis because it contains key 
narrative information. Here we learn that the mad inventor Rotwang (Rudolf Klein-
Rogge) and the ruler of the city Joh Fredersen (Alfred Abel) were once rivals for a 
woman named Hel. Hel eventually married Fredersen and died giving birth to their 
son Freder (Gustav Frölich). Rotwang, obsessed with Hel, has built a giant stone bust 
to commemorate her. This obsession explains why Rotwang builds the robot as a 
female—it is a replacement for the lost lover—and why he seeks to wreak havoc on 
both Fredersen and Freder. What is most striking in The Complete Metropolis, 
however, is the visual construction of the scene. This scene, barely three minutes long, 
offers a concise and powerful instance of the simulacral effects that can be generated 
by restoration. 
 The scene occurs almost a quarter of the way into the film. Following a long 
shot of a small windowless structure—“a strange house, overlooked by the centuries,” 
reads an intertitle—we are given the first glimpse of Rotwang. Framed in medium 
close-up Rotwang sits facing the camera. He is hunched over his desk in deep thought. 
A dwarf servant enters the room and announces the arrival of Fredersen. Rotwang 
                                                
29 Patalas, “Metropolis: Scene 103,” 170. 
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remains in the same position, raising his head only slightly and muttering something. 
The next image takes us into Hel’s room. In long shot Fredersen stands in a cavernous 
space before a large curtain. This cut from Rotwang to Fredersen offers an instance of 
Lang’s use of nested spaces. Just as the city of Metropolis opens onto the workers’ 
city below, which in turn opens onto a network of catacombs, here Rotwang’s tiny 
dwelling opens onto unseen depths. This nesting of spaces also introduces a nesting of 
narratives. After contemplating the curtain for a few moments Fredersen pulls a tassel 
and the curtain parts, revealing a towering bust of Hel. This theatrical unveiling of the 
monument announces the story of Rotwang and Fredersen’s mutual past, which is 
nested within the larger drama of the city itself.  
 These spatial and narrative seams are doubled by a sharp distinction in the 
quality of the images. The shot of Rotwang at his desk is taken from the 2001 
restoration. The image is rich and voluminous. It is relatively free of markings and has 
a high degree of contrast and sharp edges. In contrast, the shot of Fredersen in Hel’s 
room is taken from the footage discovered in Buenos Aires. Like all of the images 
taken from this footage, the shot of Fredersen is foggy and suffused with thin black 
lines that tremble and jump. The contrast is low and the depth skewed, with everything 
appearing to be pressed into the mottled surface of the image. The cut to Hel’s room 
thus visually marks both the place where footage was missing from earlier versions of 
the film, as well as the internal history of the images from Buenos Aires. 
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The source of the reels of 16mm found in Buenos Aires was a (now lost) 
35mm print purchased in Europe by an Argentinean distributor prior to the 
disappearance of the first version of Metropolis. This print was heavily used in 
Argentina and when it was transferred to 16mm sometime in the 1970s it was already 
scratched and faded. This transfer was made seemingly without any attempts at 
cleaning and repair of the 35mm print and the wear on the images was copied to the 
16mm negative, thus making the damage impossible to remove even with the most 
advanced digital tools. The transfer was also made using an improper mask, which 
blocked portions of the image. These missing areas of the image are indicated by black 
bars that run along the top and left edges of the frame. In order to maintain the proper 
scale of the shots these black areas have been left in the images used in The Complete 
Metropolis. Cuts between the comparatively pristine footage from the 2001 version 
and the heavily marked footage from Buenos Aires thus also produce a jump in the 
image ratio. 
 The effects of these qualities of the Buenos Aires footage go beyond simply 
indicating its specific history. They also have a profound effect on the film’s 
articulation of what Deleuze refers to in his cinema books as the “out-of-field” [hors 
champ]. The out-of-field has two fundamental aspects: “In one case, the out-of-field 
designates that which exists elsewhere, to one side or around; in the other case, the 
out-of-field testifies to a more disturbing presence, one which cannot even be said to 
exist, but rather to ‘insist’ or ‘subsist,’ a more radical Elsewhere, outside homogenous 
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space and time.”30 The first aspect, which Deleuze mostly takes from Noël Burch’s 
classic analysis in Theory of Film Practice, corresponds to the implied space outside 
the edges of the frame, or off-screen space. The second aspect is the whole. In chapter 
two, I described the whole as a temporalized milieu, or what Deleuze calls an open 
totality. Deleuze distinguishes these two aspects by pointing out that while the off-
screen space of a given shot has the ability to be made visible in a subsequent shot, the 
whole always remains invisible. While the first aspect of the out-of-field implies a 
spatial totality, the whole implies the transformation of this totality in time. In the 
movement-image, this whole is only given indirectly, via the articulation of space. 
 There are two particular cuts in Scene 103 that are exemplary of the way the 
out-of-field functions in this version of the film more generally. Both of these cuts 
occur between an image from the 2001 restoration and an image from the Buenos 
Aires footage. After the bust has been revealed, Rotwang enters Hel’s room and 
confronts Fredersen. In a shot from the Buenos Aires footage Rotwang, framed from 
the waist up, appears alone in front of the curtain. He is looking intently to frame left, 
and shouting angrily. He clutches his chest and thrusts his arm out before him toward 
the left edge of the frame. The outstretched hand disappears into the missing portion of 
the image. An intertitle appears and then an image from the 2001 restoration. In this 
image Fredersen is shown from the chest up, and is also alone in the frame. He is 
staring to frame right. Rotwang’s hand, cut off at the wrist by the edge of the frame, 
                                                
30 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 17.  
 
 
 
243 
gestures inches from Fredersen’s face. While the eyelines and screen direction of both 
of these shots dramatically emphasizes the off-screen space immediately to the side of 
the frame (left, then right), the differences in the quality and size of the images—
compounded by the shift from medium shot to medium close-up and the neutral 
background of the curtain—nullifies the illusion of this space (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). 
Rather than standing in the same room, the men appear to inhabit different spaces 
entirely. What is more, these spaces appear limited to the borders of the image. In the 
second shot Rotwang’s hand seems to emerge out of nothing, and Fredersen’s look 
appears to terminate at the edge of the frame instead of extending beyond it.   
 After this image of Fredersen, the men argue in a two-shot. A close-up of 
Fredersen, and then one of Rotwang, follows this two-shot. In these two close-ups 
both men look directly at the camera. One of the images has the digital clarity of the 
2001 restoration; the other image has the rough-hewn planarity of the Buenos Aires 
footage. As Tom Gunning shows in his monograph on Lang, the director often uses 
the peculiar technique of cutting directly on the axis of action as a way to intensify an 
important encounter between characters; the technique also appears, for example, in 
the “Eternal Gardens” scene at the crucial moment when Freder and Maria (Brigitte 
Helm) meet, thereby causing Freder to go underground and setting the narrative in 
motion. In other words, Lang uses these shots to further the coherency of the narrative  
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Fig. 4.1                                           The Complete Metropolis (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2                                           The Complete Metropolis (2010) 
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and the diegetic universe.31 This effect relies heavily on the way the cut on the axis 
dramatically invokes the illusion of off-screen space “behind” the camera. In this 
instance in Hel’s room, however, the emphasis on this illusion only draws attention to 
its failure. Because of the differences in the images the characters’ looks do not have 
the impression of meeting. What Deleuze says of certain aspects of Godard’s work is 
apt here: “[T]he question is no longer that of the association or attraction of images. 
What counts is on the contrary the interstice between images, between two images: a 
spacing which means that each image is plucked from the void and falls back into 
it.”32 It is not only that these looks seem to fall on nothing, but also that they seem to 
emanate from a zone of great instability. What is palpable here is the way the film 
articulates the other aspect of the out-of-field, namely the whole. To reiterate what was 
detailed in chapter two, in the regime of the movement-image the whole is linked to 
montage. On this point, Deleuze writes, “[m]ontage is the determination of the 
whole…by means of continuities, cutting and false continuities. Eisenstein continually 
reminds us that montage is the whole of the film, the Idea.”33 The whole implies a 
formal unity. The individual image not only maintains a position within the space 
implied beyond the frame, but also within the formal scheme of the film in its entirety. 
Lang’s films are often celebrated in these terms. Each shot fits perfectly into the 
complex machinery of montage, hence the common descriptions of Lang as an 
                                                
31 Gunning, Films of Fritz Lang, 31.  
32 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 179.  
33 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 29.  
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engineer or architect, and the ubiquitous analogy of clockworks. The formal 
mechanics involved in the construction of the whole also have a spiritual, social, 
and/or political connotation. The workings of the whole express a certain 
understanding of the laws of the universe. There are thus the dialectics of nature in 
Eisenstein, or what Gunning calls the “Destiny-machine” in Lang (which I will return 
to below). In this way the whole as “Idea” forges an identity for a director as well as 
for his or her films.  
In the movement-image the two aspects of out-of-field are in constant tension. 
The more the whole is emphasized the less off-screen space comes into play, and vice 
versa. In contrast, with the time-image both aspects of the out-of-field are annulled. In 
Cinema 2, Deleuze flatly states, “[t]here is no more out-of-field.” In the regime of the 
time-image the cut functions primarily as an impetus of differentiation rather than 
association. Thus, Deleuze continues, “the interaction of two images engenders or 
traces a frontier which belongs to neither one nor the other.”34 In The Complete 
Metropolis this frontier belongs to another version of the film: the virtual Metropolis. 
The virtual is the “radical Elsewhere” that is generated by the cuts described above, 
and the “void” of which Deleuze speaks. This void is in no way a negative concept, or 
a lack. For Deleuze the virtual is abundance; it is the dimension in which the absolute 
difference of the simulacrum, its “becoming unlimited,” subsists. Put differently, the 
virtual is the immanent plane of difference from which this or that manifestation of a 
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thing, or this or that specific path through time, is actualized.35 The virtual Metropolis 
is thus an unspecified, undetermined, and unimagined version of the film. Somewhat 
like the titular book in Jorge Luis Borges’ “The Garden of Forking Paths,” the virtual 
Metropolis “embraces every possibility” for the film to mutate.36 It is not that The 
Complete Metropolis is an incomprehensible array of fragments—all the celebrations 
of its narrative completeness testify otherwise. Rather, the integrity of the film goes 
beyond itself to indicate an infinite potential for difference and for the production of 
an-other Metropolis. To say that The Complete Metropolis gives rise to a virtual 
Metropolis means that the identity of the film is made contingent and fluid. 
 This potential for difference is not simply a matter of editing, as if each image 
has its own immutable identity that may or may not link up with the images around it. 
Consider another moment in Scene 103. Directly after the close-ups of Fredersen and 
Rotwang there is a two-shot—from the 2001 restoration—of the two men squaring off 
in profile. An intertitle appears in which Rotwang declares that Hel is not dead for 
him, but in fact lives on (in the form of the robot, as we will shortly learn). An image 
then appears that is identical in composition to the previous shot, but from the Buenos 
Aires footage. The effect is similar to a restoration demonstration.  It is as if we are 
seeing the same shot in different stages of its life (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). Here, however,  
                                                
35 In the last essay published before his death, Deleuze provides a concise and moving account 
of such a virtuality, which he describes as a plane or field of “pure immanence,” vis-à-vis the 
life of humans. See “Immanence: A Life,” in Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, translated by 
Anne Boyman (New York: Zone, 2001), 25-34. 
36 Borges, “The Garden of Forking Paths,” 91. 
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Fig. 4.3                                           The Complete Metropolis (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4                                           The Complete Metropolis (2010) 
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the broad distinction between “before and after” (or, past and present) that is the main 
trope of these demonstrations is overtaken by the more profound difference of the 
simulacrum inherent in both images. In the worn second image Fredersen suddenly 
notices Rotwang’s mechanical hand. He gently takes the hand and pulls it toward him. 
The screen goes black for a split second. When the image returns—utilizing the same 
camera set-up, and again coming from the shabby 16mm footage—Rotwang is 
hoisting his mechanical hand in the air. The semblance of a jump cut in this moment is 
the result of black leader inserted in place of images either lost or too damaged for 
their content to be discernible. Instead of a contrast between before and after, what is 
produced here is a contrast between both images and the void that not only surrounds  
them, but also subsists within the space of the frame itself. In this sense the virtual is 
the potential for the surface of the image to mutate, in every grain and every pixel, 
across an endless field of gradations in appearance. 
  
*  *  *  *  * 
 
 In the last chapter, I stated that the great variety of time-images that populate 
Cinema 2 is due in large part to the variety of narrative contexts in which these images 
function. An analysis of the specificity of restored films in terms of the time-image 
must therefore also deal with narrative content. In the case of The Complete 
Metropolis, this perspective elucidates a potential politics of restoration as 
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simulacrum. Key in this respect is Gunning’s concept of the Destiny-machine, which 
suggests the way in which the intricate machinery of montage in Lang’s films operates 
as social critique. The Destiny-machine, Gunning writes, “stands in for the whole 
systematic nature of the modern world which Lang sees as a complex determining 
destiny.”37 Metropolis is unique for Gunning in the way the Destiny-machine is made 
into “manifest content” in the figure of the city as a vast machine of control where the 
lives of the workers are mechanized according to the rhythms of industrial labor and 
the quantification of time in the ten-hour shift.38 The clock is in fact a crucial emblem 
of the Destiny-machine in Lang and figures prominently in Fredersen’s office, which 
is the nerve center of the city. The grand narrative sweep of the film that ends in the 
widely lamented happy ending can also be seen as a manifestation of control. The final 
resolution between workers and management really changes nothing in the operation 
of the city and can even be seen as further consolidating Fredersen’s power.39  
 Of course, images play a key role in the city as levers of control. As Julia 
Dover argues, the use of images within the narrative speaks to the critiques of the 
mediascape of contemporary capitalism by thinkers like Baudrillard, Paul Virilio, and 
Neil Postman (and, I would add, Jameson).40 The locus of this aspect of the narrative 
                                                
37 Gunning, Films of Fritz Lang, 10. 
38 Ibid., 55. 
39 This common reading of the film’s ending was first, and most (in)famously, suggested by 
Siegfried Kracauer in From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film, 
ed. Leonardo Quaresima, revised edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
40 For a similar analysis of the film, see J.P. Telotte, “The Seductive Text of Metropolis,” in 
Replications: A Robotic History of the Science Fiction Film (Urbana-Champaign: University 
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is undoubtedly Rotwang’s robot, which is given the likeness of Maria. Here Lang 
levels a powerful critique against the deceptive power of images, as well as the 
concomitant spectacularization of the female body. The scene of the dance at the 
nightclub, for example, is rightfully famous in this regard. For Dover the film also 
highlights the limits of this type of critique, particularly in the work of Baudrillard, 
which she argues suffers from a large degree of cynicism and essentially precludes the 
possibility of transformative action. In Dover’s reading, the scene in which the 
workers finally turn on the imitation Maria and burn her at the stake functions as an 
allegory of the limits of a Baudrillardian critique. Such a critique can only lead to a 
nihilistic fervor for the destruction of the image. The fact that the destruction of the 
imitation Maria paves the way for the ostensibly happy ending, and thus the 
intensification of control, reveals how such nihilism creates a “social and physical 
paralysis whose stasis is catastrophic.”41 
 Deleuze cites Metropolis in a somewhat similar vein in the conclusion to 
Cinema 2: 
Cinema considered as psychomechanics, or spiritual 
automaton, is reflected in its own content, its themes, 
situations and characters. But the relationship is 
complicated, because this reflection gives way to 
                                                                                                                                       
of Illinois Press, 1995), 54-71; see also Peter Wollen, “Cinema/Americanism/The Robot,” new 
formations 8 (1989): 7-34.  
41 Dover, “The Imitation Game,” 285.  
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oppositions and inversions as well as to resolutions and 
reconciliations…If cinema is automatism become 
spiritual art…it confronts automata, not accidentally, but 
fundamentally. The French school [of montage] never 
lost its taste for clockwork automata and clock-making 
characters, but also confronted machines with moving 
parts, like the American or Soviet schools. The man-
machine assemblage varies from case to case, but 
always with the intention of posing the question of the 
future. And machines can take hold so fully of man that 
it awakens the most ancient powers…at the service of a 
frightening new order: this is the procession of 
somnambulists, the hallucinators, hypnotizers-
hypnotized in expressionism, from The Cabinet of Dr. 
Caligari to Testament of Dr. Mabuse via Metropolis and 
its robot. German cinema summoned up primitive 
powers, but was perhaps best placed to announce 
something new which was to change cinema, horribly to 
‘realize’ it and thus to modify its basic themes.42  
                                                
42 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 263. 
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By “spiritual art,” Deleuze means that cinema is an art that hews closely to the 
processes of thought. For Deleuze, there is a certain parallelism between the logics of 
time and the logics of thought; time is the medium and milieu of thought. Since 
cinema deals fundamentally with time, either indirectly or directly, it is a type of 
thinking-machine. Moreover, as the basic machinery of cinema works without human 
intervention, it is an automatic thinking-machine, a spiritual automaton. It is cinema’s 
ability to think that, according to Deleuze, fed the revolutionary hopes of the medium 
at the beginning of the twentieth century—for example, in Eisenstein’s theorization of 
“intellectual montage,” or Vertov’s “kino-eye.” In this tradition, Deleuze writes, “[t]he 
spiritual automaton no longer designates—as it did in classical philosophy—the 
logical or abstract possibility of formally deducing thoughts from each other, but the 
circuit into which they enter with the movement-image, the shared power of what 
forces thinking and what thinks under the shock.” But, of course, this power to send a 
shock to thought could and would be used for the most nefarious ends, which 
Benjamin already predicted at the end of “The Work of Art in the Age of Its 
Technological Reproducibility”—“the spiritual automaton,” Deleuze writes, “was in 
danger of becoming the dummy of every kind of propaganda: the art of the masses 
was already showing a disquieting face.” 43 Deleuze, following Siegfried Kracauer, 
thus sees the masses that blindly follow the robot Maria in Metropolis as prefiguring 
the masses led by fascist propaganda (hence German cinema as “best placed to 
                                                
43 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 156, 157. 
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announce something new”), and later, as Horkheimer and Adorno powerfully argue, 
by the cinema as the cornerstone of the culture industry.44  
  Following Deleuze’s formulation: How, then, does The Complete Metropolis 
pose the question of the future? Given the strict isomorphism Gunning identifies in the 
film between the formal operations of Lang’s Destiny-machine and the narrative 
content, in The Complete Metropolis the breakdown of the former cannot help but 
affect the latter. Rather than isomorphism, there is opposition between the opening of 
the Destiny-machine to the “mad” difference of the simulacrum and the iron necessity 
of the city’s regime. In the midst of this tension the sense of the narrative’s closure of 
possibility loses much of its power, and the regime loses its grip on fate. The 
machinery of the city churns on, but the naturalness of its order is called into question. 
                                                
44 See Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler (ch.4, n. 38); and Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. 
Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by Edmund Jephcott, edited by Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 94-136. Deleuze further reflects on 
this development as follows: “How strangely the great declarations, of Eisenstein, of Gance, 
ring today; we put them to one side like declarations worthy of a museum, all the hope put 
into cinema, art of the masses and new thought. We can always say that cinema has drowned 
in the nullity of its productions. What becomes of Hitchcock’s suspense, Eisenstein’s shock 
and Gance’s sublimity when they are taken up by mediocre authors? When the violence is no 
longer that of the image and its vibrations but that of the represented, we move into a blood-
red arbitrariness. When grandeur is no longer that of the composition, but a pure and simple 
inflation of the represented, there is no cerebral stimulation or birth of thought. It is rather a 
generalized shortcoming in author and viewers. Nevertheless a current mediocrity has never 
prevented great painting; but it is not the same in the conditions of an industrial art, where the 
proportion of disgraceful works calls the most basic goals and capacities directly into 
question. Cinema is dying, then, from its quantitative mediocrity. But there is a still more 
important reason: the mass-art, the treatment of the masses, which should not have been 
separable from an accession of the masses to the status of true subject, has degenerated into 
state propaganda and manipulation, into a kind of fascism that brought together Hitler and 
Hollywood, Hollywood and Hitler. The spiritual automaton became fascist man.” Cinema 2, 
164. 
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The role of the image in this order is put into question as well. Because the challenge 
to the order of the city comes from the footage itself—the clash of its singular internal 
histories—the image is drawn away from being simply a tool of domination, and is 
thus presented as a terrain of struggle that maintains the possibility of a radical 
cinema. 
 In Gunning’s analysis there is also a certain challenge to the city-machine. This 
challenge comes from within the machine itself. It is the ruthless energy of the 
machine taken to the extreme point at which it becomes a force of total destruction and 
death. This apocalyptic tendency can be seen in the workers turned into a violent mob, 
in Freder’s vision of the Moloch, and most explicitly in the figure of the Grim Reaper 
that confronts Freder in the throes of a delirium. In The Complete Metropolis these 
elements of destruction take on a new meaning. Insofar as they represent a challenge 
to the order of the Destiny-machine, or the repetition of identity (i.e. the same), these 
aspects of the narrative allow the formal effects of the simulacrum to enter the story as 
manifest content. Here death indicates not a higher destiny and a terminal limit, but the 
presence of a radical unknown lodged within the present.  
 There are two moments in The Complete Metropolis in which this aspect of the 
figure of death assumes particular force. The first occurs when a vision of the Reaper, 
represented in the typical manner as a skeleton wearing a long robe and carrying a 
massive scythe, bears down on Freder. The Reaper approaches the camera, and swings 
its scythe. In a reverse-shot of the cowering Freder, a scratch slices across the surface  
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Fig. 4.5                                           The Complete Metropolis (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.6                                           The Complete Metropolis (2010) 
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of the image (Figures 4.5 and 4.6). In this moment, Gunning writes, “Lang images 
Death’s attack as an attack on the film image itself.”45 In the context of The Complete 
Metropolis this attack on the film image places the figure of death directly in line with 
the manipulations wrought by time and restoration and thus with the limitlessness of 
the simulacrum. The second moment comes when the false Maria is burned at the 
stake. As the image of Maria melts away, the lifeless metal chassis of the robot is 
revealed. There is yet another close-up of a direct look at the camera. This time it is 
the inscrutable eyes of the robot. The eerie quality of this shot is perfectly described 
by Marc Vernet in his taxonomy of ways of looking at the camera as the look of “the 
Invisible, the Elsewhere, Death.”46 What appears is not the total destruction of the 
image, but a different sort of image. Beyond imitation there is the beguiling image of 
the void: the simulacrum.  
 This scene provides a compact allegory of the potential politics of restoration, 
and the time-image more generally, as simulacrum. Indeed, Deleuze argues that the 
time-image also carries the revolutionary potential that Eisenstein, Vertov, and others 
developed in the regime of the movement-image, albeit in a drastically different form. 
In chapter two, I argued that one of the political aspects of the movement-image, 
which I aligned with Jameson’s concept of cognitive mapping, is the totalizing logic 
of that envisions the whole. The politics of the time-image, at least as presented in the 
second half of Cinema 2, operate quite differently. Here Deleuze articulates a new 
                                                
45 Gunning, Films of Fritz Lang, 75. 
46 Vernet, “The Look at the Camera,” 50. 
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conception of the spiritual automaton by way of Antonin Artaud, and then Jean-Louis 
Schefer:  
[I]t is no longer thought which confronts repression, the 
unconscious, dream, sexuality or death, as in 
expressionism (and also in surrealism), it is all these 
determinations…which enter into relation with the 
undeterminable, the unreferable…It is indeed, a matter, 
as Artaud puts it, ‘of bringing cinema together with the 
innermost reality of the brain,’ but this innermost reality 
is not the Whole, but on the contrary a fissure, a crack. 
As long as he believes in cinema, he credits it, not with 
the power of making us think the whole, but on the 
contrary with a ‘dissociative force’ which would 
introduce a ‘figure of nothingness,’ a ‘hole in 
appearances’…what forces us to think is ‘the inpower 
[impouvoir] of thought,’ the figure of nothingness, the 
inexistence of a whole which could be 
thought…[Schefer] says that the cinematographic 
image…carries out a suspension of the world or affects 
the visible with a disturbance…directed to what does 
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not let itself be thought in thought, and equally what 
does not let itself be seen in vision.47  
Within the Destiny-machine, what “does not let itself be thought in thought,” and what 
“does not let itself be seen in vision,” is precisely the immanence of absolute 
difference, or the incommensurable void of time’s eternal transformation. Thus, in The 
Complete Metropolis, when the virtuality of the simulacrum is embodied in the death 
mask of the robot, it operates, like the tear in the image opened by Death’s scythe, as a 
hole in the appearance of the present. In the face of this unfathomable thing the crowd 
rears back in shock. At this late point in the film the narrative is leading towards the 
happy ending at breakneck speed. Yet when the robot is revealed the narrative is 
suspended. There is a kind of short-circuit in the Destiny-machine, and everything is 
suddenly thrown into question, if only for a moment. Rather than a mapping of the 
totality of capital, or an articulation of class struggle, or some sort of Party program, 
the simulacrum simply shows, as Deleuze puts it, “the fact that we are not yet 
thinking.”48 If we are not yet thinking, it is because we follow the pre-inscribed 
cognitive pathways and cultural circuits of the Destiny-machine. The absolute 
difference of the simulacrum reveals the constraints of this doxa as such. And at the 
center of this mini-drama: the hard stare of the automaton, posing the question of 
cinema’s future. 
                                                
47 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 167-8. 
48 Ibid., 167.  
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Conclusion 
Cinema On the Brink 
 
 
 
 
Kairòs is the power to observe the fullness of temporality 
itself on the void of being, and of seizing this opening as 
innovation. 
 —Antonio Negri, Time for Revolution 
 
 
 
 
The question of the future of cinema is, by its nature, largely unanswerable. 
Put differently, any full answer to the question would preclude the question itself. In 
any event, the question is not one, but many. One formulation might be: How can film 
restoration, or even the new materialism of cinema more generally, function as a 
political practice? In chapter one, I attempted to point toward one way of answering 
this question through the notion of film heritage as an “institution of the common.” In 
chapter four, I tried to offer another possible answer with the concept of restoration as 
simulacrum. Yet beyond an abstract approach to the “original,” there is no strict 
formula for generating the simulacrum in film restoration; there is no specific filmic 
technique or formal program. Such a project can only be evaluated in its effects, and 
only further experiments in restoration—perhaps many more incarnations of 
Metropolis, for example—can generate such effects. In lieu of offering yet another 
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possible answer to the question of cinema’s future, I will conclude this dissertation by 
instead extending the parameters of the question, shifting its terms and moving 
laterally from the void in the time-image to the void in Negri’s philosophy of time. 
This re-posing of the question will touch on much of what has been written in the 
preceding pages, and ultimately return to the materialism of cinema.   
 Negri discusses the void at length in the first main section of “Kairòs, Alma 
Venus, Multitudo,” published as the second half of Time for Revolution. Here, the 
meaning of the void is roughly consistent with the way Deleuze uses the void in the 
pages of Cinema 2 cited in chapter four. Void is the immanence of difference, or what 
Deleuze calls the “inexplicable, the undecidable, the incommensurable” within the 
present.1 The difference between Deleuze’s void and Negri’s void is analogous to the 
difference Casarino points to between Deleuze’s concept of the simulacrum, and the 
simulacrum as it appears in Guibert’s novel: whereas in Cinema 2 Deleuze is mainly 
concerned with the productivity of the void, or what it forces us to think—“it can only 
think one thing, the fact that we are not yet the thinking”—in “Kairòs, Alma Venus, 
Multitudo,” Negri is mainly concerned with the production of the void.2 
 This approach to the void revolves around Negri’s concept of kairòs:  
In the classical conception of time, kairòs is the instant, 
that is to say, the quality of the time of the instant, the 
moment of rupture and the opening of temporality. It is 
                                                
1 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 214. 
2 Ibid., 167. 
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the present, but a singular and open present. Kairòs is 
the modality of time through which being opens itself, 
attracted by the void at the limit of time, and it thus 
decides to fill that void…if consciousness perceives 
kairòs ambiguously, as ‘being on the brink,’ as ‘being 
on a razor’s edge,’ i.e. as the instant in which the ‘archer 
looses the arrow,’ then kairòs becomes the restlessness 
of temporality…being’s act of leaning out over the void 
of the time to-come, i.e. the adventure beyond the edge 
of time.3  
This “opening” and “restlessness” of temporality is the same temporality as that 
constructed in the time-image as simulacrum. Yet Negri draws this temporality 
towards an ontological state—“being on the brink”—that is itself restless and 
dynamic, an act of “leaning out.” He then pushes this definition further:  
 Kairòs is the power to observe the fullness of 
temporality itself on the void of being, and of seizing 
this opening as innovation…Situated within the power 
of production of being, it is also the construction of the 
telos of generation. It is this production, that is to say, 
this generation, which we call praxis. 
                                                
3 Negri, Time for Revolution, 152. 
 
 
263 
    The power of kairòs, as the passage from fullness to 
the void and as production of being on the edge of time, 
is now the backdrop—better still, the articulation and the 
schema—of praxis.4 
The void is articulated to kairòs, which in turn is articulated to praxis. The 
confrontation with kairòs is not only linked to observing the void, but is also 
inseparable from “seizing” it in an act of creation. 
 What is presupposed here is the argument made in Negri’s earlier essay, “The 
Constitution of Time,” which I discussed in chapter three, and which is largely 
summed up by Negri when he writes, “time itself becomes the fabric of the whole of 
being, because all of being is implicated in the web of the relations of production: 
being is equal to product of labour: temporal being.”5 From one perspective, which I 
dwelled on in chapter three, this conflation of time and labor is manifested as the 
immanence of exchange-value or, really, capitalist control, to life in general. Radical 
difference is evacuated from time and life such that the present order is rendered as 
destiny; the future is given as “the identical repetition of what has already happened.” 
“From this point of view,” Negri writes, “the future means that which persists…the 
restlessness of time is subjected to the continuity of space.”6  Negri’s concept of kairòs 
gives a radically different perspective of this development in capital. If there is a 
                                                
4 Negri, Time for Revolution, 158. 
5 Ibid., 34.  
6 Ibid., 162.  
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restless and open dimension to temporality, and there is a conflation of time and labor, 
or time and life, then, Negri contends, it is possible to not only confront kairòs 
directly, but also to inhabit it and seize it as a form of life and an act of creation. These 
moments do not come from outside the command of capital, but rather puncture it 
internally, and thus “appear to us as fireworks and flares rather than as a secure 
trajectory of physical time.”7 For Negri, this is the radical underside of post-Fordism.  
 These moments of kairòs can be small and intimate. It is important to note that 
Negri wrote both of these essays on time while in prison. He thus launches his concept 
of kairòs with a meditation on his own thinking and writing; at the extreme end of the 
command over time, and with nothing but time, Negri constructs and affirms his own 
monad of kairòs in the creation of the concept itself. Articulated to praxis, kairòs is 
thus articulated to the power of the imagination and the tenacity of the will, which for 
Negri is at the core of militancy—in a letter from 1988, after his first term in prison, 
he writes: “We have to live this dead reality, this mad transition [i.e. post-Fordism] in 
the same way we lived prison, as a strange and ferocious way of reaffirming life.”8 
From this nodal point of the imagination, “Kairòs, Alma Venus, Multitudo” then 
moves slowly outward across the social landscape, and Negri tries to articulate kairòs 
as a way to imagine rebellion and revolt. Unsurprisingly, this movement outward also 
                                                
7 Negri, Time for Revolution, 47. 
8 Negri, “Letter to Gianmarco on the Abstract,” 9. In an interview with Negri, Deleuze poses 
something similar in terms of belief: “What we lack most is a belief in the world, we’ve quite 
lost the world, it’s been taken from us. If you believe in the world you precipitate events, 
however inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times, however small 
their surface or volume.” Gilles Deleuze, “Control and Becoming,” in Negotiations: 1972-
1990, translated by Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 156. 
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precipitates a movement into greater abstraction. The will is there, but the imagination 
falters against isolation. Yet, the form the essay takes at this point actually helps 
proves what Negri is trying to say here: kairòs thrives in and through the common. Put 
differently, in order to be adequately thought and experienced at the level of the global 
system of capital, kairòs must become “the subjective event of the multitude”9 Here, 
the power of imagination “invests the machine of the general intellect,” and “makes of 
it the machine of metamorphic events of the common subject.”10 For Negri, it is in this 
common kairòs, traversed by immaterial labor, that the multitude becomes a political 
subject and the production of the void coincides with the production of a bifurcation in 
history.  
 This invocation of the multitude takes us back to some of the ideas discussed 
in chapter two. I began there with cognitive mapping as a form of class-consciousness. 
As Jameson argues, the complexities of global capital pose new challenges to 
cognitive mapping. One difficulty Jameson points to is the relative representational 
poverty of information technology—e.g. the visual banality of the computer. In a 
similar vein, one might point to the visual banality of immaterial labor. Against the 
charging motors, sweat, and muscle of Man With the Movie Camera, the image of a 
workstation operator painting a digital image, for example, is arguably lacking in 
                                                
9 Negri, Time for Revolution, 258. Earlier, Negri writes: “The event is determined through the 
constellation of singularities, realizing the telos of the common in active form from 
below…The event becomes subject. The metamorphosis of bodies and the constitution of 
subjects interlink in the event…The singular constellations present themselves as the machine 
of a common subjectivity. The subjective decision is the expression of this machine, and the 
event is its production.” Time for Revolution, 255-6.  
10 Ibid., 256. 
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inspiration. More challenging still would be the visualization of something like the 
multitude becoming-subject. Indeed, I ended that chapter by suggesting that the “eye 
of the common” articulated in Decasia still lacks a body and a collective subject.  
In Cinema 2, in the chapter immediately following the conceptualization of a 
new spiritual automaton, Deleuze addresses a similar challenge. Here, in some of the 
most explicitly political pages to be found in both Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, Deleuze 
drifts in the direction taken by Negri, and segues from the confrontation with the void 
into a discussion of collective subjectivity. Deleuze states: “For in classical cinema, 
the people are there, even though they are oppressed, tricked, subject, even though 
blind or unconscious…the people are already there…Hence the idea that cinema, as an 
art of the masses, could be the supreme revolutionary or democratic art, which makes 
the masses a true subject.” In contrast, Deleuze argues, if there is to be a contemporary 
political cinema, “it would be on this basis: the people no longer exist, or not yet…the 
people are missing.”11 Thus, Deleuze continues, “[a]rt, and especially cinematographic 
art, must take part in this task: not that of addressing a people, but of contributing to 
                                                
11 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 216. “Soviet cinema is an example: the people are already there in 
Eisenstein, who shows them performing a qualitative leap in The General Line (Old and New), 
or who, in Ivan the Terrible, makes them the advanced edge held in check by the tsar…and in 
Vertov and Dovzhenko, in two different ways, there is unanimity which calls the different 
peoples into the same melting-pot from which the future emerges. But unanimity is also the 
political character of American cinema before and during the war: this time, it is not the twists 
and turns of class struggle and the confrontation of ideologies, but the economic crises, the 
fight against moral prejudice, profiteers and demagogues, which mark the awareness of a 
people, at the lowest point of their misfortune as well as at the peak of their hope (the 
unanimism of King Vidor, Capra, or Ford, for the problem runs through the Western as much 
as through the social drama, both testifying to the existence of a people, in hardships as well as 
in ways of recovering and rediscovering itself).” Deleuze, Cinema 2, 216. 
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the invention of a people…the missing people are a becoming, they invent 
themselves…in new conditions of struggle to which a necessarily political art must 
contribute.”12 “Not yet,” and “a becoming,” the “people” are what is constituted in, to 
return to Negri’s formulation, “leaning out over the void of the time to-come.” The 
nature of the contribution of political cinema to this constitution of the subject is also 
not yet formed. Coming on the heels of Deleuze’s conceptualization of a new spiritual 
automaton, one meaning of this contribution could be a strategic construction of the 
simulacrum, that is, one in symbiosis with “new conditions of struggle.” In very 
different terms, but which might amount to something similar, it could also be the 
cognitive mapping of a common kairòs, “surveying over the edge of time.”13  
The condition of being not yet in existence perfectly describes the multitude as 
political subject. Indeed, Hardt and Negri use Deleuze’s line, “the people no longer 
exist, or not yet…the people are missing,” as the epigraph to the final section of 
Empire, where they first lay out the concept of the multitude. Starting from this point, 
Hardt and Negri pose the virtuality of the multitude: “By virtual we understand the set 
of powers to act (being, loving, transforming, creating) that reside in the multitude.” In 
other words, what is virtual is labor power, since this power is a potential, rather than 
an act or a thing. As such, labor power is “productive excess with respect to the 
existing order and the rules of reproduction…and the substance of the new social 
                                                
12 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 217.  
13 Negri, Time for Revolution, 158. 
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virtuality of labor’s productive and liberatory capacities.”14 From this perspective, the 
immanence of difference that appears in the simulacrum slides into the immanence of 
the potential to act, transform, and create; the confrontation with “the fact that we are 
not yet thinking” is also a confrontation with the potential for thought. The ontology 
of time intersects with the ontology of labor—temporal being—and politics becomes 
“a field of pure immanence.”15 Furthermore, within the regime of immaterial labor this 
manifold potential “is constantly constituted as a common thing…The power to act is 
constituted by labor, intelligence, passion, and affect in one common place. ”16   
 In chapter one I argued that this virtuality, the virtuality of the common 
productive and liberatory capacities of labor, is colored by film history; the common, 
from this perspective, is a cinematic common. In this virtuality the past and the future 
of cinema bleed together, and brush against the future of the multitude. The question 
of a political cinema must therefore be posed today in relation to this virtuality—
illuminating it, enriching it, and actualizing it, on the brink. For Negri, this also 
constitutes the very definition of materialism:  
[I]f one acts at the level of immanence, duration—that 
is, the duration of existence—has any meaning and 
make any sense only to the extent to which one risks it 
as void. Any of our experiences verifies and attests to 
                                                
14 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 357.  
15 Ibid., 354.  
16 Ibid., 358. 
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our exposure to the void, to chance, to a truly regal 
contingency. And that’s what materialism is! If 
materialism were not this absoluteness of our precarious 
condition, this absoluteness of a coming or future 
condition founded on doing, making, producing—
materialism would simply not exist. Each one of us 
builds on the void: any form or presence is a bridge that 
we cast over the void.17  
In this sense, another formulation of the materialism of cinema might be: any image is 
a bridge that we cast over the void. 
 
                                                
17 Casarino and Negri, In Praise of the Common, 121. 
270 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
Agamben, Giorgio. The Coming Community. Translated by Michael Hardt. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.  
Balsom, Erika. “A Cinephilic Avant-garde: The Films of Peter Tscherkassky, Martin 
Arnold, and Gustav Deutsch.” In New Austrian Film, edited by Robert Von 
Dassanowsky and Oliver C. Speck, 263-75. New York: Berghahn Books, 
2011. 
Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. Translated by Richard 
Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1981.  
Barr, Charles. Vertigo. 2nd Edition. London: BFI, 2012. 
Bazin, André. “The Ontology of the Photographic Image.” In What is Cinema? Vol. 1. 
Translated by Hugh Gray. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. 
Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: 
Second Version.” In Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Vol. 3 (1935-1938), 
translated by Edmund Jephcott, Howard Eiland, et al., edited by Howard 
Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, 101-34. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2002. 
Beller, Jonathan. The Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy and the 
Society of the Spectacle. Lebanon, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2006.  
Belton, John. “Getting It Right: Robert Harris on Colour Restoration.” Film History 
12.3 (2000): 393-409. 
Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. Translated by Arthur Mitchell. Mineola: Dover, 
1998.  
——. Matter and Memory. Translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. 
London: George Allen & Co., 1913.  
Bertellini, Giorgio. “Restoration, genealogy and palimpsests. On some 
historiographical questions.” Film History 7.3 (1995): 277-90. 
Borde, Raymond. “Film Restoration: Ethical Problems.” In Protection and 
Preservation of Films, edited by Ramon Espelt, 90-8. Barcelona: Oficina 
Catalana de cinema, 1988. 
Borges, Jorge Luis. “The Garden of Forking Paths.” Translated by Helen Temple and 
Ruthven Todd. In Ficciones, edited by Anthony Kerrigan, 89-104. New York: 
Grove Press, 1926. 
271 
 
Böser, Ursula. “Inscriptions of Light and The ‘Calligraphy of Decay:’ Volatile 
Representation in Bill Morrison’s Decasia.” In Avant-Garde Film, edited by 
Alexander Graf and Dietrich Scheunemann, 305-20. Amsterdam: Editions 
Rodopi B.V., 2007.  
——. “Memories are Made of This: Bill Morrison’s The Film of Her.” senses of 
cinema 41 (November 2006). http://sensesofcinema.com/2006/41/morrison-
film-of-her/ (accessed February 15, 2013).   
Boxer, Sarah. “Where a Film’s Gooey Bits are the Real Showstoppers.” The New York 
Times, December 3, 2002. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/03/movies/critic-
s-notebook-where-a-film-s-gooey-bits-are-the-real-
showstoppers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (accessed May 3, 2013). 
Brown, Royal S. “Back From Among the Dead: The Restoration of Alfred 
Hitchcock’s Vertigo.” Cineaste 23.1 (July 1997): 4-9. 
Busche, Andreas. “Just Another Form of Ideology? Ethical and Methodological 
Principles in Film Restoration.” The Moving Image 6.2 (2006): 1-26. 
Carroll, Nathan. “Unwrapping Archives: DVD Restoration Demonstrations and the 
Marketing of Authenticity.” The Velvet Light Trap 56 (2005): 18-31.  
Casarino, Cesare. “The Simulacrum of AIDS.” Parallax 11.2 (2005): 60-72. 
Casarino, Cesare, and Antonio Negri. In Praise of the Common: A Conversation on 
Philosophy and Politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. 
Cavell, Stanley. The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film. Enlarged 
Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.  
Cherchi Usai, Paolo. The Death of Cinema: History, Cultural Memory, and the Digital 
Dark Age. London: BFI, 2001.  
——. Silent Cinema: An Introduction. London: BFI, 2000. 
Cheshire, Godfrey. “The Death of Film/The Decay of Cinema.” New York Press, 
December 30, 1999. http://nypress.com/the-death-of-film-the-decay-of-
cinema/ (accessed July 28, 2013).  
Citron, Alan. “Value in the Vault.” Los Angeles Times, May 29, 1990. 
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-05-29/business/fi-153_classic-film (accessed 
February 1, 2013). 
Connolly, Kate. “Metropolis, mother of sci-fi movies, reborn in Berlin,” Guardian, 
February 11 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2010/feb/11/metropolis-
fritz-lang-berlin (accessed January 2, 2011). 
Dargis, Manohla. “Napoleon Is Lost, Long Live Napoleon!” New York Times, March 
16, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/movies/the-many-lives-of-abel-
gances-napoleon.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (accessed August 25, 2013). 
De Lauretis, Teresa, and Stephen Heath, eds. The Cinematic Apparatus. London: 
Macmillan, 1980. 
Debord, Guy. Society of the Spectacle. Detroit: Black & Red, 1983.  
272 
 
Deleuze, Gilles. “The Actual and the Virtual.” Translated by Eliot Ross Albert. In 
Dialogues II, by Deleuze and Claire Parnet, 148-59. New York: Continuum, 
1987. 
——. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.  
——. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.  
——. The Logic of Sense. Edited by Constantin V. Boundas, translated by Mark 
Lester with Charles Stivale. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 
——. “What is a dispositif?” In Michel Foucault, Philosopher, translated and edited 
by Timothy J. Armstrong. New York: Routledge, 1992. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987.  
Dixon, Wheeler Winston. “Twenty-five Reasons Why It’s All Over.” In The End of 
Cinema As We Know It: American Film in the Nineties, edited by Jon Lewis, 
356-66. New York: NYU Press, 2001. 
Doane, Mary Ann. “The Index and the Concept of Medium Specificity.” differences: 
A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 18.1 (2007): 128-52.  
Dover, “The Imitation Game: Paralysis and Response in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis and 
Contemporary Critiques of Technology.” In Fritz Lang’s Metropolis: 
Cinematic Visions of Technology and Fear, edited by Michael Minden and 
Holger Bachmann, 272-88. Rochester: Camden House, 2000. 
Easton, Nina J. “Sony to Cash in on Columbia’s Cache.” Los Angeles Times, 
September 29, 1989. http://articles.latimes.com/1989-09-29/entertainment/ca-
155_1_columbia-pictures (accessed November 10, 2012).  
Elsaesser, Thomas. Metropolis. London: BFI, 2000. 
Enticknap, Leo. “Electronic Enlightenment or the Digital Dark Age? Anticipating 
Film in an Age Without Film.” Quarterly Review of Film and Video 26.5 
(2009): 415-24.  
——. “Some Bald Assertion by an Ignorant and Badly Educated Frenchman: 
Technology, Film Criticism, and the Restoration of Vertigo (1996).” The 
Moving Image 4.1 (2004): 130-41. 
Epstein, Robert. “Mining Hollywood’s Old Movie Gold.” Los Angeles Times, July 16, 
1992. F1. 
Ernst, Wolfgang and Harun Farocki. “Towards an Archive for Visual Concepts.” 
Translated by Robin Curtis. In Harun Farocki: Working on the Sight-Lines, 
edited by Thomas Elsaesser, 261-86. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2004.  
Farocki, Harun. “Workers Leaving the Factory.” Translated by Laurent Faasch-
Ibrahim. In Harun Farocki: Working on the Sight-Lines, edited by Thomas 
Elsaesser, 237-43.  
273 
 
Fisher, Bob. “Off to Work We Go: The Digital Restoration of Snow White.” American 
Cinematographer 74.9 (1993): 48-54. 
Foucault, Michel. “The Confession of the Flesh.” Translated by Alain Grosrichard. In 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77, edited by 
Colin Gordon, 194-228. New York: Pantheon, 1980.  
——. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” Translated by Donald F. Brouchard and 
Sherry Simon. In The Essential Foucault: Selections from the Essential Works 
of Foucault 1954-1984, edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, 351-69. 
New York: The New Press, 2003.  
Frick, Caroline. Saving Cinema: The Politics of Preservation. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011. 
Gunning, Tom. The Films of Fritz Lang: Allegories of Vision and Modernity. London: 
BFI, 2000.  
——. “Film ist. A Primer for a Visual World.” 
http://www.gustavdeutsch.net/index.php/en/shop/91-film-ist-eine-fibel-fuer-
eine-sichtbare-welt.html (accessed February 3, 2013).  
——. “From Fossils of Time to a Cinematic Genesis.” 
http://www.gustavdeutsch.net/index.php/en/bibliography/80-from-fossils-of-
time-to-a-cinematic-genesis-gustav-deutschs-film-ist-.html (accessed February, 
9, 2013). 
Habib, André. “Ruin, Archive and the Time of Cinema: Peter Delpeut’s Lyrical 
Nitrate.” SubStance 35.2 (2006): 120-39.  
——. “Thinking in the Ruins: Around the Films of Bill Morrison.” Offscreen 8.11 
(November 2004). 
http://www.horschamp.qc.ca/new_offscreen/cinematic_ruins.html (accessed 
May 10, 2013).  
Hardt, Michael. “Affective Labor.” Boundary 2 26.2 (1999): 89-100.  
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Commonwealth. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2009.  
——. Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.  
——. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. New York: Penguin 
Press, 2004.  
Heath, Stephen. “The Cinematic Apparatus: Technology as Historical and Cultural 
Form.” In The Cinematic Apparatus, edited by Teresea De Lauretis and 
Stephen Heath, 1-13. 
Henderson, Stephen. “Teaching New Generations the Joys of Old Movies.” New York 
Times, June 8, 1997, 29-30.  
Hoberman, J. “Back to Nature.” The Village Voice, March 18, 2003. 
http://www.villagevoice.com/2003/-03-18/film/back-to-nature/2/ (accessed 
May 14, 2013).  
Houston, Penelope. Keepers of the Frame: The Film Archives. London: BFI, 1994. 
274 
 
Grainge, Paul. “Reclaiming Heritage: Colorization, Culture Wars and the Politics of 
Nostalgia.” Cultural Studies 13.4 (1999): 621-38.  
James, David E. Allegories of Cinema: American Film in the Sixties. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989.  
Jameson, Fredric. “Class and Allegory in Contemporary Mass Culture: Dog Day 
Afternoon as a Political Film.” In Signatures of the Visible, 47-74. New York: 
Routledge, 1992. 
——. The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.  
——. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1991.  
——. A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present. London: Verso, 
2002. 
Jones, Jonathan. “Ghost World.” Guardian, September 25, 2003. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2003/sep/26/art (accessed April 16, 2013).  
Jovanovic, Stefan. “The Ending(s) of Cinema: Notes on the Recurrent Demise of the 
Seventh Art, Parts. 1 and 2.” Offscreen 7.4 (April 2003). 
http://www.horschamp.qc.ca/new_offscreen/death_cinema.html (accessed July 
21, 2013).  
Klinger, Barbara. Beyond the Multiplex: Cinema, New Technologies, and the Home. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.  
Kula, Sam. “Introduction: Moving Image/American Image.” The American Film 
Heritage: Impressions from the American Film Institute Archives, edited by 
Kathleen Karr and Tom Shale, 9-13. Washington, D.C.: Acropolis, 1972. 
Manovich, Lev. The Language of New Media. Cambridge: Leonardo-MIT Press, 2002. 
Marrati, Paola. Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy. Translated by Alisa Hartz. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008.  
Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. 1. Translated by Ben 
Fowkes. New York: Vintage, 1976. 
——. Grundrisse. Translated by Martin Nicolaus. London: Penguin, 1993.  
National Film Preservation Act of 1988, Public Law 100-446, 100th Cong., 2nd sess. 
(September 27, 1988).  
Negri, Antonio. “Letter to Gianmarco on the Abstract.” In Art and Multitude, 
translated by Ed Emery, 3-12. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2011.  
——. Time for Revolution. Translated by Matteo Mandarini. New York: Continuum, 
2003. 
Morrison, Bill. “Decasia.” www.decasia.com/html/highangle.html (accessed January 
10, 2008). 
Murch, Walter. “A Digital Cinema of the Mind? Could be.” New York Times, May 2, 
1999. http://filmsound.org/theory/nyt5.htm (accessed July 10, 2013). 
Paletz, Gabriel M., “Archives and Archivists Remade: The Paper Print Collection and 
The Film of Her.” The Moving Image 1.1 (2001): 68-93. 
275 
 
Patalas, Enno. “Metropolis: Scene 103.” Translated by Miriam Hansen. Cinema 
Obscura 5.3 (1986): 165-73. 
Peck, Gregory. “Foreword.” The American Film Heritage: Impressions from the 
American Film Institute Archives, edited by Kathleen Karr and Tom Shale. 
Pinel, Vincent. “Film Restoration.” In Protection and Preservation of Films, edited by 
Ramon Espelt, 80-9. 
Pomerance, Murray. “The Man Who Wanted to Go Back.” In The End of Cinema As 
We Know It: American Film in the Nineties, edited by Jon Lewis, 43-9.  
Rancière, Jacques. “The Ethical Turn of Aesthetics and Politics.” In Dissensus: On 
Politics and Aesthetics, edited and translated by Steven Corcoran, 184-202. 
London: Continuum, 2010. 
——. “A Fable without a Moral: Godard, Cinema, (Hi)stories.” In Film Fables, 
translated by Emiliano Battista, 171-87. Oxford: Berg, 2006. 
——. The Future of the Image. Translated by Gregory Elliot. London: Verso, 2007. 
Rodowick, D.N. The Virtual Life of Film. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. 
Rosen, Phillip. Change Mummified: Cinema, Historicity, Theory. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2001.  
——. The Future of the Image. Translated by Gregory Elliot. London: Verso, 2007.  
Sartre, Jean-Paul, The Psychology of Imagination. New York: Philosophical Library, 
1948. 
Scorsese, Martin. “Preface.” The Death of Cinema: History, Cultural Memory, and the 
Digital Dark Age, by Paolo Cherchi Usai. 
Sherman, Stratford P. “Ted Turner: Back from the Brink.” Fortune, July 7, 1986, 24-
31. 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1986/07/07/67824/in
dex.htm (accessed December 3, 2012).  
Slide, Anthony. Nitrate Won’t Wait: A History of Film in the United States. Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland Classics, 2000. 
Sontag, Susan. “The Decay of Cinema.” New York Times Magazine, February 25, 
1996. http://partners.nytimes.com/books/00/03/12/specials/sontag-cinema.html 
(accessed June 10, 2013).   
Smith, Jason. “Preface.” The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy, by Franco 
Berardi. Translated by Francesca Cadel and Giuseppina Mecchia. Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2009. 
Steyerl, Hito. “Is a Museum a Factory?” In The Wretched of the Screen, edited by 
Julieta Aranda, Brian Kuan Wood, and Anton Vidokle, 61-77. Berlin: e-flux-
Sternberg, 2012. 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. 1972. 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/ (accessed February 7, 2013).  
276 
 
——. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. 2003. 
http:// portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=17716&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_ 
 SECTION=201.html (accessed September 15, 2012).  
——. “Intangible Heritage Lists.” 2008-2011.  
 http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index:php?pg=00011 (accessed January 30, 
2013). 
——. Recommendation for the Safeguarding and Preservation of Moving Images. 
1980. http://portal.unesco. org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13139&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
(accessed September 15, 2012).  
Vernet, Marc. “The Look at the Camera.” Translated by Dana Polan. Cinema Journal 
28.2 (1989): 48-63. 
Vertov, Dziga. “Kino-Eye.” In Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov, edited by 
Annette Michelson, translated by Kevin O’Brien, 60-78. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1984.  
Virno, Paolo. “Notes on the ‘General Intellect.’” Translated by Cesare Casarino. 
Polygraph 6/7 (1993): 32-8.  
——. A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life. 
Translated by Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito, and Andrea Casson. Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004.  
Wagner, Craig A. “Motion Picture Colorization, Authenticity and the Elusive Moral 
Right.” New York University Law Review 64, no. 3 (1989): 638-725. 
Weschler, “Sublime Decay.” The New York Times, December 22, 2003. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/22/magazine/22DECAY.html?pagewanted=
all (accessed May 2, 2013). 
Wollen, Peter. “Compulsion: Was Hitchcock a Closet Surrealist?” Sight and Sound 7.4 
(1997): 14-18. 
Wood, Robin. Hitchcock’s Films Revisited. Revised Edition. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002. 
Zourabichvili, François. “The Eye of Montage: Dziga Vertov and Bergsonian 
Materialism.” Translated by Melissa McMahon. In The Brain is the Screen: 
Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema, edited by Gregory Flaxman, 141-9. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
277 
 
 
 
 
 
Filmography 
 
 
 
 
All the President’s Men. Directed by Alan J. Pakula. 1976. Los Angeles: Warner 
Home Video, 2010. DVD. 
Arbeiter verlassen die Fabrik. Directed by Harun Farocki. 1995. Chicago: Video Data 
Bank, 2004. DVD. 
The Complete Metropolis. Restoration by Friedrich-Wilhelm-Murnau-Stiftung. 2001. 
Directed by Fritz Lang. 1927. New York: Kino International, 2010. DVD. 
Decasia. Directed by Bill Morrison, Brooklyn: Icarus Films, 2002. DVD. 
Dog Day Afternoon. Directed by Sidney Lumet. 1975. Los Angeles: Warner Home 
Video, 1997. DVD. 
The Film of Her. Directed by Bill Morrison. Brooklyn: Icarus Films, 1996. VHS. 
Film in which there appear sprocket holes, edge lettering, dirt particles, etc. Directed 
by Owen Land. Chicago: George Landow, 1966. Film.  
Film ist. (1-12). Directed by Gustav Deutsch. 1998-2002. Wien: Index, 2004. DVD. 
Histoire(s) du cinéma. Directed by Jean-Luc Godard. 1988-98. Chicago: Olive Films, 
2011. DVD. 
Man With The Movie Camera. Directed by Dziga Vertov. 1929. Los Angeles: Image 
Entertainment, 2002. DVD. 
Obsessed with “Vertigo:” New Life For Hitchcock’s Masterpiece. Directed by 
Harrison Engle. 1997. Vertigo. Directed by Alfred Hitchcock. Los Angeles: 
Universal, 2001. DVD. 
Toute la mémoire du monde. Directed by Alain Resnais. 1956. Disc 2. Last Year at 
Marienbad. Directed by Alain Resnais. New York: Criterion, 2009. DVD. 
Vertigo. Restored by Robert Harris and James C. Katz. 1996. Directed by Alfred 
Hitchcock. 1958. Los Angeles: Universal, 2001. DVD. 
 
